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ABSTRACT
I discuss what I take to be the strongest recent
arguments for and against mind/body identity. On the pro
side I discuss Lewis' views, and on the con Kripkels. The
discuss10n of Kr1pke takes the form of an examination of the
major objections which have been made against his ·views.
~ne conclusion of my discussion of Lewis 1s that he
has not adequately defended his claims of type/type identity.
The, more tentative, conclusion of my discussion of K~ipke
is that his arguments by and large escape unscathed from the
challenges offered. Since Krlpke's arguments are directed
at token/token views also, the~ will apply to Lewis' even
if it 1s construed as such.
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Mind, n. A mysterious form of matter secreted by the
brain. Its chief activity consists in the endeavor to
ascertain its own nature, the futility of the attempt
being due to the fact that it has nothing but itself to
know itself with.
Pain, n. An uncomfortable 'frame of mind that may have a
physical. basis in something that 1s being done to the body,
or may be pure~y mental., caused by the good fortune of
another.
Ambrose Bierce, The Devil'~ Dictionary.
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Il~TR0DUC TI0 N
The mind/body problem, one of philosophy's most
ancient and venerable, continues to be--w1thin the Anglo-
American tradition--a stubborn source of philosophical
controversy and perplexity. It is by and large t~ue that
most contemporary philosophers are materialists of one
sort or another. There remains, nevertheless, a vociferous
minority which, though it shares the same intellectusl roots,
does not hew the materialist party line.
Actually, when one examines the views of contemporary
philosophers strictly on the basis of their content, those
views are so varied, and the questions which they are
responses to so diverse, that it often seems that there
exists a continuous spectrum of views. In addition, some
views, e.g., run~t1onallsm on many of its construals, are
arguably "orthogonal" to the traditional disputes. Muddying
the waters yet further is the unfortunate fact that
prcpounders of many of these positions are often themselves
unclear about which questions they wish to answer.
The present thesis is concerned with the mind/body
question viewed trom a metaphysical perspective. I am
primarily concerned with such questions as, "Are persons
identical to bodies?", and, "Are all mental states (events),
particulars and universals, identical to phys1cal states
7
(events)?". My main- goal is to evaluate what I take to
be the most forceful current arguments for and against
mind/body identity: Lewis on the pro side, and Kripke
on the con.
I choose Lewis on the pro side because I consider
his position, as do many others, the most defensible and
clearly stated one. It is a position which seems to
easily handle n1sny of the more recalci trant problems beset-
ting Inost othfJr cont;ezr.porary fo:r:-mulat1ons of type/type
materialism.
The fir'st he].!- (Jf this thesis presents Lewis I views and
considers "'arious objections. Most of these objections
are seen to have possible responses; but I show that making
those responses forces Lewis into a position which diverges
from the views and motivations of the standard type/type
materialist. My;attack on Lew!!' position does not, of
course, show that every variant of type/type physicalism
(in this thesis I shall use the terms 'physicalism' and
'materialism' interchangeably) is vulnerable to similar
cr1t1queso To the extent, however, that we view his formu-
lst'ion as the most 1nclteful attempt to date to deal wi th
the problems associated with (type/type) physicalism, Ol~
negative conclusion 1mpllcates, albeit indirectly, (type/
type) physicalism generally. However, nothing I say in
this section would affect Lewis' views if construed as a
8
token/token doctrine.
The second half of this thesis discusses the recent
antimaterialist arguments of Kripke--who has resurrected
and put into modern garb Descartes' arguments. Krlpke l s
arguments are by now so well known 3nd have generated so
much discussion that there would be no point in recapitulating
them here in detail. Inste·ad, I shall assume that the reader
is familiar with the details; and start right in, in the
second half of the thesis, by considering, in individual
sections, three of the strongest objections to his
views. I show that none of them are compelling (though some
are more persuasive than others). Though such a sampling
can hardly claIm to be eXhaustive, these views were chosen
for their comparative strength. Therefore, my tentative
conclusion must be that Kripkels arguments presently stand.
The overall .result of my discussion is that there
presently exists a cogent unanswered objection to materialism.
And since this objection is directed to both token/token
and type/type physicalism, it will apply to Lewis, even if
he is construed as only a token/token physicalist. Thus,
I conclude that given the present state of philosophical
discussion, as exemplified by the views I consider, the anti-
materialist has the stronger'position, especially with
reference to type/type claims. It may not be checkmate,
but it is check.
9
LEWIS
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The first part of this thesis will discuss David Lewis'
views on the nature of psychological (mental) and physical
states and properties. Lewis is a physicalist in the
tradition of those--most notably, and ambitiously, David
Armstrongl_-whO argu~ that physicalism follows from the func-
tional def1nabillty of mental terms and some true empirical
assumptions. The interest in Lewis' views lies in their
constituting the most precise formulation to date of this
sort of argument for physicalism, indeed of any sort to my
2knowledge.
Lewis 1s not concerned, as Armstrong for the most part
1s, with specific analyses of particular mental terms; he is
concerned to state precisely and consistently what that view
1s which Armstrong's analyses purport to be particular
instances of.
My discussion will be divided into four sections.
The first presents what I take to be the most prominent
problem with Lewis' views; and Lewis' response--whlch 1s
lArmstrong's views are most fully expounded in A
Materialist Theory of Mind. Both Lewis and Armstrong
suggest that their translational programs are the same.
Rosenthal ("Menta11t,: and Neutrality," JP Vol. LXXII,
No. 13, July 13, 1976) suggests that ArMStrong's and Lewis'
views are not quite 8S similar 8S they make out. He also
points out that to the extent that they are not, Lewis'
views are aearly preferable.
2Thus , Smart calls Lewis' views "by far the best, most
sophisticated and convincing" ("Further Thoughts on Identity
Theory," Monist LVI, No.2, April 1972, Pg. 162).
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seen to be inadequate. The second section offers two more
objections to Lewis, one of them Kripke's. Lewis' replies
are given, and his views are presented in more detail.
Section three examines some or the ramifications of
the views presented in two. Section four is more general,
concerning itself with an analysis of Lewis' construal
of theoretical definition and reduction. What should be
a paradigm tor a term defined according to Lewis:
'Gene', 1s considered; oth6r facets of Lewis' more
general views are also discussed.
The conclusion we shall draw 1s that while it 1s true
that Lewis' views constitute a precise formulation, formally
elegant and internally coherent, the virtues are bought
by having those views, when fully elucidated, actually
be quite different from standard type/type physica11sm,
both in detail and motivation.
12
SECTION I
13
IThe thesis Lewis defends is "the hypothesis that---not
necessarily but as 8 matter of fact--every experience 1s
3
identical with some physical state." One should keep 1n
mind that Lewis' thesis purports to identify the relevant
4
un1versals r not (only) particulars. His argument
lnforDUilly put is:
3David K. Lewis, "An Argument tor the Identity Theory,"
1n Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem, David M.
Rosenthal, ed.
The above quote is somewhat misleading; as it stands,
it seems susceptible to attack by well-known arguments of
Krlpke's. When we come to a more precise formulation of
Lewis' views, we shall see that it does not, in fact,
succumb to these arguments. Indeed, it is one of the vir-
tues or Lewis' vlews--especlally when compared with other
"contingent identity theorlsts"--that one can see
immediately how he would meet Krlpke's challenge.
4About the nature of those things Lewis means to
identity, he has the following to say:
Experiences here are to be taken in general 8S univer-
sals, not as abstract part1culars. I am concerned,
for instances, with pain, an experience that befalls
many people at many times; or with pain of some
deflnite sort, and experience which at least might
be comman to different people at different times.
Both are univ.ersals, capable of repeated instantiation.
The latter 1s a narrower universal than the former, 8S
crimson of some definite shade 1s narrower than red,
but still a universal. I am not concerned with the
particular pain of a given person at a time • • • •
(Lewis, Ope Cit., Pg. 162, Fn. 1)
This 1s not to say much about the nature of universals,
but tor the purposes or this section, it is enough. It 1s
Lewis' contention that these unlver~als (1.e., mental ones
like pain) are physical, which gets hLm into trouble. If he
would have restricted himself to what 1s called 'token!
token ldentity '--the claim that each particular mental event
is identical with soma particular physical event--the problems
I suggest tor Lewis' view would not have arisen.
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( 1) Mental state M = the occupant of causal role R
(by the definition of M)
( 2) Neural state N = the occupant of causal role R
( 3)
(by the physiological theory)
N (b'yMental state M =sneuraI state the
translvity of =)
Premise (1) 1s supposedly definitional; it follows
6from the definition of mental terms--1n this case, M.
Psychological terms referring to mental state (events,
properties, etc.) are, as are theoretical terms, definable
in te~s or their most typical causes and effects.
(Fn. 4 continued)
Lewis also writes, "States also are to be taken in
general as universals. I shall not distinguish between
processes, events, phenomena, and states, in a strict sense n
(Ibid.). These are all on Lewis' view (I belle~e)J a
species of property. I shall go into Lewis' views on the
nature of universals in more detail in section two. For now,
and unless otherwise specified, I shall follow Lewis and
not distinguish among any of these when I speak of univer-
sals, comments about which should be taken to apply equally
well to properties. states, experiences, etc. (that is,
pain as well as the property of being in pain as well as
the experience of pain). I shall be using the relevant
terms ('property', 'state', 'experience') interchangeably
(where I wish to ~lstingu1sh them, I shall do so explicitly).
We should also note that by 'physical', Lewis seems to
mean something like, 'referred to by some term of physics',
or perhaps, 'referred to by some term which is reducible
to 8 physical term'.
SThls 1s Lt:'w1s' own swmrlary from "Psychological and
Theoretical Identification," 1n Australian Journal of
Philosophy, Vol. 50, No.3, Dec. 1972.
6Lewis often construes letters--e.g., 'M', in 'by the
definition of M'--as referring to themselves. When
discussing Lewis, or where 1t is olear from context, I sh,all
do so alsoj otherwise, I will follow standard conventions,
using corner quotes, single quotes to mention letters
and words, and double quotes for longer quotes and scare
quotes. Green letters should be construed as metallngu1stic
variables.
15
One forms such a definition by first collecting all
the plat1tude~J generalizations, and causal statements
of common sense psychology. One then conjoins all these
to form a 'theoretical postulate' which we write: T(t).?
'T' here represents the causal role which the psychological
states, events, etc., must satisfYi and 't I j.s shorthand for
Itl ••• t I which are construed as names of psychologicaln
states and events. From this postulate, one forms a
modified Ramsey sentence, b, first replacing all the
psychological terms (1.e., 't') with variables and
placing corresponding existential quantif1ers cue front,
getting: 3xTz, and then forming: ~'xTx, the modified Ramsey
sentence (wh1ch is 10g1cal1y equivalent to 3YVx( Tx .. x) ) • One
then forms the desired identity (which 1s taken to be defini-
tional: )xTx=t.8 (which is equivalent to (31TLil..,TCtJ)1lo ,3!1CiC7J~1=--J
7 I shall henceforward take it that there is only one
psychological term 't' to be defined; and that there 1s
only one variable 'x' which replaces it. This simplification
will not affect the main issues. It should be pointed out
that one of the virtues of Lewis' analys1s(,s opposed to
say Armstrong's) 1s that it allows for mental terms to be
defined in a way that mentions other mental entities, as
Rosenthal points out (Op. Cit.).
8Lewis gives two everyday examples of such definlt1ons.
The .first ( .. An Argwnent for the Identl ty Theory I If Pg. 109)
1s that the definitive character of a (cylindrical) lock's
being unlocked 1s the "syndrome ot its most typical causes
and effects, namely that setting the combination typically
causes the lock to be unlocked and that being unlocked
typically causes the lock to unlock when gently pulled • • •
alignment or the bolts occupies precisely the causal role
that we ascribed to being unlocked by analytic necessity,
8S the definition characteristic ot being unlocked (for
these locks)."
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It is important to realize that the sort of definition
just summarized is intended to apply to two cases. First,
to theoretical terms generally (as adumbrated in nHow to
Define Theoretical Terms"). T(t) in such cases formulates a
bona fide theory in which It' denotes the new theoretical
terms introduced by the theory.
Secondly, it applies to our everyday, common sense
Fn. 8 continued)
The other example 1s that of a detective who introduces
characters called only 'X', 'Y', 'ZI, as the agents in a
complicated tale of intrigue and murder (without further
saying who these characters are). These terms are then ana-
lytically defined as referring to those three people
fulfilling the roles presented in the detective's story.
If there 1s such a unique triple, then X, Y, Z, are those
three.
For an example from folk psychology, I shall simplify
tremendously. Say that the common beliefs about pains are
that they are often caused by the cutting of skin and that
they often cause shouting behavior. (To be really a proper
example, I should mention other psychological states in
my beliefs about pain; 'pain' itself would not be defined
in isolation, but rather as one term among many in an
enormous postulate which constitutes folk psychology. As
long as we ke~p this in mind, things will be clearer if
we simplify.) Our postulate 'T(t)' will now be: 'pain
is often caused by cutting skin & pain often causes shouting
behavior', where 'pain' 1s our 't'. The Ramsey sentence
of this postulate, '3x (x is often caused by cutting skin & x
often causes shouting beh~v1or)', asserts that. something
satisfies the causal role T(), and the modified RaMsey
sentence I~!X (x 1s otten caused by cutting skin &
x orten causes shouting behavior)', asserts that there is
just one thing which does so. Our definition of 'pain',
1s " x( x 1s usually caused by cutting skin&. x .usually causes
shouting behavior)'. Thus, 'pain' refers. by def1nition, to
the unique entity, if there 1s such, which satisfies the
predicate I often caused by cutting skin & causes shout-
ing behav1oFT. --
For a more comprehensive treatment, see, "How to Define
Theoretical Terms," JP Vol. LXVII, No. 13, June 1970. The
technical details or~ewls' treatment are somewhat more
complex, but not crucial here.
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mental terms. 9 Thus, if we think of our everyday psychologic )1
beliefs as a "folk" theory and our psychological terms as
having been introduced as theoretical terms, we shall get
the appropriate definitions. To be sure, psychological
terms were, in fact, never introduced this wayj the
claim that they were is, says Lewis, a myth--but 8 convenient
myth, for 1t entails tha t our everyday psychological te"rms
have the meanings they in fact do.
Taken by itself, Lewis' analysis of the meaning of our
everyday mental terms is on shsky groundsj 1nde~d it is, I
believe, probably incorrect. Nor does Lewis actually, argue
in its defense. What he says 1s that it captures
behaviorism's insights: viz •• that there 1s an analytic
component in the relation between states and typical causes
and effects, without behaviorism's defects. most of which
are circumvented by actually identifying mental states
with physical (nearophysiolog1cal) states. But these
considerations are not intended as a complete reasoned
defense powerful enough to convince the sceptic; they
are meant, rather, to capture the motivation behind Lewis'
definitional program tor those willing to be convinced
(though in fairness to Lewis, we must say it is hard to
think of what else one might adduce in support of one's
g
To allow that some of our everyday beliefs might be
false and mental terms refer. Lewis suggests that W~ take
instead of a simple conjunction of all our beliefs, "a
disjunction of all conjunctions of most of them."
This modification 1s not important here.
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meaning analyses of everyday terms).
Secondly, even if Lewis' meaning analyses are correct,
there is still the objection, made by Nagel against
Armstrong, that, "even if some form of materialism is true,
it will not automatically be expressible in the framework
of common sense psychology • • • • The psychology of
common sense, embodied in the ordinary concepts of behav'ior,
desire, sensation, perception, and emotion, and so forth,
is not a scientific theory. The mental states for which
Armstrong offers causal analyses are picked out by a system
which has evolved naturally, and whose form may depend
10
significantly on its extra-sc1entific functions." Or,
in other words, it 1s possible that pain may go the way of
phlogiston; indeed, it is not only possible, but also
11probable by the lights of recent philosophers.
When, however, we take into account the subsumtion of
everyday psychological definition to theoretical definition
in general, thes~ problems lose their force. Consider first
the second problem. Lewis is certainly willing to grant
that pain may go to the way of phlogiston (an example he
himself uses). In both tolk psychology and bona fide theo-
ries, if the theoretical postulate is not realized or if it
1s multiply realized, then, claims Lewis, the theory 1s false
lOIlArmstrong on the Mind," !!! LXXIX, 1970.
11See "Why Robots Can't Feel Pain," by D. Dennet, in
Brainstorms (U.S.: Bradford Books, 1978), for an argument to
thIs effect in the case of pain.
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and the terms therein (e.g., 'pain') denotatlonless. But the
fact that pain is not identical to any physical state because
it does not exist hardly counts as a threat to Lewis'
physicalism. .If aone other scientific psychological tlleory
evolved out of our folk theory, then its theoretical terms
would get defined as ar'e all theoretical terms, and the
argwnent for physicalism could proceed along normal line·s.
A similar response can be made to the first point.
Evem if Lewis' definitions of everyday psychological terms
are incorrect, he still has his general account of
theoretical definition which he may apply to whatever psy-
chological theory{ies) ultimately develops; and his
physicalism can reduce these to physical terms.
So Lewis' physicalism gains considerable credence by
its subsumt10n of the case of psychological definition under
the more general class of theoretical definitions. And if
one 1s dubious of Lewis' analysis of everyday psychological
terms, he can let, without any real weakening of Lewis'
argument, talk ot, e.g., 'pain', be construed as standing
proxy tor talk of terms of some future psychological theory.
Before continuing, let me turn cursorily to the second
premise of Lewis' argument.
That, claims Lewis, follows from the standard belief
in the dogma that all sciences will, ultimately, be reducIble
to physics (~ la Putnam and Oppenheim); that all phenomena
are ultimately explainable by physics. Thus: "My second
20
premise does not rule out the existence of nonphysical
phenomena • • • • It only denies that we need ever explain
12
physical phenomena by nonphysical ones." We need never
advert to nonphysical entities in our explanations of the
nature of the world.
! do not wish to entangle myself here in the intricate
problems surrounding the notion of' explanation. We mlgh"t
point out, however, that we could grant that if physics
could explain all the phenomena there is to explain, then
there might be good reason for 1dentifying the objects,
states, etc., of psychology (and other special sciences)
with phys1cal objects, states, etc. But there do seem to
be good reasons, made most forcefully in a series of recent
articles by Putnam, for thinking that no such comprehensive
explanatory power 1s to be expected of physics. One such
rea~on (in the case" of psychology) 1s that different physical
properties are, it is likely, correlated with any given
13psychological property (or state).
Questions of explanation aside, the fact that most
likely there are many physical states correlated with any
l2"An Argument for the Identity Theory," Pg. 169.
l3In fact, Putnam contends that even 1f 1t turned out
that there was only one physical property corresponding to a
(or every) psychological property, it would still not follow
that an explanation of the relevant phenomena could be
g1ven on the basis of this physical property. For further
expatiation and examples, see, "Reduction and the Nature of
Psychology, I' Cognition 2( 1), pp. 131-146, and "Philosophy and
Our Mental Life, II in Mindi La~uage! and Rea11t~: Ph11osoEh1-cal Papers Vol. 2, pp. 29 -30 j especIally Pg. 93.
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one given psychological state (in different s~ecies or in
different people) poses a serious problem for Lewis; for
it would appear that we are not justified in identifying
psychological states and properties with anyone of their
physical correlates: they would not even be coextensive.
Lewis is very much aware of this objection and is conce~ned
to defend his view against it:
Putnam argues that the brain-state hypothesis (and
with it, the functionally speclf1.ed brain-state
hypothesis) ought to be rejected as scientifically
implausible. He imagines tHe brain-state
theorist to claim that all organisms in pain--be they
men, mollusks, Mart1ans, machines, or what have you-··
are in some single common non-disjunctive physical-
chemical brain-state. Given the diversity of
organisms, that claim is incredible. Put the brain- ~
state theorist who makes it 1s a straw man. A
reasonable brain-state theorist would anticipate
that pain might well be one brain state in the
case of men, and some other brain (or non-brain)
state in the case of mollusks. It might even be
one brain state in the case of Putnam, another in
the case of Lewis. No mystery: that 1s just like say-
ing that the winning number 1s 16 in the case of
this week's lottery, 137 in the case of last week's.
The seeming ,contradiction (one thing identical to
two things) vanishes once we notice the tacit
relativity to context of one term of the identities.
or course, no one says that the concept of pain is
different in the case of different organisms (or
that the concept of winning number 1s different
in the case of different lotteries), it is the
fixed concept expressed by 'pain' that determines
how the denotation varies with the nature of the
organism in question. Moral: the brain-state
theorist cannot afford the old prejudice that the
name ot a necessary being (such as a state) must name
it necessarPJand independently of context. 14
This argument 1s particularly noteworthy in its
departure from the typical central state materialist analysis
14
"Review of Art, Mind, and Religion," The Journal of
Philosophy 66 (October 1969): 22-27.
(ss exemplified by Armstrong and others of the "Australian
School U). They require that 'for every type of psychological
state, there be one type of physical state which, in every
case, 1s identical with the corresponding psychological
state--1.e., "type/type" physical1sm--whlch is typically
contrasted with "token/token" physica11s1n (as espoused by
Fodor and others). For such type/type materialists, an
admission such as the above would be tantamount to
concession.
So we must apparently conclude that there are s1gni-
f1cant differences between Lewis and the standard
"Australian" line. Still, the above quote creates a tension
with Lewis' purported claim that the universal pain 1s to be
identified with 'something that befalls many people at
many times I i and wi th Lewis' categoriza.tion of himself as a
15
type/type Materialist in the Armstrong mold.
Given our above quote, can we attribute a form of
type/type materialism to Lewis (even if it 1s not
precisely the same as the standard vers1on--so long as
it preserves the basic spir1t)? This 1s the question which
the rest of the section 1s concerned with. Notice that I
aM not questioning here Lewis' credentials as a materialist
tout oourtj merely his claim to be a type/type materialist.
15Thus, "D. M. Armstrong and I (independently) proposed
a materialist theory of mind that joins claims of typel
type identity ••• ," in "Mad Pain and Martian Pain"
forthcoming in Philosophy of Psychology. N. Block, ad.
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It 1s, by the way, only construed as such that Lewis would
be the target of the objections of, e.g., Putnam and Fodor.
Have we here been stalking a straw horse? Since
atter all, Lewis takas mental terms to be analytically
equivalent to functional descr1ptions, should we not place
him in the functionalist camp and not the physicalist?
One might even think that this business or reBtlvlty to
context tollows from the functional definab111ty ot mental
te~s 8S understood by Eew1s. For the idea 1s just that
such te~s reter to Whatever happens to fill the functional
role: and just as, 88 we shall see in the next section, such
descriptions can reter to different things 1n different
possible worlds, so, too, in the actual world, can
they pick out different things in different people. I6
The answer to our question 1s: No. We have not been
stalking a" straw horse. It 1s an important component of
Lewis' views that, he 1s a physicalist and not a functionalist,
as is, say, Putnam. For Putn~, pain is (1dentical to) a
functional state and not a physical one; and, ~onsequently,
distinct pains do not necessarily have anything physical 1n
common. For Lewis, on the other hand, mental states are
(honest to goodness) physical states; they just happen to
be funct10nally specified. To say they are so specified is
16Lewis himself, in a forthcoming paper, "Mad Pain and
Martian Pain," draws the analogy_ "If a nonrigid concept
or name applies to different states in different possible
cases, it should be no surprise if it also applies to
different states in different actual cases. Nonrlg1dlty
is to logical space 8S other relativities are to ordinary
space.
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a comment not on themselves but on our method of referring to
them. And this 1s just how Lewis wants it, for he wishes to
show that. 'every experience 1s some physical state'. So
our queries as to the nature of Lewis' physicalism are not
misplaced. Lewis 1s clearly 8 metaphysical physicalist.
There are two ways of reading the relatlvlzatlon to
context quoted just before,whlch Lew1s uses to disarm'
objections. The first reading finds its greatest support
1n Lewis' most recent article, "Mad Pain and Martian Pa1n. 11
On this view, the relatlvlzat10n to context does not
manifest itself with1n the purported definition of 'pain'.
Rather, 'pain' 1s defined s1mply, and independently of
context, as the satisfier of a certa1n causal role. This
definition will, within a given context or "population,"
pick our some state. For humans, it picks out pain for
humans) wh11e tor Martians, it p1cks out pain for Martians,
and so on. The one nonrelatlvlzed concept--'pa1n'--plcks
out different states in different contexts, just as the
concept 'the winn1ng number' picks out different numbers in
17different contexts.
17Actually. the example ot 'the winning number' (or
'this week's winn1ng number') is not a good one. This latter
tarm 1s an lndexlcal--l.e., a term whose reference varies
with the context or utterance: one thing when uttered this
week; another when uttered next week. But 'pain' and
its 11k, as presently analyzed by Lewis, 1s not at all like
a typ1cal indexical: 'Pain' reters to the same th1ng(s)
in every context of utterance--1.e., different speakers,
d1fferent times, different aud1ences, different physical
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Thus Lewis says:
We may say some state occupies a causal role for
8 population • ~ • • Human pain 1s the state that
occupies the role of pain for humans. Martian pain
1s the state that occupies the same role for
Martians.
A state occupies a·causal role for a population, and
the concept of the occupant of that role applies
to it, if and only 1f, with few exceptions, whenever
8 member of that population is 1n that state, his
being in that state has the sort of causes and
effects • • • •
How, on this v1ew, is it assured that there will
be one unique physical state corresponding to each popula-
tion, species say? That, on the present reading, 1s taken
care ot by the second premise. It is, in this case, the
empirical hypothes1s that there will be species specific
physical states corresponding, by and large, to each
psychological state.
(Fn. 17 continued)
locations, different pointing gestures. etc.; and what
1t reters to in any such context is different 1n different
entltles--aga1n unlike typical lndexlcals. Thus, in
Le\11s' writings on semantics, an intension (not precisely
a meaning, but close enough for present purposes) is 8
function not just trom possible worlds to things, but trom
indices. These indices accomodate the contextual elements
necessary to determine the extension of indexlcals ("General
Semantics," in Semantics tor Natural Languages, Davidson
and Harman, eds.'. The contextual elements lIsted would not,
however, help to determine the extension of 'pain'--
for the context 1s irrelevant to its extension.
A better example tor Lewis' purposes would have been
something like 'the largest city 1n the state'; a different
oity tor each state. Though oven here the analogy is
not eX8ct--there 1s an implicit indexical eleme~t missing
trom the case of 'paln'--we assume that the city in the
state in which the utterance occurred, 1s being referred to.
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Given this view, we would have to reformulate the
argument at the beginning of the paper by 8 series of
arguments, 8 schema for which 1s 8S follows:
( 1)
( 2)
of
of
So 'paln' may p1ck out different states 1n different
species; indeed, according to our first quote, it may pick
out different states in different individuals: one state
for Putnam and another for Lewis. What 1s true 1s that the
concept and the name 'pain' apply equally well to both.
After some reflective thought, this view seems
Intuitively unappealing. One would have thought that not
only 1s it true that the same concept, 'pain', applies to
Putnam and Lewis' states (as the concept 'the winning number'
applies to 16 and 137), but that the universal state that
'pain' refers to in both was the same. That both are in
the same psychological state--paln-~notmerely in different
states picked out by the same concept.
Now it is true that according to Lewis, there is a
state which both Lew1s and Putnam are in: the state of
having pain. That state, as we shall see 1n the next sec-
tlon, 1s 8 "functional" state distinct from pain. But
as we shall also see in the next section, this state lSa
properl~ not taken by Lewis to be physical. So the state
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which is had by both Putnam and Lewis is not physical, while
states which are physical are not the same tor both Lewis
and Putnam. Yet, my reflective intuition at least 1~ that
there 1s one relevant psychological state here; and that is
the state which a type/type physicalist must show to be
physical (again. above and beyond just showing that distinct
states are picked out by the same concept). This, Lewis
does not do.
There is a closely related point to the above which,
instead of appealing to intuitions, concerns the motivat1on
behind a type/type view. That motivation, as I understand
it, is to give an answer to the question of what it 1s that
all pains have in common in virtue of which they are all
pains. This 1s the real issue, as I understand it, that
divides the type/type trom the token/token physicalists.
The latter will claim that though every mental state
1s indeed a physical state, what all pains have in common
in virtue or which they are pains, 1s B2! anything physical
(such a physicalist might, e.g., say that it is something
functional). While, tor 8 type/type physicalist, it will
be something physical.
From th1s perspective, it appears that Lewis' present
view 1s closer to the token/token view; for pain in dif-
ferent species or individuals may have nothing (of
relevance) physically in common.
The force ot this point is mitigated somewhat if we
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simply say that it 1s part of Lewis' (empirical) claim
that the Mental states ot all members or a species (or most),
in tact, have the same physical oaa1s; that if this turns
o~t to not be the oase. then his claims for type/type
identity will have been falsified. Lewis could then say
that there exists something physical in virtue of which all
(or most) pains within 8 species are pain. A s1ml18~
response would be much more difficult to accept if Lew1s is
willing to relatlvlze, aa seems to be the case, to individuals.
In any cas~. Lewis' argument, 8S present~y construed,
does depend on the empirical ass~ptlon that there will be
natural kinds, species say, which have spee1tlc physio-
10g1ca1 b.ses tor their mental states. And, ot course, the
obvious problem with this assumption 1s that it may turn out
tc be v~ong; tho~ the present evidence does point in
that direction.
Even lt we grant t~Qt L~wls 1s correct in this
assumption, there remaIn two further points. First, we may
construe Lewis' arguments to be concerned str1ctly with
type/type Identitl theory: the claIm that each mental
universal is identical to some physical universal. But
even it his argument suffices tor this claim, it will not
do if we take into account the ~nlvers81s ot all the other
(than everyday psychology) special sciences. For to these.
there would seem to be no correspond1ng physical natural
klnds--e.g., money 1n economics.
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Of course, if we restrict our attention to the identity
theory, narrowly construed, other special sciences are not
relevant. But in point of fact, Lewis' claims for the
identity theory are just a part or his larger c18~s regard-
ing all the sciences. Thu~ Lewis' defense of h1s second
premise In, "An Argument for the Identity Theory," reads:
My second premise 1s the plaus1ble hypothesls that
there 1s some universal body ot scientific theories,
ot the sort we now accept, whIch together provide
8 true and exhaustive account of all physical
phenomena (l.e., all phenomena describable in
physical terms). They are unified in that they are
cumulative: the theory governing any phys1cal
phenomenon 1s explained· by theories govern1ng
phenomena out or which that phenomenon is composed
and by the way it 1s composed out of them.
It should be clear that Lewis' claims for the identity
theory are part ot his larger physicalist doctrines. And
this 1s 8S it should be. One ot the reasons that there
has traditionally been so much discussion ot the identity
theory taken as a thesis about mental entities 1s that it
has constituted the greatest challenge to the materialist.
Consequently, 8 view which adequately defended its
materlallst clatms with respect to mental entities, but
left itself open to objet1ons with respect to other
sclences, could hardly constitute an adequate defense of
Materialism tout court. And this, I claim, appears to be
the present status of Lewis' type/type mater1a11at claims.
For there does not seem to be any reason to believe that
there w111 be natural kinds corresponding to the universal
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terms of all the special sciences.
It, on the other hand, I ~ wrong and Lewis does intend
his type/type claims to apply to psychology only (by the
way, I do not think this is his view), then.the claim
reduces to no more than. an interesting, and probably
true, emplr1cal conjecture. But, it can not be. said to even
purport to be a defense or type/type Materialism as a
general metaphysioal doctrine. Let me po1nt out yet
one more time that nothing I say here 1s meant to impugn
any claims about token/token physicalism.
F1nally. whether we construe Lew1s' thesis as applying
to psychology only, or to all sciences, it does seem strange
that his c18~ tor (type/type) materialism hinges on a
falsifiable empirical claim. For the doctrine is a meta-
physical one and not the sort one expeots to be open to
such invalidation. One would have thought that Lewis would
wish to secure his views against such empirlcal invalidation.
Thus, imagine a possible world in which, for ~olutlon8ry
reasons, the brains ot sentient beings are adaptable
to the extent or having their physical oomposition change
over time (perhaps with changes 1n the environment). Such a
world would not be, merely because ot the above-mentioned
condition, any less 8 mater1a11st world than our own. But
on our present reading of Lewis, he would have to say
that such a world 1s one 1n which the claims of type/type
materialism we~e not true. This example highlights the
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empirical character of Lewis' views aa we are presently
construing them. The thesis of materialism (type/type or
otherwise) 1s a doctrine about one of the fundamental aspects
of the universe; it should not be affected by the vagarIes
of, say, evolutionary development. '
The second reading ot Lew1s reflects a concern for
this last problem and tries to disarm it. On 1t, Lewis
1s concerned to defend his cla1m against the possibility of
unfavorable empirical d1scoverles. This 1s done by
having the concept of 'pain' itself (and ot cou~se, other
mental terms) be a relat1vlzed concept; most perspicuously
gl~en as 'paln tor Y', the tree varlable being implIcit
in our everyday usage or the te~ 'pain'; and having a
value which varies over species, races, 1ndlvlduals, or
whatevet'.
There are several reasons for thinking that something
like this 1s what Lewis has in mind. First, he seems to
genuinely desire to protect his view trom the vagar1es,
ot empirical findings. Thus, consider the following quotes:
n • • • pain might well be one brain state in the case of
men. and some other brain (or non-brain) state 1n the csse
or mollusks. It might even be one brain state in the case
or Putnam, another in the case of Lewis." Or: "In general,
or in the case of 8 given species, or in the case of 8 given
person. It might turn out that the causal rules definitive
of mental states are occup1ed by different neuI'sl (or
other) states in different organisms." Finally, consider thIs
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(from an unpublished thesis):
John Perry has made an objection to Lewis that is
s1milar to the Putnam objection discussed above.
Imagine that there 1s a radical change 1n the world
at time~. Before t S ' the state occupying Rin Jones 1s B (where-A~B). According to the-
revised definition (2T,-paln tor Jones =A, and
pain tor Jones =!. which again leads to i
contradiction.
Lewis replies to Perry by stating that pain is
relative not only to individuals, but also to
times. That ls, the context dependence or Ipain t
extends to times in addition to individuals. If
we agaIn revise the definition or 'pa1n' to account
for time. we should detine' 'pain for (or in) 1. at
!' where 'z' ranges over individuals and I!'
ranges over times. Thus, the new definition 1s:
(3) Det: pain tor Z at ~ =the state occupying
causal R in Z at t.
Definit10n (3) enables Lewis to avoid the contra-
diction we got using definition (2). For now we
get: 'pain for Jones at !1 = ! and pa1n for Jones
at!S = ~I, which involves no contradiction. IS
The above quote 1s admittedly third-hand and can not
be relied on as to deta1ls. But unless the story 1s
completely apocryphal, it does buttress this second
interpretation. For apparently Lewis 1! concerned ta
protect his view against the possibility of empirical
dlscont1rmatlon; even where that possibility 1s in all
likelihood not actual. He teels the possibility needs to be
accomodated ~y his position.
As a further point, notice that, as we quoted before,
Lewis says that, "It 1s the fixed concept expressed by
18Th1s 1s from an unpublished thes1s by N. Lubow, "The
Mind-Body Identity Theory."
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'pain' that determines how the denotation varies . . . .fI
Now for Lewis, a concept (as we shall discuss in detail
later) 1s a function from possible worlds to particular
entities in those worlds; in the case of the concept 'paln 1 ,
those entities would be states. But actually the s1tuation
1s somewhat more complex: the functions are not from
possIble worlds merely, but from n-tuples, ot which
19possible worlds are just one coordinate. The other ele-
ments are contextual elements: time, place, speaker, etc.
In the case of mental terms, it appears that there will have
to be one further coordlnate--Y let us call 1t--plck1ng out
a particular state based on a given population, however we
construe populat1ons.
So that once we have in fact fixed the interpretation
ot all the other coordinates ot the funct10n for 8 given
argument (including possible world, let us say)
1n the case of the concept 'paln'. what we will have w1ll
be a function which picks' out for each population Y, the
satisfier ot the causal role for that population; or to
formalize, 8 function which for each val~ ot y satlsr1es~
jg«x)(x~Y~Q(9») where Q represents our postulate (1.e.,
the conjunction or all our platltudenous mental bellefs).
But this concept 1s just what 1 have suggested for Lew1s
on our second reading.
19See , "General Semantics," in Semantics for Natural
Language, Davidson and Harman, ads.
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Thus, it ls· that the relat1vizatlon to context, on
this view, is secured by the very m.eanlng of the terms 1n
question, and is not a question ot matter of fact. This
interpretat10n of Lewis, it must bo admitted, 1s not forced
on us; but it does appear, the above considerations adequat~-
1y sho·: I believe, to be a plausible reading of Lewis.
And even 1f it 1s not Lewis' intention, it 1s certainly a line,
the feasib1lity of which 1s worth examining. We shall
see.later that H. Field's reading of Lewis, in a highly
praised article, is very slml1a~ .
What sorts of things are we to take Y as ranging over?
On this second 1nterpretatlon, it would not
do to say species, or even lnd1v1duals (as 1s apparently
.
suggested in the "Mad Pain and Martian Pain" article).
IFor Lewis, analysis is supposed to capture the
meanings or our everyday psychological te~si but why
should people happen to mean in their use of everyday mental
terms such as 'pa1n', 'pain tor a species'? And further,
even if they did, we are granting that 1t is possible that
different individuals within 8 species may have different
psycholog1cal states corresponding to 'pain'. Our everyday
concept would now have to be narrowed to 'pain for 8 person~
But once again, why, atter all, should, in such an
eventuality, people happen to mean in their use of the
everyday mental term 'pain', 'pain for a person' (what a
happy coincidence)? In short, what reason do we have for
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believing that our everyday mental terms are going to have
just that restriction of doma1n which empirically turns out
to be that tor which there 18 only one corresponding
physiological state. Further, If we grant that, e.g., 'pain'
is a relative concept, as Lewis suggests, then ft seems
intu1tive that the relevant populations should be 8
natural kind and probably at least a species, as he
himself says.
Thus, on this second reading of Lewis, where the
contextual relativ1ty 1s construed as an implicit part of
the term's meaning, Lewis 1s driven, if he 1s going ~o
protect against the posslb111ty or empirical falsification,
to something very much similar to what was quoted above: we
need to define pain tor an individual at a time, or pain for
o at t.
But now his cla~ will be that tor any given person at
a part1cular time, at a particular place, an occurrence of pain
w111 be some one physiological state or other; a thesis
hardly to be distinguished from token/token identity (though
we know that Lewis 1s out to cla1m more tor his view).
There are, to be sure, ways of circumventing this
conclusion. 20 Thus, one might say that the view is that in
20 0ne possibility would be to say that what 1s identified
is a universal with only one instance. Besides being an ad
hoc and uninteresting way of saving type/type physicalism,
it 1s certainly something Lewis would not hold. He is
concerned with something that occurs to "many people at
many times."
36
any given context (l.e •• a person at a place at a time),
pain 1s ldent1tled with some one universal physical state.
Though trom some perspectives. one mlg~t discern a metaphy-
sical distinction between such's view and token/token
identity. it does not generate an interesting dlstlnctlon !!
tar as phlslcallsm goes: it does not capture what the
type/type theorists were atter, snd 1s something that a
toke~token theorist would find extremely comfortable;
tor 8S mentioned previously, the motivation behind the
type/type views 1s to elucidate what all pa1ns (or a certain
sort) have 1n common in virtue of which they are pains (ot
that sort). And the view we are dlsoussing here 1s certain-
ly not one which can respond, "something physical"; tor each
occasion ot pain. though it may be something physical, may
also be distinct trom all others.
To be sure, even on the present view, it 1s still possible
that pain in 01 at tl will be identical with pain in 02 at
T2 given the appropriate physical circumstances. This does
not make the present view any less 8 toke~token view: tor
similar comments can be Made ot any token v1ew.
Let me conclude my dlscuss10n ot this second read1ng
by glv1ng Field's interpretation of Lewis, which is, in many
respects, similar to that just g1ven. The relevant
passage 1s the following:
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Suppose that ~ is a psychological theory that is
intended to apply any time t to all organisms which
are of type ~ at t. (p might, for instance, be
a theory intended to apply to all adult humans, or
to all organisms capable of feeling pain, or to all
rational beings.) For simplicity, let us suppose
that ~ 1s f1nitely 8x1omat1zedj then we can repre-
sent it 8S a single formula which I abbreviate as
A(XJ t), where X 1s a variable ranging over ..
organisms and t a variable ranging over times. lThen
the theory 1s true of all the organisms in its
intended range if and only 1t the following claim holds:
For any t and any~ I 1f:l.. 1s of type Z at t then
A(~, t) •
It is th1s last cla1m, rather than P, that 1s properly
speaking true 01" false, so you might prefer to use .the
term 'theory' for the last claim rather than for ~.1
In giving crude formulations of psychological theories
we otten om1t the variables (and initial qual1f1ers),
but they must be understood as implicit: we say
'pa1n has such and such a causal role' when what we
really mean 19 I For any t end any ~ of type i at t,
pain has such and such a causal rola in X at t'. If
we do not write the theory in this way, we cannot
properly define the notion of a realization.
- -_..• -- - ---,-
Suppose that the specifically psychological primitives in
pare Tl , ••• ,T ; then we can write p as A(Tl , ••• ,Tn;~t). For sim9lic1ty, I will assume that Tl, ••• ,Tn
are all predicates. Let us say that an n-tuple (PI' ••• ,
Pn ) of properties realizes ~ in organism.X at time t ifand only if the tqrmula A(Yl' ••• ,Y ;)C,t) is true of
<P, •• ~,P ,X,t)· and that such annn-tuple uniquely~e8iizes p i8 X at t if it and no other n-tuple realizes
p in X at t.
Now if P1s a psychological theory with n primitive
psychological predicates we can use it to define n
functional properties. Suppose tor instance that T1
1s a predicate that stands for a I-place property or
organisms, the kind of property (like pain) of which it
Makes sense to say that the organism has it at one time
but not at another. (Lewis calls properties of this
sort 'states', but I preter to reserve this term for a
different use.) If T i is a predicate of this sort, thenthe jth functional pr~perty associated with p is the
property ~ defined as tollows:
(2) X has ~ at t 5 df there is some I-place
physical property P such that
(1) P 1s the jth component of a unique
realization of ~ in X at t
(11) X has P at t
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It Y 1s the jth functional property associated with P,
we can then say that a realization ofYln X at t
is sLmply the jth component or a unique realization
of p in X at. t. From this and (2) we derive
(2') X has ~ at t 1t and only if there 1s some
l-place physical property P such that
(1) P real12es y in X at t, and
(11) X has P at t.
This Machinery enables us to give a precise sense to
the general remarks ot five paragraphs back. What
functionalism about pain claims 1s that the property
ot pain 1s a functional property associated with some
theory p, by (2)(or by the analog ot (2) with the word
'physical' replaced by 'non-tunctlonal'--see note 26).
By taking functionalism 1n this way, we can make
precise sense ot various vague notions appealed to in
the general remarks (e.g., the notion or psychological
isomorphism), and we can also verify the really
Lmportant claLm that if materialism 1s true, then for
an organism to have the pSyChological property of pain
it must have some physical property that rea2izes
that psychological property in the organism.
As to the correctness of this interpretation, Field
says:
Lewis'own account ot what realIzations are is
strictly speaking inaccurate because he does not take
the precaution I've recommended: as his account
st~nds, something can serve as 8 realization of pain
only it it realizes pain in all organism at all times,
thus dearlv1ng functionalIsm of its point. (cr.
Harman ll~, Ch. 3, Section 4). But it Is clear
that what I have suggested (which is equivalent to what
Ha~an suggests) 1s what Lewis really had 1n mind.
Let us note a few th1ngs. 'Pain' as defined here, 1s
a functional propertyj what he has defined is lX'S having
~8t t.' What this deflnlt10n entails for materialism
21This and all the following quotes ere from H. Field,
"Mental Representation," Erkentnlss 13 (1978): 9-61.
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1s that, "for an organism to have the psychological
property or pain, it must have~ physical property that
realizes the psychological property in the organism"
(emphasis mine); 1.e., that there 1s some property in each
case, but perhaps different 1n different cases, which
realizes (not, 1s identical to) the psycholog1cal property.
But this 1s precisely token/token materla11smo And this 1s
all that Lewis' definitions, as Field and I have construed
them, will yield.
It is true that what Field defines as pain 1s the
functlonal property which Lew1s takes to be the property or
having pain. Thus:
According to Lewis, 'the property of pain' and 'pain'
refer to different propertles: 'the property of pain'
refers to 8 functional property, and 'pain' refers (in
the context ot discussing a specific organism X aD
a specific time t) to the non-functional property
which realizes the functional property in X at t. I
have tried to remain neutral on the question of whether
'pain' reters to the functional property or refers(1n 8
context-dependent way) to a realization if it.
If we do take it 1n the latter way--that Is, 1f we do
construe 'pain' as the non-functiQnal property--then x and
t are most appropriately taken to be open variables, or
schematic letters. This would essentially yield the prior
formulation. In any case, the 1mportant point is that we
are relativ1z1ng to 8 person at a time. And that is, in
spir1t at least, a token/token view. Thus, our overall
conclusion for this second reading of Lewis; ·-its spirit and
possibly even its lette~ ·1s that of a token/token view.
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As my last major point, I turn to the question of how
Lewis' relat1v1zat1on to context affects the subsumtlon
ot everydaJ mental definition to the more general case of
theoretical definition. This is of cons1derable concern,
for, as indicated at the beginning of this section, much of
the persuasiveness or Lew1s' definitions of mental terms
comes from th1s subsumtlon. 22
This point is applicable mainly to the second reading
ot Lewis, but also to B certain extent, the first. On
the second interpretation, Lewis relativ1zes to a person at
8 time. And even on the first reading, it still seems to
be true that Lewis is willing to restrict his empirical
cla~ 8S far. as he needs; 1.e., he 1s willing to go with the
claim that pain picks out 8 different universal state 1n
different individuals, 1f need be.
Now this in a sense tr1v1al1zes Lewis' claim to have
defended a type/type view. Thus, cons1der the consequences
of applying this relat1v1zat1on context to all theoretical
terms. 23 This would essenti&lly make eny theory immune
22Let me remind the reader that without it, we must
worry about the plausibility ot Lewis' definitions (independent-
ly of the issue of relativity to context). We then would have
to take into account such worries 8S phenomenological
qualities (see, e.g., Block, "Are Absent Qualls Impossible,"
PR, April 1980). We would also have to worry about "Nagel's
-problem," as mentioned in the text.
23or course, in a sense, scientific theories do typically
relat1v1z8; their laws are meant to apply to 8 specific domain
only. But in such cases, there are independent theoretical
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from falsification. Thus, consider if there were some
theory positing some specific causal agent--Tox--as the muse
of toxemia (a disease of pregnancy) •. In point of fact
thoug~ it turns out that there is nospec1f1c cause of the
disease. there 1s only a set of symptoms (or perhaps
there are two factors, each of which 1s sufficient to cause
the disease). We could still preserve the truth of our
theory, and our purported reduction of the universal, Tex,
to a physical entitYI by relativ1z1ng as appropr1ate: to
individual pregnant women) perhaps. But to be able to do
this would tr1v1allze both any purported claims of reduction
ot, Tax, the relevant universal, and the claim of
falsifiability for our theory ot toxemia.
Thus, either (1) the relatlv1zatlon move 1s not
extendable to scientific theories generally, including a
future scientific psychology, 1n which case Lewis' everyday
defin1tions lose the virtues of being subsumed under the
more general case; or (2) the move is extendable, in which
case Lewis I· construal of theoretical dar in1 t10n and
reduction 1s v1t1ated.
-Let me here summarize the major points made so far.
Two interpretations were given of Lew1s' attempt to preserve
a form of type/type physicalism. They were seen to have
complementary faults. On the first interpretation, Lewis'
(Fn. 23 cont 1nued)
reasons for the domain restrictions. In the present case,
it 1s the ability to relatlvlze as one sees fit (i.e., to
save one's theory or reduction) that is at issue.
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view can legitimately be claimed to be a tipe/type one, but
ita domain is restricted, and its truth is contingent on the
existence of certain empirical facts, facts which it 1s
physically possible do not obtain. While the second
interpretation does have unrestricted domain, and does
attempt to insure 1ts~lr against empirical fans1f1ab111ty,
it can not, however, be said to properly be 8 type/type
view. And both views seem to ~un into trouble when ~e
co~slder extending relativlzat10n to the special sciences.
Lewis' problems, it seems to me, arise trom a set of
desiderata which together entail the denial of a truth. He
wishes to contend t~Bt there are true special sc1ences
(among which we May include folk psychology), that
the theoretical terms therein uniquely refer, and that--ln
line with his reductlon{st be11efs--all such terms, in-
cluding those for universals, will ultimately be seen to
refer to physical entities. These are, however, jointly
inconsistent with the claim, which appears true, that there
are true special sciences with more than one physical
reallzat1on. 24
24Putnam has made this point in various contexts. and with
a considerable amount or force. For a concise statement. see
J. A. Fodor: "Special Sciences (Or: The Disunity of Science
as a Working Hypothesis)," Synthese 28, 1974.
or course, Lewis claims that It is reasonable to expect
that theor1es will have only one realization. Indeed, his
definition of theoretical. terms embodies that expectation--
given his meanings of theoretical terms the theories which
contain them l~glcally imply that the th~ory is true only
It 1t has 8 unique realization.
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. Before proceeding to the next section, we must con-
sider one other possible response which, though he does not
Make it,24 1s open to Lewis; that of d.1sjunctive propert1es.
'Pain' and other psychological terms, it might be claimed,
refer to certain disjunctive physlcal stat~s: e.g., pain
in mollusks v pain, in hwnana v..... ; that is the state
one 1s in when one 1s in either pain 1n mollusks or pain
in humans or in •••• etc.
The problems with such a view have been discussed in
various places (e .g., by Block and Fodor in, n'Nhat
Psychological States are Not,lI and in Davidson: "Mental
Events"). Many of ,these objections have had, as their
crucial premise, that even if a psychological predicate 1s
coextensive with a certain (disjunctive) physical predicate,
it still remains to be shown that the coextens1v1ty is
lawlike. I am not convinced of the strength of this objec-
tion (it strikes me as question begging), but in any case,
it is not clear how it 1s directly applicable to Lewis'
(Fn. 24 continued)
. It we grant the reasonableness of this last ex-
pectation, then. it seems to me, we can not grant that there
is 8 unique ~sic81 realization of such theories. For
surely. economIcs, linguistics, psychology, and even
blology, can be satisfied by various physical systems. If
we wish then to preserve uniqueness, we will have to allow
unique nonphysical universals having various physical
1nstant1at1ons.
25Lewls eschews such a move 1n, "f.1Iad Pain and Martian
Paln,fI Ope Cit.
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views.
I can think of three problems for Lewis besides its
ad hoc nature, with such a view. First, it 1s not
compatible with what he says--1.e., with construing 'pain'
as analogous with 'the winning number'. We could not
say that 'the winning number' refers to some one disjunctive
number: 16 v 137 v ••••••
Secondly, imagine that in the actual world, PI' P2' P3
are the physical correlates of pain. On the pres~nt view.
pain would be identified·with the disjunctive statD PlvP2vP3J
as the unique satisfier of the appropriate causal role.
However, imagine that on some other world, there is an
additional correlate to pain--P4--which is not correlated
with pain in this world; on that world, pain is to be
identified with PlvP2vP3vP4. Clearly, this latter disjunctive
state would also satisfy the appropriate cQt\sal role in the
26 IThis objection usually comes down to the claIm that the
two predicates are not neoessar11y coextensive. While Lewis
might grant this, he would claim that he has an argument to
show that the referent of 'P-ness'--the Dame of 8 psycho-
logical state--1s ldentical with the referent of 'Q-ness', a
certain phys1cal name. If-this is so, then naturally, what
the name 'P-ness' refers to in the actual world is coexten-
sive, in all possible worlds, with what 'Q-ness' refers to
in the actual world. There 18 one property (state) referred
to by two names, and it has whatever extension it has (natu-
rally) in all possible worlds. It is true, as our
intuitions might inform us, that P-ness might not have been
Q-ness, but since 'Q-ness' 1s, on Lewis' view, a nonrigid des-
ignator, this 1s no stranger than 1t being the case that
Benjamin Franklin might not have been the inventory of
bifocals. These issues will be discussed in greater detail 1n
the next sect1on.
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actual world; thus, if an organism has its skin cut, it 1s
usually in Pl vP2vP3vP4 ; that 1s, it is either in PI or
P2 or P3 or P4, s.1nce by hypothesis, it is either in PI or
P2 or P3" So now there are at least two states which
satisfy the appropriate causal role. So the move to dis-
junction yields multiple realization.
I reallz'e that this 1s a contrived counterexample
but I am not moved: the whole idea of adverting to
disjunctive states 1s contrived to begin with. Such dis-
junctive states (or rather predicates) are not, in Goodman's
terminology, project1ble. My objection to the proposal
is in the same spirit in wh1ch it was offered.
Thirdly, and most importantly, even if we neglect
the above two problems and assume disjunctive properties
do the trick, allowing these properties 1s either to be
restricted to everyday psychology, or not, and 1s to be
allowed to apply to the referents or all theoretical terms.
Either of these alternatives, as with the relativization
to context move, will prove to be unsatisfactory.
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II
This section shall deal with issues related to Lewis'
physicalism arising from his views on semantics and other
possible worlds. I shall ignore here the problems raised
in the previous section and shall assume, for expository
reasons, that pain (and likewise, for other psychological
states) is ident1cal with some one physiological state--
in particular, with C-fiber stlm~latlon (eta).
As an entry point into these issues, consider the
following two apparent problems for Lewis. First, there
1s Kripke's argument that if a 1s identical with b, then
1
necessarily, a 1s identical with b. It 1s not the case,
however, that necessarily, pain 1s identical with C-fiber
stimulation; tor--as Lewis readily adm1ts--ln some possible
world, pain might be (say) D-flber stimulation. So if
Krlpke l s argument 1s sound, it ap~ars that pain and C-flber
sttmulatlon could not be the same, even in the actual world.
Secondly, in Lewis' view, a property 1s uniquely
determined by wh1ch things have it, 1n every possible worldj
propert1es 8 and bare 1dentical 1f they are coextensive
in every possible world. But pain and C-fiber stimulation
are not coextensive in every possible world and hence must
be distinct.
lOr, to put it in the formal mode, if a and b are rigid
designators, then if 'a=b' 1s true, so 1s 'necessarily a=b'.
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Lewis 1s not perturbed by these arguments ( he deals
directly only with the second, but it is clear how he would
respond to Kr1pke). To understand his response, it 1s
necessary to examine 1n some detail the general view
which underlies it. In a general discussion of theoretical
terms, he says:
I take it that 8 property 1s ident1fied when, and
only when, we have specified exactly which things
have it in every possible world. And I take it
that 8 name or the torm 'the property ot doing
so-snd-so' names the property that belongs, in the
world W, to whatever does so-and-so. For instance,
'the property of having tIl names the property
that belongs, in any world w, to exactly those
things which, in the world ~, have the property
named by tl.
Now we can see the problem. Do we mean:
1) the property that belongs, in any world w, to
exactly those things Which, in the world ~,-h8ve
the property named by tl in our actual world? That,
or course, 1s just the same property which Is named
by t l in our actual world. On this first reading,
'the property of having tll and It l ' do both namethe same property.
Or do we mean: 2) the property that belongs, in any
world~, to exactly those things Which, 1n the world
w, have the property named by tl in the world w? On
~h1s second--and, I believe, better--readlng, Tthe
property ot having t 1 ' 1s a logically determinate
name ot a certain property, which we may call the
d1agonallzed sense of tIe The sense ot tl may be
representsted by 8 function II tlll which ass1gns to
any world ~ a property II tI'l w. A property in turn
may be represented by a function P which assigns to
any world ~ the set Pw of things Which, in the" world
~, have the property. Then the dlagonal1zed sense
or tl 1s the property whose representing function
assigns to any world the set ot things (11tlll w)w.
It is not named by t 1 in any world, unless T 1s a
very peculiar theory. Neither 1s it the sense of t 1 ;that is. not a property at all, but rather a function
from worlds to propertles. 2 '
1
"How to Define Theoretical Terms," Op.C1t. Pgo 437.
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Notice that if Itl ' 1s a rigid designator, there 1s
no distinction between t
1
and the property of having tl-~
even on the pro!%,1etary reading. The representing function
of the pro~rty of having t 1 assigns 'to each world ~ the
set of objects that have the property that the sense of 'tIl'
assigns to that world--and that is the same property in
every possible world. Thus. the sense of 'tallness' (as~
sumlng it 19 rigid) assigns to every possible world the
same property (tallness). Consequently, the property of
having tallness will have, as its extension, in every possible
world, the extension of the same property--tallness. Tallness,
and the property of having tallness. are, therefore, the same
property.
So, if the distinction between iL and having t 1 1s to
be made to do any work in our present consideration, it
must be that 'pain' 1s a non-rigid des1gnator--and that 1s
precisely what L~w1s asserts:
We must not identify an experience itself with
the attribute that 1s predicated of somebody by
saying that he 1s having that experience. The
former 1s whatever state it la that occupies a
certaln-aeflnlt1ve causal rolej the latter 1s
the attribute of belngln whatever state it 1s
that occupies the causal role. By this
distinction, we can answer the objection that since
experience-ascriptions and neural state ascript10ns
are admittedly never synonymous, and since attributes
are identical just in case they are predicated by
synonymous expressions, therefore, experiences and
neural states cannot be identical attributes. The
objection does establish 8 nonldent1ty,
-:t
-Lewis does not use the term 'rigid designator'. He uses
the term 'non-contingent name', which means more-or-less the
same thing. Since the former term has become so popular, I
shall consistently use it. even when talking about Lewis' views.
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but not between experiences and neural states.
(It 1s unfair to blame the identity theory for
needing the protection of so suspiciously
subtle a distinction, for 8 parallel distinction
is needed elsewhere. Blue ls, for instance, the
color or my socks, but blue is not the attribute
predicated of things by saying that they are the
color of my socks, since I ••• 18 blue' and
, ••• 1s the color ot my socks' are not synonymous.)
He develops this point further in an appended footnote:
"Here I mean to deny all identities of the form '~.ls
identical with the attribute of h8v1ng~ " where f(
1s an experience-name definable as naming the
oc~upant of a specified causal role. I deny, for
instance, that pain 1s identical with the attribute
of having pain. In my theory, 'pain' is a
contingent name--that is, a name with different
denotations in different possible worlds--s1nce 1n
any wnrld, 'pain' names whatever state happens in
that world to occupy the causal role definitive .of
pain. If state X occupies that role in world V
while another state Y (1ncompatible with X) occupies
that role 1n world W, then 'pain' names X in V
and Y 1n W. I take" 'the attribute of having pain'
on the other hand, as a non-contingent name for the state
or attr1bute Z that belongs, in any world, to whatever
things have pain in that world--that 1s, to whatever
things have in that world the state named in that
world by 'pain·. (I take states to be attributes of a
special kind: attributes ot things at times.) Thus,
Z belongs to whatever things have Y in Wj hence,
Z 1s identical neither w1th X nor with Y.
Richard Montague, in liOn the Nature of Certain
Philosophical Entities", Monist 53 (1969): 172-173,
objects that I seem to be denying a logical truth
having as its instances all identities of the form
I -< is identical with the attribute or hav 1ng -< ' ,
where CIC.. 1s a non-contingent name af a state which 1s
(either contingentiy or necessarily) an experience.
I would agree that such identities are logically true;
but those are not the identities that I mean to
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deny; since I claim that our ordinary exper1ence-
names--'paln' and the like--are contingent names
of states.
The above quotes are sufficient to respond to the
object~ons raised; some elucidation is, however, called for.
F1rst, let me dispell a possible confusion. There is nothing
special about 'pain' that makes it nonrigid; most theoretical
terms defined ~ 18 Lewis will, it appears, be nonrigid.,
Let me also emphasize the difference between names
which refer to properties and predicates which express or
attribute those properties. The sense of a predicate 1s
the property which it expresses--1.e., a function from possible
worlds to individuals. The sense of a name of such a
property (e.g., 'cleverness') is a very different thing. It
is a function which assigns to every possible world a
unique property, each one of which is, as above, also 8
. function from possible worlds.
Thus, if one were to ask the average academician on
the street, 'Is having the property I am thinking of
necessarily coextensive with cleverness?', he wo~ld very
likely respond, 'No'. Lewis would respond: If you mean to
be talking ot what the two terms 'cleverness' and 'the
411An Argument for the Identity Theory," Pp. 164-165.
The problem Lewis 1s here replying to 1s not precisely
the one I Mentlone~ The problem here 13 that there seems
to be two non-synonymous predicates expressing the same
property--whlch Lewis believes can not be. Lewis' reply would,
however, be the same ror~ther problem; in fact, in Lewis'
view (we may take it), the sense of a predicate 1s the function
which assigns to every possible world the extensIOn of the
predicate in that world--in which case we really do have one
problem here (see below).
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property I am thinking of' refer to, then they refer to
the same property, which is. or course, necessarily
coextensive with ltselt. If you mean, instead, the sense of
the terms 'cleverness' and' ••• has the property I am
thinking oft, then you are comparing apples to oranges:
the tormer assigns a property to each possible world, while
the latter assigns a set of objects (its extension). Only if
you compared the reference or 'cleverness' with the sense
of I ••• has the property.I am thinking of' (or equivalently
the reference of 'The property of having the property I
am thinking of') would you get a meaningful no.
When forming one's theoretical and psychological
definitions, according to Lewis, one first reformulates the
postulate in such a way that all theoretical (psychological)
predicates are el~lnated in favor of names or properties,
states, etc. This 1s done by having in the a-vocabulary
(non-theoret1cal~~1.e., old, already understood) copulas
of the form, I has the property J 1s in the state
____at time • What goes in the appropriate blank and
gets replaced by a variable in the modified Ramsey sentence,
1s the name ot 8 property or state. So it 1s pain, and
not having pain, that Lew1s 1s primarily concerned with.
Pulling together the various strands so tar presented
(at the risk of some redundancy), and filling in some of the
detail, we have: predicates express (or attribute) properties
which are the senses of those predicates. In, 'My socks are
blue', I ••• are blue' expresses the property of being blue.
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Two predicates express the same property 1f they are
synonymous--since properties are the senses of predicates.
These properties (senses) are I1 var ious set theoretical
constructions out or worlds and individuals • • • there is
no reason to believe that besides those construct1ons.
there are some other entlt1es--the properties, states, etc.
themselves. 115 States, as well as events, phenomena,
5Quoted trom private correspondence.
The views I-. aM p:resent1ng here have been gleaned from
Lewis' published writings. In correspondence. he has made it
clear that though I have indeed stated his favored view, I
have misled about the degree of determinacy he thinks there
1s to be found. (My ~xcuse 1s that I had, in any case, to
put some one formulation down to sink my teeth into.)
Thus, Lewis says that properties correspond to set
theoretical entities. But which ones? There is no
dete~1nately correct answer to this quest10n (Lewis be-
lieves). There 1s no tact ot the matter; just as there 1s
not (Lewis believes) copCernin! the/ questl09 of whether the
ordered pair <x, y> is J! x, y 1.J\. or ~x1)fx, y Jf. I have
identified what predicates exp ess--the1r senses, properties,
and tunctlons--from possible worlds to extensions, and have
asserted that states are just a species of property. All
this also seems to be, in Lewis' view, one possible formulation
among many equally correct ones. One thing that 1s deter-
mlnately true, however, is that properties are identical
it the predicates which express them are synonymous (that ls,
they have the same sense) 11' the f'urlctlons which correspond
(or are identical) to these properties are identical. And this
contention 1s sufficient tor the purposes or this paper.
In the rest of the paper, I shall take the views
presented abova to be Lewis'. The points :: make will"
I think, he reformulable to coincide with other possible
formulat1ons of Lew1s' views. It any of my pn1nts do depend
on the particular manner in which Lewis has formulated his
claim, then Lewis can extricate himself by choosing some
other. In that case, my argument can be construed (more
weakly) as showing that either Lewis must give up the view
I am attacking (1f my argument 1s sound), or he must give
up the contention that it 1s arbitrary which formulation one
uses concerning properties, states, etc.
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experiences, etc., are just a species of property: functions
from worlds to sets or time slices.
Names refer to, among other things, properties (states,
etc.). 'Blue' names 8 property--that which is expressed by
• • • 1s blue'. But the sense of 'Blue' is not identical
. . .
. . .
with the sense (that which 1s expressed by) of I ••• is
6
blue'. The sense of 'Blue', as with all names, 1s a function
whose value in each possible world1ssam one entity which tlle
name refers to in that world--in thi~ case, a property.
While the sense of ' ••• is blue' 8ss1g~s to each possible
world sets of, mostly, relatively mundane objects (e.g.,
socks).
Finally, and or most relevance to us, there are cases in
which @ (some property name) does not even name what'
has @I expresses, unlike the case of 'Blue'. Th1s will
occur when and only when @ 1s a nonrigid des1gnatcr. Thus,
'The property I am thinking of' names, in the actual world
but not in every possible world, stupidity say. So what
this term actually names 1s a property whose extension 1n
overy possible world 1s the set of stupid things.
has the property I am thinking of' expresses (in, say, 'Harry
has the property I am thinking of') the property whose
extension in any possible world 1s the set ot things I
am thinking of in that world: stupid things in this
world, brilliant ones in some other. Since their extensions
6And nam~d by, -The property ot being bluel. Where @ is
some predicate, 'The property of being (or haVing) @' 1s taken
to name what 1s expressed by I ••• 1s· @'.
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are possibly different, the property I am (actually) thinking
of and the property expressed by I • • • has the property
I am thinking of: are therefore distinct; and similarly for
any nonrigid designator of a property.
In particular, this situation obtains for I,ewls in
the case of 'pain'. There ~--.-" , Jur, not necessarily
distinct, things to consider. The state named by 'pain';
the state expressed by , ••• 1s in pain' (and named by
'The property of being in pain'); a certain physiological
state named by 'ets'; and what 1s expressed by lia in ers'.
Let us assume that 'erst is rigid. It names in every
possible world the same state. What it names 1s then
identical, as should be clear from the above, with that
which 18 expressed by • • • • is in efs' (and named by 'the
property of being in crs').
'Pain', however, is nonrigid; as it turns out in the
real world, it names (we are assuming) ers. So pain = era =
the property of being in cfs. But none of these 1s identical
with the property of having (or being in) pa1n~-the pro-
·perty we attribute to people when we say they are in pain.
That propertY9 since 'pain' is nonrigid', 1s the distinct
property whose extension in any possible world w is the
1
set of things wh1ch are in pain (Ipain' can here be replaced
by the nonrigid description to which it 1s synonymous) in WI-
Allot the above poInts are summarized in the following
table. The reader should satisfy himself that he understands
and 1s in agreement with everything in it.
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LEWIS ON UNIVERSALS
Universals, properties, attributes. states, events,
experiences. kinds, senses, etc., are all set theoretic
constructions out of possible worlds and individUAls.
Some ot th~se may be subsets or others--e.g., the
extensions of states are particulars at times. Predicates
express or attribute properties which are the predicates
senses--v1zo, the functions which assign to each possible
world the set'of individuals which satisfy the predicate
in that world,
Reference/Extension'Term
1) "clever-
n~ss I
( 'cfs I )
Rigid/Nonrigid
rigid (let's
agree)
Reference: The
property, C, which
1s the sense of
, • 0 • is
clever'
Sense
A function
/;/cleverness//
which assigns
to each pos-
sible world w,
a property,
IIcleverne aallwi
in this case=
C tor all w
1s cle-
ver'
(' . . .
is
orsing' )
2) ,
• • • Not applicable
to predicates
Extension: all
those things
which are
clever
A fW'lct1on
( property) ,
A, which
assigns to
any world W,
the set of
things Ow
Which, in the
world W, are
clever.
3) 'The
property
of having
clever-
ness
( being
clever) I
( 'The
property
of bel~
in cfs l )
rigid Reference: the
d1agonalized
sense of
'cleverness I ;
a property
which assigns
the set ot
things:
(//cleverness// )
to each W W
world w. Iden-
tical to C, since
tor all w, C =
(/lcleverne~~/lw)w
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A function
II/The property
of hav1n~ cle-
verness/I,
which assigns
to each world
a property.liThe property
of having
~~e~~~~e~:~~w~
the diagona-
lized sense
or 'cleverness' =
C, for all w
Rigid/Nonrigid Reference/ExtensionTerm
4) 'The pro- nonrigid
party I am
thinking
of'
( 'pain')
Reference: The
same as that of
'cleverne ss ,~~ C
Sense
A function II
The property
I am thinking
or!/ which
assigns to
each world W,
a property
!!The pro-
perty I am
thinking of#J·
1n this
case, dif-
ferent pro-
perties for
different w
has the
property
I am
thinking
of I ('has
(is in)
pain' )
Lewis'
preferred
analysis
5) I
• • • Not applicable
to predicates
Extension: all
those things which
have the property
I am thinking ot;
same as the
extension of
, • • • is
clever'
The dlagon-
allzed sense
of 'The
property I
am thlnlr1ng
or ,; a
function
( property)
which assigns
to each world
w, the set
of things{liThe
property I
am thinking
of//w)w
6) 'The pro-
perty of
having the
property I
am think-
ing of'
( 'The pro-
perty ot
haVing
pain' )
Lewis'
preferred
analysis
rigid
58
Reference: sense
or 5)
A functionlithe property
of having the
property I am
thinking of/I,
which as-
signs to each
possible
world W, a
property,
liThe pro-
perty of
having the
property I
am thinking
off/wI the
same property
tor all w
We can finally take care of the problems with which
this section opened. Kr1pke's claim that pain might not
be era proves nothing since 'pain' (in Lewis' view) 1s 8
nonrigid designator. This example proves no more mysterious
than the tact that the inventor 'of bifocals might not
7have been Benjamin Franklin.
As for the second problem, pain and era do have the
same extension in every possible world--they are, after all,
the very same state (property). To be sure, in a sense,"
pain might not have been ers, for 'pain' does not neces-
sarily refer to the same state as 'erst: the concepts (the
senses of) 'pain' and 'ers' are distinct. This should not
bother us, for in a similar vein, pain might not have been
pain: 'pain' does not necessarily refer to what 'pain'
actually refers to.
What may be responsible far confusion is, Lewis
believes, the tal1UI'9 to distinguish the above claim that
pain and era are identical, which" 1s true, from the claim
that the property attributed to people when we say they are
1n pain 1s identical with the property we attribute to people
7Kripke, or course, thinks that terms like 'pain' are
rigid designators; Lewis does not, so there 1s at least a
stalemate until the question or rigidity can be cleared up.
Kr1pke might try to reformulate his argument by saying, 'n1ap'
say, and let us proceed to give the same argument using this
term. To this, Lewis might rightly reply tfiat rigid designa-
tors are not so eas11y created. One must give a word meaning
and in the present case, 'nlap' seems to be synonymous with
'pain' (which 1s nonr1gid). If we clearly did have B r1g1d
des1gnator--e.g., "That entity which, in fact, 'pain' refers
to in the actual world," our intuitions about the possibility
of the entity referred to not bein~ identical. with cra would
no longer be clear (after all, ian t era what 'pain' refers
to in the actual world?). Kripke has-S-reply, I believe,
but it would take us far afield.
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when we say they are having ers, which 1s false. And that
contusion, thinks Lewis, 1s due to a failure to distinguish
pain trom the property of having pain.
Thus, it appears that Lewis has eas11y circumvented
two rather dlfficult problems. It might, at f1rst glance,
be though~ that this escape is vitiated by the apparently
gratuitous assumption that 'pain' and other psychological
terms are nonrigid. 'Pain' and its 11k might, after all,
be naturally taken to be on par with 'cow', 'gold', and
other natural kind te~s; which act like, according to the
8popular account of Kr1pke and Putnam, rigid designators.
Though I do indeed think something like this correct.
I shant argue for it here. Perhaps ordinary psychological
terms are nonrigid. In any case, the important issue (see
s~ct1on 1) 1s whether the theoretical terms of a mature
psychology, it we ever have any, would be reducible to
physical terms. Our concern should then be whether such
theoretical terms are, as Lewis suggests, nonrigid. And
to this question, the Kripke-Putnam analysis 1s not directly
aBut not, at course, according to Lewis' account.
Even it the Krlpke-Putnam analysis 18 correct, it could
turn out that 'pain' does not, 1n fact, name any natural
kind. This 1s no problem as it 1s true of most terms.
'Richard Nixon' might not name 8 person, or anything else
for that matter. We feel no inclination on that account to
say that it is not a rigid designator; for it turports to
designate (rigidly) a certain person. Similar y, It might
be argued. we purport by our use of 'cow' to name a certain
species, and by our use of 'pain' a certain kind of mental
entity, if anything.
germane: their examples are not of theoretical kinds, and
9
there 1s no saying that their intuition holds up for such.
In sum, Lewis' v1e~deal very neatly with the two
problems which opened ,this section. It 1s not the least
virtue of his account that it does so, espec1ally considering
how easily other views are ensnared.
His responses to these problems, as I have conveyed
th~m, bring to the tore two assumptions which call for
consideration: The first is whether or not to take, in the man-
ner or Lewis, theoret1c~1 terms as typically nonrigid. This
question has obvious interest beyond that which concerns the
meaning of everyday psychological terms. The second is the
legitimacy of Lewis' distinction between pain and the
property of having pain, upon which his claim that 'pain'
refers to some physical state seems to depend. I shall
deal, in reverse order, with these questions in the
following sections.
9In, "Reference and Theoretical Terms," Nous VI. X, #3,
Sept. 1916, Ene has argued that 1n fact the Kr1pke-Putnam
account 1s deficient when applied to theoretical terms.
Enels argument would be of no solace to Lewis though; it
argues against his account even more so.
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SECTION III
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III
A careful reader will have noticed that the previous
section's distinction between pain and the property of
having pain has the untoward consequence that the property
of having pain, as construed by Lewis, 1s not physical.
Here we have yet another important respect in which Lewis'
1
v1ew differs from traditional "Australian" materialism.
For the AU8s1e view--a view one would think an integral
part or any materlallsm--1s that all properties, events,
etc., are physical properties, events, etc. Further, the
property ot having pain 1s precisely the sort of property
the Aussles are typically concerned to insist 1s physical.
Thus: "1 am not arguing that the afterimage 1s 8 brain
process, b~t that the experience or having an afterimage 1s
2
8 brain process."
One might contest what I have just said: The property
or having pain being, after all, 8 set theoretic construct
ls, thereby, a physical property for Lewis. Let us
quickly recall what (as quoted on ~g. 35) this property 1s:
Assume 'pain' 1s synonymous w1th 8 description which picks
~ecall that the other respect was Lewis' allowing
different physical states to correspond, i.n different
contexts, to the same mental state.
2J • J. C. Smart, "Sensations and Brain Processes,1I
Philosophical Review, LXVII (1959): 141-156. One should.
In the above quote. replace 'afterimage' by 'pain'. The
view.quoted takes care of afterimages (pains) by saying
that there ls, in a sense, no such thing.
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out some physical state, X, in this world, and Y in world w.
Then the experience (property, state, attribute) of having
pain 1s the experience (property, state, attribute) whose
extension in the actual world 1s XiS extension, and
in w is Y's extension; it is, consequently, identical to
neither of these physical states; here, by physical, we must
mean something like, referred to by a term of physics or'
a term which caD be appropriately reduced. Allowing that
the mere fact that a property 1s a set theoretic construct
to purchase i.ts physica11ty would be buying 1 t very cheap
1ndeed. 3
Nor should one th1nk that the nonphyslca11ty of
having pain 1s a consequence of the particular conventions
used by Lewls--convent1ons which could be changed if need be.
Lew~s is categorical concerning the adduced distinction
between t 'and 'the property or hav-lng t'. And it 1s this
distinction which 1s invoked to resolve the problem--a
very real problem for Lew1s--of the nonsynonymy and non-
necessary coextenslvlty of the properties attributed in
'John ,is in pain' and 'John 1s in efa'. Lewis' distinction
1s not a mere matter or convention; whatever formulation
he chooses must deal with the nonsynonymy problem.
~. Field makes this point in. "Mental Representation."
Erkentnlss 13 (1978): 9-61. I.e., 1f the above sort of
move were legitimate, we could always preserve our material1sm
by reducing any recalcitrant property to the set of things,
in each possible world, which have that property. This would
pretty well make one's physicalism vacuous.
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Lewis would not, however. be perturbed by our concerns;
for he h1mself says, or at least impl1es, that having pain
1s not physical; it Is, in any, case, part of his general
view that there can be nonphysical entities.
But there 1s more to the problem than we have so far
presented; it 1s not merely that Lewis countenances non-
physical entities; it 1s the nature of the entities so
countenanced. For having pain, or better, the property' of
being a pain, which would get similar treatment by Lewis,
is a property whose physicality 1s crucial for physicalism.
It exemplifies, on Lewis' analysis, that in virtue of
which all pains are pains, what all pains have in common
1s that they satisfy a certain causal role; the property of
satisfying that causal role 1s the property of being 8 pain;
the property or being in a state which satisfies that role 1s
the property of being in pain. These are prec1sely, or so
it seems to me, the crucial properties for 8 type/type
physicalism to reduce (doing so 1s a large part of the
traditional motivation behind a type/type 8S opposed to
token/token form of materialism).
What we must conclude 1s that (1) Lewis' view substantial-
ly diverges from standard central state materialism, and
(2) 1t is, in certain respects, an attenuated version of
physicalIsm. In the first section, we questioned whether
Lewis ditfered sign1ficantly trom proponents or a token!
token view; here, we are questioning his credentials as 8
physicalist.
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This p~lnt can clearly not be pressed too far; Lewis,
and others, will accept the consequences with equan1m1ty--
and not feel they are any the less a physicalist thereby.
Those who are physicalists must decide for themselves
whether they could live with this version of it.
Un11ke that which we have just discussed, the relation
between the problems that follow and the convent1ons used
in Lewis' formalism 1s not clear. All of them, though some
less than others, depend to some extent on these con-
ventions; whether they depend crucially, or would apply
no matter what set of conventions Lewis used, 1s hard
to say. It the following arguments are indeed convention
dependent, then they should be construed as directed not at
.
Lewis' substantial claims, but at (1) Lewis' p~eaent
formulation, and (2) the claim that it 1s arbitrary which
set ot conventions one uses (See rn. 5, section II).
The' first point is a relatively minor one. Recall
that in Lewis' formulation, all theoret1cal (psychological)
predicates are replaced by nameSj this 1s how we come to
talk or 'pain' 8S distinguished from' • • • 1s in pain'.
But though 'pain' may look like a nams. in practically all
of its everyday uses, it does not function as such--e.g.,
4II am in pain', 'He has 8 pain in his root l , etc. Of
course, it 1s Lewis' formulation to do with as he pleases:
4Thus Davidson remarks in a different context:
We recognize that there 1s no s~ngular term referring
to a mosquito in 'there is a mosquito 1n here'
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in particular, he can restrict his formulation to names.
But in the case of folk psychology, for which he purports
to be giving the meaning of our everyday terms, this sort
or formulation 1s embarrassing, to say the least.
The next point 1s that Lewis' formulation would
count as nonidentical properties wh1ch most physicalists
would claim are. Thus, most would agree that the property
ot having a ·certain temperature 1s identical with the pro-
perty of having 8 certain molecular energy. Lewis will not.
This 1s essent1ally the same point as was Made with the
property of having pain, but applied now to a less contentious
example.
When one has 8 name for an experience such as 'pain',
it may be reasonable to distinguish the experience from
(Fn. 4 cont1nued)
when we rea11ze that the truth of this sentence is not
impugned it there are two mosquitos in the room. It
would not be" appropriate it noticing that there are two
mosquitos in the room. I were to ask the r.erson who
says, "There 1s a mosquito in the room," 'Which one
are you referring to?" In the present analysis, ordlAary
sentencBS about events--1.e., 'Doris capsized the canoe
yesterday'--are related to particular events in just
the same way that 'There 1s a mosquito in here' is
related to particular mosquitos. It 1s no less true that
Doris capsized the canoe yesterday if she capsized it
8 dozen times than it she capsized it once; nor if she
capsized it a dozen times does it make sense to ask,
"Which time are you referring to?" As it this were
needed to clarity 'Doris capsized the canoe yesterday'.
We learned some time ago, and it 18 a very important
les80n, that phrases like's mosquito' are not singular
te~s, and hence do not refer 8S names or descriptions
do •••• "(liThe Individuation of Events," Essays in
Honor of Carl Hempel, Reacher ED.
Davidson's point can be made with equal validity about
the occurrence ot 'pain' in most sentencnes; the truth of the
sentence 1s not impugned if there 1s more than one pain.
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the attribute ot having that experience. But there are
many everyday psychological terms for which this dist1nction
can not be easily made. Thus. suppose that it 1s claimed
thet intelligence 1s identical to "I-fiber st1m~lat1on
(or, e.g., getting correct scores on an intelligence test). '
The senses of the predicates in 'John 1s intelligent', and
'John 1s having IFS', are not synonymous; the question now
1s, can Lewis deal with this fact in 8 Manner analogous to
his treatment ot the corresponding problem in the case of
pain?
I think not. Consider: if we did make such a move, we
would have to say t~at there 1s 8 property attributed to peo-
ple when we say they are intelligent (call it what you
will: the property ot being intelligent or the property of
having intelligence), and a further distinct property named
by 'intelligence'. It 1s this latter name which 1s to be
defined as synonrmous with 8 certain description, and
which picks out, 8S it happens, IFS. But the name for
which property 1s it that he 1s defining 8S synonymous
with a certain description, if not the property we attribute
when we 8ay 'John 1s intelligent'? There 1s no other pro-
perty around that I can see. I am not here questioning--
1t should be clear--Lew1s' right to define terms the way he
doesj I am pointing out that in so defining, e.g., 'intelli-
gence', it does not make sense to say that what 1s being
defined 1s a te~ tor something other than what 1s at-
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theoretical predicates are el~lnated in favor of names.
His motivation tor this 1s convenience and esthetics: it
eliminates the necessity ot having more than one type of
variable, as in Ramsey's treatment (as well as Carnap's).
The implication (and perhaps explicit assertion) is that
It should make no difference whether we have names or
predicates; and this seems as it should be. for one imagines
that it should not Make a difference which or two logically
equivalent formulations one uses.
So let us leave the predicates in; let our theory ~e.
'If John is in pain, then John 1s apt to shout', with om'
theoretical (psychological) predicate, ' • • • 19 in pain'.
"The most natural way to form a def1natlon 8 1s Lewis would
be I J F( F( John), then Jolm 1s apt to shout ) I • But the
5Actually, an analogous point can be made if we
consider standard theoretical predicates, and not just those
ot tolk psychology.
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only property we have here defined is the property of being
in paln--that is, the property attributed to John. And we
know that this 1s not the property Lewis wishes to define.
But can we not isolate 'pain' and define it? Perhap's
our definl tlon should be, I) F( x) (John 1s 1n x and Fx, then'
John is apt to shout) I; but we havs now defined the
property.or being a pain, a property attributed to states.
This 1s equally of no help, tor ' ••• 1s a pa1n' 1s not
synonymous with (say) , ••• 1s a CFS'j we could not
allow these predicates to express the same property.
Indeed. whatever term we now detine, will be, by
assumption, in predlcative position. And we will thus
always have nonsynonymous pred1cates attributing the same
property (contrary to Lewis' wish): the defined predicate,
whatever it ls, and the predicate for the corresponding
physical property. So it does make a difference, it appears,
whether we use names or predicates; Lewis seems 'to be able
to hold all his views only 1f he sticks to names.
Finally, let us consider the postulate of folk
psych~logy with the psychological terms replaced by varia-
bles. This postulate must, according to Lewis, be uniquely
satisfied (or nearly so) it our folk psychology 1s true.
Letting 't' be the variable which replanes 'pain' in our
theory, consider the interpretation which purportedly
uniquely satisfies the postulate, but with the exception
that we assign to 't' not CFS but the property of having
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pain, which property, let us recall, 1s coextensive with
p81~ in the actual world. This new interpretation preserves
truth; the only part of the postulate which is affected is,
let us say, '(x)(If x has t~ then x 1s apt to shout) ,--
which will r~ma1n true'. So now there are two interpretations
satisfying the postulate, contra hypothesis.
Let me conclude by saying once more that I am cogn1~
zant that this last problem, along with the previous ones to
varying degrees, 1s an artifact of Lewis' formulation and
is possibly resolvable by Changing the formulation (in this
case, perhaps by insisting that one needs unique physical
realizations; this 1s in Lewis' spirit. but not strictly
speak1n~. in his letter). They remain, nevertheless.
problems Lewis must deal with.
In the remainder of this section, I shall suggest and
consider a way out of the above problems, including that. of
the nonphysicallty of having pain. The basic idea will be
to distinguish the senses of predicates from what they refer
to--1.e., essentially a Fregean conception. This will allow
nonsynonymous, nonnecessar11y coextensive, predicates to
refer to the same property. (I do not mean to prejudge by
my use of the term 'rerer' here, whether or not the relation
that holds between singular terms and objects 1s the
same as that which holds between predicates and properties;
I just know or no better term.)
There are various ways one might attempt to formulate
thlso We might, for instance, distinguish universals,
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the reference of predicates, from properties, their senses,
requiring only actual (and not necessary) coextens1v1ty
from un1versals. The fact then that I ••• is in pain l , and
I ••• 1s in CFS' are not synonymous would not prevent them
from referring to the same universal, ani one would not have
to make being in pain nonphysical. Of course, on this
conception, we must have some identity criteria for
universals: perhaps nomological equivalence would do.
The method I prefer for accomplishing our Fregean
. .An example of this would be I •
objective 1s perhaps best presented by introducing the notion
6
of nonrigid predicator.
has the property t' where 'the property t' is 8 nonrigid
deslgn8tor--e~g.J 'the property I am not thinking of'. If
't' ret&rs to CFS in this would and D~S in world w, then
••• has the property t' will refer to having CFS in this
world and having DFS in world w.?
· 6This way fita in more smoothly, I believe, with Lewis'
actual views: we need not distinguish, as Lewis does not, two
sorts of nonpartlculars, universals. and properties. Further,
the criterion of nomolog1cal equivalence would not fit in
eas11y with Lewis, for we could not then identity pain with any
physical universals, since pain, as we have seen, 1s not even
coextensive with anyone such universal.
7Montague (in, liOn the Nature of Certain Philosophical
Entities," in Pormal PhilOSOphI) has an argument which seems
to show that where t 18 8 nonr gld designator, its referent 1s
not, generally, identical with the referent ~or 'the property
of having tie It examined closely, it will be seen that his
argument depends on 'The property or having t' being a rigid
designator. If it 1s not, then his argument does not follow.
He does further show that we can not deduce that the
experience Jones has (his example) 1s 1dentlcar-wlth the pro-
perty ot having the exper1ence Jones has, from logically true
premises. But he does not show that we can deduce that they
are not ident1cal either! And if 'The property of having the
experience Jones has' 1s nonrig1d, then they can be ldenflcal.
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There 1s nothing in the above that I can see which
would prevent us from taking the properties hav1ng CFS,
and having DFS, from being interpreted as standard Lewis
set theoretic constructs. And if we wish to stay 8S close
8S possible to Lewis. we can say the same for the senses of
predicates. Thus, in terms of Lewis' formalism, my
suggestion would be that where t 1s nonrigid, the sense of
'The property or haVing the property t' (or, I ••• has
the property t l ) 1s the function which assigns to any
possible world w the property ~, where ~ has as its
extension 1n any possible world z those things which have, in
z, what t names in w. This function will be different from
what 1s referred to by the predicate (e.g., see immediately
below).
The above formulation gains the physicality of having
paine For' ••• having pain' just like 'pain' will refer to
CFS: it refers. by the above, to having CFS, but that,
according to Lewis. 1s itself identical to CFS (assuming, 8S
we shall, that 'CFS' 1s rigid). And, once again, th1s fact
need not be reason to worry over the nonsynonymy (and
possible noncoextenslvity) of the (senses of) predicates
• • •.1s 1n pain', and ' • • • 1s in CFS'.
It should not need pointing out that the above suggestions
are incompatible with Lewis' views as they now stand. For
him, properties (attributes, states, etc.) are senses of
predicates, and determined by necessary coextens1v1ty. The
view I am suggesting ls, however, compatible with the spirit
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or Lewis· doctrines (the physicalist ones anyway); and it
would do away with the problems presented earlier. Further,
one would think it a natural move on Lewis' part: He allows
that the names 'pain' and 'CFS' ,can refer to tho same state
tho~ they have different senses; why not similarly for the
predicates, , . . . 1s in pain' and ' • . . 1s in CPS'?
There are also independent ~easons for thinking that
something like the above 1s correct; I shall cursorily
present some of them.
The first point has really just been mentioned, but
let me repeat. We allow names with many different senses
to pick out a single reterent, why not similarly with
predicates? If we ask after the truth of a given sentence,
we, typically, think or an object which may have been
variously referred to, and determine if it, in fact, has the
property attrlbuted--and it seems natural to add, 8 property
which may have been variously attributed (referred to).
For the next point. imagine that I aM now thinking of
the color blue. In these circumstances. it seems true to
say that the table's being the color I aM thinking of just
is this table's being blue: there 1s here one event variously
described. In a different context, this table's being the
color I am thinking of m1ght have been this table's being
8green.
SIn a similar vein, Kim has said, "There is 8 sense 111
which his being a good man consists in, amounts to, and is
nothing over and beYOnd! his being generous, sympathetic-,-
and truthIul, ••• it s, rather, that being B good man
represents, or consists in, different properties 1n differ-
ent instances." Kim, "Causality, Identity, 811d Supervenience
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One possible analysis of these facts-.-though by no
means the only one!--is that in the present circumstarlces,
••• 1s the property I am thinking of' and' ••• is
9blue' refer to the same property. We may, to be sure, have
used different descriptions with different senses to refer
to this property; and, consequently, in different clr-
cumstances, I ••• is the property I am thinking of' might
"rerer to a different property than I 1s blue I; but'
in the circumstances that actually obtain, they do refer to
the same property; and this is just to say that I • • • is
the property I am thinking of' 1s a nonrigid predicator.
To the extent that my above analysis is persuasive,
and I admit that there are other reasonable competitors,
it supports the view I am defending.
The next point has already been br1efly mentioned.
It seems natural to say, following Putnam. that. lithe
physical propertoy" of having a particular temperature is
really (in some sense or 'really') the same property as the
(Fn. 8 continued)
in the Mind-Body·Problem,n in Midwest Studies in Philosophy
Volume I'f, Studies in Metaphysics. French Uehling, Wettstein,
eds. TLis point 1s not uncontroversial.
9 I should point out that a more standard analysis
(e.g •• Kim's') would have it that in the present context,
the particular instances of the two properties, though
not the properties themselves, are identical. I do
not know whether this analysis can be made compatible with
the view I am concerned to defend.
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10property of having a certain molecular motion." This
seems prima facie correct. even though the corresponding
predicates are not synonymous (or necessarily coextensive).
Actually, the view Putnam expouses 1s very close to
the first one we mentioned above. On Putnam's view, predi-
cates (~ linguistic entities) correspond to what I called
there "properties" j and p,hys1cal properties correspond to
what I called there "universals." The difference in the
views 11es in the difference between the identity criteria
for phys1cal properties. For Putnam, A =B if A reduces to
B, or B reduces to A, or both reduce to C (Putnam's article
is concerned with developing this point). In any event,
the ~portant point, as tar as we are concerned, 1s that
he exhibits 8 credible example of nonsynonymous predicates
referring to the same property.
Flna~ly, there seems to me to be more mundane (than
the above) cases or nonsynonymous pred1cates referring to
the same property.
Perhaps the best way to approach what I have in mind
1s by way ofextenslon or Donellanls ~eferent1al/attributlve
d1stinction to predicates. I shall not go into details,
since they are widely known, but briefly, the standard
distinction 1s th1s: It at a party, someone remarks, "The
man in the corner with a martini in his hand 1s a
10Putnam, "On Properties,1I Mathematics! Matter! and
Method.
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genius," he may have succeeded in referring to a particular
individual, though in fact, there is no man in the corner
with a martini (his glass contains water). This 1s 8
refer6ntlal use of the referring term 'The man in the
corner'. An attributive use 1s one 1n which we take the
description to refer to whatever, if anything, literally
satisties the description; in the above example,IDone.
Let us now extend this distinction to predicates. I
say to :You, "John has the most dangerous character trait
possible for a politician." I might just lr..l3an by this
that John has whatever character tra1t it 1s which is
most dangerous--about which I need have no opinion: th1s
would be an attributive u~e ot the predicate. On the other
hand, we may be just concluding 8 long political discussion
in which I strenuously contend that lust for power 1s the
most dangerous character trait possible tor a politicianj
by way of example I say, "John has the most dangerous
character trait possible tor a politician." This 1s 8
referential use of the predicate, for I have clearly at-
tributed lust for power to John, whether or not l~t for
power ls, in fact, the most dangerous character trait
possible for a politician. (I certainly have not attributed
stupidity to him it, say, that happens to be the most
dangerous trait possible tor a pollt1clan--I may think he is
brilliant.)
This relevance or all this to our present concerns
1s that 1t 1s an everyday case or nonsynonymo~s pred1catas
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referring to the same property: I ••• lusts for power',
and (used referent1~11y) , • • • has the most dangerous
• •
character trait possible for a politician'.
Another approach to the above point is to invoke
Lewis' first reading of 'the property of having t' where
t 1s nonrigid (see quote on pg. 33). On the second (and
proprietary) reading, the property attributed by, e.g.,
• has the most dangerous chara.cter trait possible
for 8 politician', is that which has as ita extension in any
possible world w. whatever has the most dangerous character
trait possible for a politician on W: 8 property which 1s
distinct from lusts for power.
But it seems to me that in the situation described
above, the first reading would be more appropriate. On
that reading, the property 1s that which has as its
extension in any possible wo~ld w. the extension of the
most dangerous character trait possible tor 8 politician
in the actual world-~l.e., lust tor power (say). For lust
for power is, it seems to me, the property being attr1buted.
And again, it this 1s correct, we have nonsynonymous
predicates attributing the same property: I • • • lusts
tor power', and (on Lewis' first reading) , ••• has the
most dangerous character trait possible for a politician'.
This latter approach has problems'the attributive!
11
referential approach does not. Thus, the example I have
llThe referential/attributive distinction for predicates
1s not the same as Lewis' two readings of 'the property of
78
used might strike the reader as also one 1n which Lewis'
second reading 1s more appropriate. Further, choosing
between Lewis· two readings seems, to 8 large extent, to be a
matter of convention. Even so, I would assume that the
reader, understanding what I am driving at, will be able
to construct what, by h1s lights, 1s a more suitable example:
one in which it 1s not just 8 Matter of convention what the
right reading 1s. (After all, it isn't just a matter of
convention what sense predlcatea have in a given situation).
Another problem is that Lewis might say that even if
he were to grant th8~ in this cas~ the r~rst reading 1s
more suitable, he could still claim that in those circum-
stances, the predicates, , ••• lusts tor power' and
I ••• has ~ most dangerous character trait possible for a
politician', are not only coreferentlal but also used
synonymously.
If anyone were to adhere to such a view, there would
be no way that I could think of to refute him. But the
I
view does seem prima facie falsej even in the above contexts,
the predicates clearly do not have the same sense. The only
possible reason for claiming that they do would be that it
(Fn. 11 continued)
having t'j just 8S the normal referential/attributive
distinction 1s different from the rigid/nonrigid distinction.
Indeed, there 1s a very close parallel between singular
terms and predicates in this respect. Thus, both of Lewis'
readings can be construed either referentially or
attributively.
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1s a consequence ot Lewis' other views; but since it 1s
just the reasonableness ot those views which are presently
in question, appeal to them can hardly be countenanced.
Whether we use the referential/attributive distinction,
or the more problematic one ot Lewis' two readings, the
main point remains the same: we have an example of no~.­
synonymous (l.e., whose senses are not necessarily coextensive)
predicates referring to the same property.
These considerations can, or course, hardly do justice
to the complex issues they deal w1th--and they were not
meant to. Their purpose 1s just to lend some initial credence
to the suggestion that we distinguish propert1es from the
. senses ot predicates.
And the point of that, as far as we are presently
concerned, 1s to suggest a modification to L6Wis' views which
would allow him to deal with the problems presented previous-
ly; most Lmportantly, it would allow him to deal with the
nonsynonymJ or predicates without making. e.g., having pain,
nonphysical (as he presently does). Doing this would, it
seems to me. make Lewis even more or a physicalist.
Let me conclude by emphasizing once more that though
the above modification may be appealing, it 1s not one Lewis
makes or suggests. As his views presently stand, the
problems mentioned remain to ~de81t with.
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SECTION IV
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We have, until nQw, 88s~ed the correctness of
Lewis' analysis of theoretical definition and reduction.
Thus. in the first section, we took it as a virtue of
Lewis' views on everyday psychology that they were sub-
sumable to the more general theoretical case. In this last
section, we shall turn our sights on this more general
case. Since the considerations adduced will usually be
applicable to the case of psychology 8S 8 particular
instance, they will have, besides their intrinsic interest,
implications tor our previous discussions. Indeed, the
issues here raised will often parallel already mentioned
ones.
The structure ot this section will ba somewhat similar
to that ot section III. The first part will concern itself
with one general problem ot·conslderable significance; the
second, with a tew problems or a more technical nature.
My first concern 1s with the dogma--used as a premise
in Lewis' reductive argwments--ot, "The explanatory adequacy
of physics," or "The Unity or Science. II (Recall the
discussion in section I.) I.e., that (A 18 Putnam and
Oppenheim) all true theories are ultimately reducible to
physics. Thus:
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My second premise 1s the plausible hypothesis that
there is some unified body of sc1entific theories,
or the sort we now accept, w~h together provide a
true and exhaustive account or all physical phenomena
(i.e., all phenomena describable in physical terms).
They are unified in that they are cumulative: the
theory governing any physical phenomenon 1s explained
by theories governing phenomena our of which that
ph~nomenon is composed and by the way it 1s composed
out of them. The same 1s true of the latter phenomenon
and so on down to fundamental particles or fields
governed by a few simple laws, more or less as con-
ceived in present-day theoretical physics. I rely on
Oppenheim and PutnaM for a detailed exposition of the
hypothesis that we may hope to find such a unified
physicalistic body of scientific theory and fo~ a
presentation of evidence that the hypothesis is
credible.
Further, all theoretical terms, he contends, will
refer, when functionally defined as he suggests, to physical
entlties--g1ven the above dogma. He does allow, as we know,
for the possibility of nonphysical entities; but he does
not allow that they are causally efficacious with respect
to any phenomena within the domain of any scientific theory.
It 1s this I wish to consider; again, I will be con-
cerned only with nonpartlculars (properties, states, experi-
ences J etc.). As a test case, a particular example will be
used: that of genes and DNA molecules. I choose this
example because it 1s a particularly good case for Lewis.
For it 1s 8S good an example as there 1s of a theoretical
2term which is, on the face of tt, definable by its causal r~.
lllAn Argument for the Identity Theory," Pg. 169.
2It has also been claimed (by Armstrong and others) to be
a paradigm or what psychological reduction will look like.
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If the reader feels that there is something peculiar about
my example which makes it inappropriate, he should substitute
3his own in the following arguments ~ e.g., 'electron l or 'quarkl ).
Further, it would seem, at first blush, that this case
fits neatly into the pattern of Lewis' analysis. First, it
is true that genes are DNA molecules; and secondl~ the
apparent difference between the universals (properties,
whatever) might plausibly be attributed to the difference
between the concept 'Gene' and the concept 'DNA molecule'. We
could thus account for our intuition that the two might not
have been identical.
In discussing this example, I shall first restrict
myself to Lewis' actual viewsj I shall then turn to Lewis'
views as modified in the way suggested in the previous
section. The problem I am concerned with can be brotght to
the fore by asking, "What universals, in the present case,
41s Lewis identifying?1I
30r course, Lewis' views are meant to apply to all
theoretical terms; so even one counterex~ple would be
sufficient. But a stronger claim 1s intended. I am
taking this 89 a particularly good example for Lewis. If
there are problems here, there will be problems generally.
4Carnap (See: An Introduction to the PhilOSOthY of
Science) translates everything into a language wh ch consists
~ theoretical class and relation terms~-e.g., 'Mol'
is to stand for the class of molecules. He then proceeds in
the usual manner to define the theory's RaMsey sentence.
tihatever the merits of this strategy, it is of no use to
Lewis. The most it would give us is that the class of
pains (say) is 1dant1cal with the class of CFSs--l.e.,
token/token identity.
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In the case o£ everyday psychology, pain was identified
with CFS. This was accomplished, essentially, by positing
the trichotomy:
1. Token pains
2. Pain
3. Having pain
This 1s not unreasonable 1n the case of experiences
such aa pain. 5 When, however, we come to the present case,
. and in the rea~ of objects talked about by theories
generally, we seem to be more restricted; there 1s only:
1. Genes (electrons)
2. Being a gene (being an electron)
There seems to be nothing 1n these caRes corresponding
6to pain. So, whereso in the pain case Lewis had two
terms, ope ot which he could interpret rigidly and the
other ('pain l ) nonrigldly, identifying the latter with CFS,
an analogous move does not seem possible here; there seems
to be no clear way of extending Lewis' views to theoretical
7
terms generally.
5ThOUgh we should keep in mind that even in these
distinctions. Lewis 18 atypical. For him. the extension of
pain conslsts ot individuals. where most would take it to
cons1st ot states. (Do not confuse this with the fact that
tor Lewis, the reference or 'pain' 1s a state.) Thus, we
could ~e811y add for Lew1s a fourth to the above list: the
property ot being a pain.
6- .Or it you identify pain with being a pain (See Fn. 5),
there will be nothing corresponding to having pain.
7The formulation ot the point just presented is due to
Ned Block.
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How can Lewis respond to this objection? There 1s only
one way I can think of. (Since Lewis does not directly
deal with this question, one can1t be absolutely positive, but
(1) I can not think of any o~her r'esponse he might make;
(2) The response I give parallels his discussion of pain; and
(3) Though not directly stated, the view below is strongly
implicated by his discuaslon of theoretical terms.)
He would respond ~y positing ~n, e.g •• the present case.
distinct from both the set or genes and the property of
being a gene, a nonpartlcular referred to by 'Gene'; this
term, he would say, 1s defined 8S synonymous with a certain
nonrigid functional description. It would probably be
8
most appropr1ate to refer to such a nonpart1cular as 8 "kind."
If we tollow the analogy with the paln case all the way, we
wo~ld now have 'the property of being a gene' as a rigid
designator which names in every possible world the property
which has as its extension in any world w1 ' the extension of
what 'gene' names in w •
1
Thl:J r"ltPQn~~_13vYJ.n~~,bl~ to, cb~rge or lmplausl-
bl11ty-~a charge of considerable force, I believe. There
just does not seem to be some further universal other than
the property or being a gene wh1ch might be referred to by
'Gene l • (And as we have seen. there are those such as Davld-
son who not lmplaus'lbly contend that terms like 'gene I are
not names tor anything.)
81 do not know whether Lewis would use "kind" termi-
nology; the precise terminology does not, ot course, matter;
the point would remain the same.
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On Lewis' behalf, we may respond that taken from his
particular perspective, there is nothing particularly prob-
lematic about kinds as construed above. They are on par
with universals (properties, attributes, experiences, etc.)
in being functions from possible worlds to extensions.
In the gene case. as 1n the pain case, he is merely
distinguishing two such functions. One, in the present case,
named by Q and the other named by 'the property of being Q'.
These two could be identical only if Q 1s rig1d; if it is
not, and theoretical terms standardly are not according to
Lewis, the two will not be identical. The kind I am
thinking of may be Horse, but this 1s not what I attribute
when I say, "Affirmed 1s an object of the kind I p,m thinking
of. II
A response such 8S this on Lewis' behalf will. obviously,
be open to objections analogous to those to the last section.
Instead, how'ever, of reiterating, I shall fOOllS on what I
take to be the crucial problem with such a view. Let me say
that while I am confident that the view I am attacking 19
Lewis'. for the discussion below it 1s not crucial that I
have gotten every detail correct. What 1s cruc1al t it
appears. 1s Lewis' explicit contention that theoretical
terms be nonrigid.
The response we are attributing to Lewis might be
thought to have some independent support. Thus. we often
hear it said that, as Fodor puts it, liThe natural kind
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predicates ot a science are the ones whose terms are bound var-
91ables in its proper laws." That ls, if we have a proper
law of the form: (x)(Px~Fx)J then the class of Ps form a
natural kind. The variables in such 8 law are, in a sense,
taken to range over possible as well as actual objects; for
we intend the law to assert of any possible object that if
it were a P, then 1t would be an F: We mean to assert more
than just that all actual Pa are Fa. The natural kind P is
then plausibly construed as determined by saying which
things have P in any possible world.
Consider tor & moment 'Horse l and other such natural
kind terms. Typically, they are count nouns, sortals,
or whatever (e.g•• mass te~s). In most contexts ~uch as
'There 1s 8 horse over there', they can not be said to ~erer
to anything at all; or it they do refer, not as singular
terms do.
It we do construe such terms 8S names, then there 1s
a natural candidate tor what they refer to: the kind, in the
case ot 'Horse'. ot all those things actual or possible
(o~ the app~oprlate function) which are horsea--that ls,
which have the property ot being a horse. If we are inclined
to identity kinds with properties, this would just be the
property ot being a horse. Terms 8~ch as these let us call
'natural kind predicates', and say that they express when
9Jerry Fodor, "Special Sciences," Synthase 28 (1974):
97-115.
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''I
used predicat1vely, the kind we say they name.
We can now rephrase the above Fodor quote as the
contention that the natural kinds of a science are those which
are expressed (in the above sense) by the natural kind
predicates of its proper laws. If P is such a predicate,
then the class of Ps, actual· or possible, form a natural
kind of that science. And the laws of that science purport
to make true generalizations. over just those kinds.
"1
.
,~'~ Ij We can now see what is wrong with Lewis' view. On it,
j
the theoretical terms for kinds or properties which occur
in his formulation of theoretical postulates, do not name
the kinds or properties which, in the above sense, the
theory purports to make true generalizations about; for the
theoret1cal terms are not natural kind terms in the above
sense: 1~ according to Lewis, Q 1s 8 theoretical term naming 8
kind, it 'will not, since it 1s nonrigid, generally mme the
kind which has as its extension in any possible world those
things which have the property ot being 8 9. Thus, 'Gene'
would name the kind DNA molecule whose extension in any
poss1ble worlds does not consist of those things which have
the property or being a gene.
To be sure, Lewis does countenance terms for kinds of
properties which satisfy my above conditions, to wit 'The
property ot being a gene l • But this 1s not the theoretical
/,
name which ge~s functionally defined; it 1s defined, accord-
ing to Lewis, but in such a way that it 1s not identical to
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any physical property or kind.
Thus, it 1s that Lewis has not defined so they come out
physical the kinds over which laws purport to make true
1nterestlng generalizations. The laws of (statistical)
genetics purport to make true assertions which s'upport
cQunterfactuals about anything that might be a gene--not just
DNA molecules (which 1s in the domain of genetics when
construed as a part of biochemistry). And it is these kinds,
it would seem, which it 1s incumbent upon a physicalist to
show physical.
While from one perspective this objection is indeed
strong, it can, again, not be pushed too far. All I have
really shown 1s that Eew1s' views are inconsistent with
others; I have not shown him to be lnternally inconsistent.
Different 1s not necessarily wroIlg; and 1f' Lewis' analys 1s
ls·1ncompatlble with the standard one, no conclusion can be
drawn on this basis alone.
Nevertheless, we can, I believe, say that Lewis'
analysis does not capture the motivation behind physicalist
(type/type) doctrines. A large part or that motivation, as
I understand it, 1s to show that all natural kind terms of the
special sciences reduce to physical kinds. And this, I
believe, he has not done~
10Thus, 1t 1s not ident1cal wi th the property ot bej~ng a
DNA molecule, nor with be1ng a RNA molecule. It will have 8
different extension in some possible world from every physical
property or kind. (Compare with the property of having
pain. )
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The mere fact that all theoretical terms on Lewis'
formulation refer to physical entities should not be given
too much weight. We could, 8S already mentioned, reduce
I
all properties by identifying them with ·the set theoretic
functions to their extensions; and then claim set theory as
part of the physical sciences. Would this be a satisfactory
reduction? Or we might eliminate all theoretical terms from
our laws by Craig's strategem, and hence, have nothing left
to reduce. Would this be a satisfactory reduction? No and no.
Similarly, the mere fact that all theoretical terms in the
formulation refer to physical entities (which is true for
Craig also) does not, in itself, make for a sufficient
reduction. More 1s required, and I think we will not find
it in Lewis. 11
It 1s or some interest to seo how our test case would
fare if Lewis' views were modified as suggested in the last
section. This is, by introducing a property/universal
(predlcat,e/physical property tor Putnam) distinction; or
by introduc1ng my notion of nonrig1d predicator.
It would seem that in this case, my query. "What
universals should we identify?", will have a very simple
response. We can identify the property of being a gene
with the propertJ ot being a DNA molecule, and not worry
that the correspond1ng predicates are not synonymous.
111 should lay my cards on the table and say that I
believe no formulation can do it.
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things, consider that it would clearly be a bad argument,
since the conclusion 1s false, to contend that the property
of having a certain temperature could not be the property
of having a certain kinetic energy; and similarly with the
property of being 8 body of water, because they are not
coextensive in all possible worlds; for since water (say)
1s H20, any world in which water occnrs is a world in which
occurs.
'" "-." ( From our present vantage point, with our knowledge of
the identity of water and H 0, we can make the above reason-
2
able response. What this shows is that prior to our know-
ledge of these ldentltles p it would have been invalid to argue
that being water and having a certa1n temperature could not,
because of possible nomological noncoextenslvlty, be
identical to being H20 and having 8 certain kinetic energy.
Similarly, we caD not now eliminate the possibility that the
property of being a gene is identical with the property of
being a DNA molecule merely on the grounds of the supposed
possible nomological noncoextanslv1ty of the two. Whether
we construe the two as possibly noncoextens1ve or not depends
on whether we construe them as diverse or not; and not, as
1s often 1mplled, the other way around (as if ore could just
look in other possible worlds and see).
So I have not shown that Lewis, 8S modified, would be
wrong in making the identification. Nevertheless, it remains
pretty clear that they are not: for the gene/DNA molecule
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example 1s not completely analogous with the temperature!
kinetic energy case. We already pretty well understand the
relation between genetics and the biochemical entities and
mechanisms which underlie it, just as we understand the
relation between statlStlcal mechanics and thermodynamics.
It 1s safe to assume that (barring a complete' paradigm change)
no new discoveries will have any effect on our understanding
of ~hese relations. And still we are inclined to say that
there could not be temperature which was not kinetic energy,
while there could, even.nomologlcally, be entities that had
the property of being gen~whlch were not DNA molecules;
there could be other things which functioned like a gene,
and to function like a gene 1s to be a gene (though to reel,
look, etc., like water, 1s not to be water).
Essentially, this same point can be made using Krlpkean
terminology. It 1s metaphysically necessary that: temperature=
kinetic energy; while it 1s not metaphysically necessary,
even 1f we restrict ourselves to nomologically possible
worlds, that: DNA molecules are identical to the satisfier
ot the appropriate causal role. The contention that the
first or the above claims 1s false because we can imagine
cases in which temperature turns out not to be associated
with kinetic energy, can be dealt with by appeal to Kr1pke's
12
notion of eplstemlc necessity.
12This view 1s d1scussed in detail 1n the portion of
the thesis which deals with Kripke.
94
So in the end, Lewis' views, as modified, do fall prey
to the standard ant1reductionist argument; though we have
seen that that argument 1s not as strong as is often supposed.
The real Lewis sees this problem, ina sense. and deals
w1th it by eliminating reference to the recalcitrant pro-
perties from theoretical ~ostulates. Victory for him is
obtained by having all theoret1cal terms in his formulatlon
refer to physical entities; he is not concerned about any
other entities which escape his net.
But this is, from a certain perspective, a Pyrrhic
victory lndeea. Eliminating reference to entities does not
eliminate those entities. Lewis needs, by my lights, to
explain, or explain away, the appearance that he does not
reduce the universals which, as explained above. the
postulates of special sciences are committed to. Or if he
thinks such postulates are not, in fact, committed to those
universals, explain why he thinks that.
I turn now to various, somewhat more techn1cal problems.
While these do involve the particulars of Lewis' formulation,
they seem to me to be, moreso than, say, the problems of
section three--problems ot principle more than problems of
detail.
The form ot theoretical definitions for Lewis 1s
essentially that which was given tor psychological terms
at the beg1nning' of section one; I shall not bother repeating
it here. His treatment of theoretical reduction 1s likewise
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essentially that an informal instance of which was given at
the beginning of the discussion of Lewis. It will, however.
pay for us to have a more precise formulation:
It' may happen after the introduction of the T-terms,
that we come to believe of 8 certain n-tuple of entities,
specified otherwise thaD as the entities that realize '
T, that they do realize T. That ls, w& may come to
accept a sentence -
T( r)
where r 1 • • • r are either O-terms or theoreticalterms or some otHer theory, 1ntroduced into our
language independently ot t 1 ••• tn- This sentence
which we may call a weak reauctlon premise for T, 1s
free of T-terms. Our acceptance of it mIght have
nothing to do with our previous acceptance of T. We
might accept it as part of some new theory; or-we might
believe it as part of our miscellaneous, unsystemat1zed
general knowledge. Yet. having accepted it, for
whatever reason, we are logically compelled to make
theoretical identifications. The reduction premise,
together with the functional definition of the T-terms
and the postulate ot 1. logically implies the identity:
t=r
In other words, the postulate and the weak reduction
premise deflnitionally imply the identity t1=r1- Or
we might somehow come to bel1eve of 8 certain ~-tuple
or entitles that they uniquely realize Tj that ls,
to accept a sentence -
Vx( T( x)5x=r)
where r 1 ••• r n are as above. We may call this a
strong reduction premise for T, since it deflnitlonally
implies the theoretical ldentTflcations by itself,
without the aid or the postulate of T. The strong
reduction premise logically implies the identity
r=1xT( x)
which together with the functional definition of the
T-terms, impr!es the identities of t1.=r i by transitivityof identity.
First point. There has been cons1de~able discussion
on what constitutes lawllkeness, or lack thereof, in 8 given
13 11 psychological and Theoretical Identifications," Op.
Cit., Pg. 255.
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theoretical statement. About the only criterion about which
there seems to be general agreement is that a statement,
whether true or not, is lawlike if it supports cQunter-
factuals. Lewis' formulation, if what I say below is correct,
vitiates this criterion. There are many statements which,
if taken as part of a theory, do support counterfactuals
on that formulation, though they are clearly not lawlike,
and would not, on a standard reading, be said to support
counterfactuals.
Consider, 'All coins in my pocket are copper'. Suppose
I add this statement to the laws of my new chemical theory.
A standard, and legitimate, criticism of my theory would
be that, whether true or not, it is certainly not 18wl~ke,
for it does not support counterfactuals: if there were
dimes in my pocket, they would not, in point-or-fact, be cop-
per.
But suppose I adhere to Lewis' views and am construing
'copper' 8S a theoretical term. Then it will be defined,
forgetting for the moment about the rest of the theory,
8S '1 x( y) (y 1s a coin in my pocket..., y is x)'. What now
or a (nomolog1cally possible) situation in which there are
dimes in my pocket? If we accept Lewis' account then, B!~
the above definition, these dimes would be copper in that
situation; tor 'copper' 1s a nonrigid designator, referring
1n any possible situation to whatever fills the appropriate
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condltions--in this case, some dimes. 14 So the comment that
II I AI'l the coins in my pocket are copper I, Is not lawlike
because if the coins were dimes, they would all the same not
be copper," can not be made by Lewis; they would be copr-er--
as defined by such a crazy theory--on Lewis' view. Now.
granted the theory being considered is silly and not one
ever seriously p~oposed. My point just is that according to
Lewis, there is no way to sift out theoe crazy theories (on
the basis of counterfactuality) from the reasonable ones.
What underlies this problem is. I think, the seml-
analytic nature of Lewis' theoretical definitions: in any
possible world in which the terms refer the statement is true.
Thus, as Hample in another context has said:
For if the principles asserted by a scientific theory
are implicit definitions of its key terms and hence
analytic, the role of experiment and the need for
empirical evidence are thrown into question. If·-
to construct 8 schematic example--Galileo·s Law and
Kepler's Law are taken to be definitive of 'free fall'
and of 'planetary motion', then there would be no need
for experimental observations test. Moreover,
empirical data on the actual motion of the planets about
the sun would be irrelevant to those laws. If the
findings did not conform to the law, this would show
only that actual fall 1s not free fall as implicitly
defined by Galileo's formula or that the actual motion
of the planets 1s not planetary motion as implicitly
def1ned by Kepler r slaws. The laws would be lK1s1yt 1c;
in order to make them applicable to their usual
empirical subject matter and thus to restore the
relevance or empirical testing, they would have to be
supplemented by laws to this effect: the fall of a body
in 8 vacuum near the surface of the earth 1s free fall
14Th1s counterfactual will come out true on Lewis'
analysis; see his, Counterfactuals (l'~', 1).
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as characterized by Kepl.er I slaws. But the I theor 1e s I
obtained by such supplementation clearly are no longer
analytic: their terms are no longer implicitly defined
by them. 15
As it stands, this quote 1s not directly relevant to
Lewis. For Lewis, O-terms just mean old, already understood
terms. Consequently, these terms could very well suffice to
tie down theoretical postulates and definitions to particular
interpretations. One of the O-terms might, for instance, be
Inear the surface of the earth'.
Bu'c we can modify the above quote and put 1n the form
of a dilemma so that it does present a problem for Lewis.
We can say that either (1) the O-terms are so general
as not to tie down the theory to any particalar interpretation,
Ip which case the above Hample remarks apply; or (2) the
O-terms do tie down the theory to a particular interpretation;
in this csse, however, the definition of the theoretical terms
will, it seems, become implausible. Do we really want 'near
the surface of the earth' as part of the theoretical postu-
late which consists of Kepler's or Gallleo's Laws? I think not;
but it would have to be there, it se~msJ if this horn or the
d11emna were grabbed.
The strength of such an objection 1s diminished by (1)
the possibility that Lewis would contend that such terms
as 'near the surface of the earth' are (at least implicitly)
in the theor1es; and (2) there being no eliminating the
15Hemple, Carl. "Reduction: Ontological and Linguistic
Facets. 1I In, S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes, and M. White (ads.)
Essays in Honor of Ernst Nagle, Pp. 191-192.
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possibility that Lewis' formulations could find a happy
medium: with O-terms specific enough to tie down the inter-
pretation, but not so specific as t make the definitions 1m-
plaussble. Perhaps this 1s so, but I think if Lewis wishes
to defend one of these positions, the burden of proof will
16
now fall upon h~ to show them reasonable.
16Here is another objection, which I offer only
tentatively:
Consider an unreduced theoretical term such 8S 'quark'.
Given a standard nonLew1s functional account of theoretical
terms, we might propose the following problem. Consider a
possible situation in which little men satisfy the
appropriate functional definition (For the details of
such an example, see Block, "Troubles with Functionalism").
The existence ot such an example would seem like good
reason to deny the synonymy or~ in this case, 'quark' with
the appropriate functional defi!11tion (and similarly, with
'pain');" there are, after all, possible situations in which
the description picks out little men and not quarks (or pains).
We know that this problem will not be applicable to
Lewis' views: for on his account, 'quark' is nonrigid and
can pick out different things in different possible worlds
TiUch 8S little men). The ability to make this response
1s a .substantial virtue of Lewis' treatment, one that Lewis
is at pains to emphasize; but it 1s a knife that cuts both
ways.
For if 'quark' does not purport to pick out one thing
in every possible world, what can it be said to refer to in
the actual world? How do we fill in the following blank:
In world wI, 'quark' picks out little men, but in the actual
world, it picks out ? The natural response seems to be
quarks (or the synonymous description), but that w1ll not do;
for quarks may be very many things according to Lewis,
1nc].udlng little men; what is it in the actual world?
The temptation is, no doubt, strong to insist that all
one need say is that quarks are whatever satisfy such and
such a causal role and leave it at that. But r~call~ that
we are considering unreduced terms; we have still not said
anything which will show us that quarks are not actually
little men.
The only way out of this, as far as I can see, is to
introduce some ostensive component beyond the description:
getting in front ot an instrument and saying, 'What caused that
1s a quark'. But or course 'quark' will now now be, contra
Lewis, analytically defined by the original des~riptlon.
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(Fn. 16 continued)
'Again, as in the problems mentioned above, it is the
analyticity of Lewis' definitions which seems to be the
culprit.
There are a few possible responses which might be made
to all of this. First, it might be claimed that Lewis·
functional definitions are, not meant to apply to unreducible
theoretical terms. I do not think LEWis would, or reasonably
could, respond thus. His writing suggests that he means his
analysis to apply to all theoretical terms. Further, his
definitions are supposed to be analytic. But where reduction
stops, which theoretical terms, if any, are ultimately
primitive, is an emp1rlcal question; and if the definition of
a term hinges on an empirical question, it can not be analytic.
And in any case, such a restriction on Lewis' part on what
gets functionally defined, if he were to make it, would be
ad hoc. Lewis' definition 1s of the sort which one expects
to hold generally if it holds at all. Indeed, the most
plausible examples of theoretical terms functionally defined
often are those which are unreducible (e.g., our 'quark'
case)j 1t 1s just in such cases that we commonly reify
entities and give them names in order to fill some causal
role.
It might also be contended on Lewis' behalf that for
him. theoretical terms do not really name anyth1ng--they are
theoretical terms 8 18 instrumentalism. Lewis explicitly
denies that this 1s his intention.
Finally, 1t might be said 1n Lewis' defense that he
could just invent 8 name 'Krauq', defining it as referring
(in every possible world) to what 'quark' refers to in the
actual world. My question could now be answered by saying
that 'quark' picks out Krauqs in the actual world. This will
also not do; the reference of 'quark' is still untied. (We
have violated what Kripke calls the nonclrcularity condition
on reference fixing.} For we are here saying no more than
'Krauql refers to whatever 'quark' actually refers to; given
that there 1s no independent way of saying what that now is,
we are no further out ot the woods.
or co~~se, we could always say kraqus are that, pointing
·to some instrument reading. But this will just bring back the
ostensive component into the definition, and be of
no additional help.
Though I am not entirely convinced of the validity
of the objection I am presently raising against Lewis, it
it 1s valid, then it 1s very stnong. It shows that--at
least for a large subset of theoretical terms--we must have
an ostensive component.
101
For my next point, let us consider a theory, T, wh1ch
is reduced to 8 more basic theory, R. Let 't' be some
\
theoretical term (for a universal) and T (defined a Is
Lewis) and Ir I the term of R which, on the basis of" the
reduction 't
'
, is reduced to; so that It' and 'r' are
coreferentlal. Instead of T, we also write T(t).
Part of Lewis' ~cenarl0 for reduction is that we
discover that T(r); that r, something referred to by
a theoretical term ot the reducing theory, satisfies the
causal role definitive of It'. And it 1s very often,
though not always, the case that T(r) follows from the
reducing theory r. Such cases, contends Lewis, are the sig-
nificant cases of reduction. So that this point is clear,
I will quote at some length:
Suppose that during this period, T 1s reduced
by means of some other acc6~ted scientific
theory ~~ • • •• The more interesting case,
however, 1s that in which T* 1s well systematized,
and at least. part of T* 1s newer than T. It 1s in
that case that the reduction ot T by meaDS of ~~
1s likely to be an important advance toward
the systematization of all empirical knowledge.
T*, or part of T*, may introduce theo~etlcal terms;
if so, let us assume that these ~-ternlS have been
introduced by means of the O-vocabulary which
was used to introduce the theoretical terms of T.
This 1s possible regardless of the order in which
T and T* were proposed. Any term that is either
an O-term or a T*-term may be called an O*-term;
so at the time T 1s reduced, the relevant part
of our scientific vocabulary 1s divided into the
T-vocabulary and the ~·-vocabu18ry.
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Suppose the following O~~-sentence is a theorem of
~~; we may call it a reduction premise for T:
I :l ('l. . . Q ) I. The terms Ql • • • Q are to be namesbelonging to llile O~:- vocabulary. They mIly be
elementary expressions and belong to the 0*
vocabulary in their own right, or they may be
compound expressions--for instance, definite
descriptlons--whose ultimate constituents belong
to the 0* vocabulary. The reduction premise
says that T is realized by an n-tuple of entities
named, respectively, by the O*-terms Q 1 • · • en-Notice that it cannot be true if any or those
0* names are denotationless • • • •
If T* yields as theorems a reduction premise for
T, and also a suitable set of definit10nally
expanded.bridge laws for T, then ~~--w1thout
the aid of any other empirical hypothesis--
reduces T. For T* defin1tional1y implies the
postulate of T, as well as the set of bridge laws.
Once ~} is accepted, there is no choice whether
or not to reduce T. The reduction of T does
not need to be justified by considerations of
parsimony lor whatever) over and above the
considerations of parsimony that led us to accept
~~ in the first place • • • •
(2) Let T be a theory explaining the regulation
of certain biological processes by positing
hormones t ... t n : chemical substances of un-
specified 6ompos1tion, secreted by specified cells
under specified conditions and regulating the rates
of specified chemical reactions 1n a specified
way. The T-terms t 1 ••• tn' in this case,purport to name substances. Let T~~ comprise
our body of biochemical knowledge at some later
time; ~~ might imply that certain substances
named by chemical formulas Q 1 • • • 9 0 realized T,
and that they alone did so. To exclude multiple
realization of T, ~~ would have to contain the
information that, e.g~, a certain gland secretes
nothing but the substance with f~?mula Ql; but
we often do have such knowledge.
17
"How to Define Theoretical Terms," Pp. 441-444.
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The comments below are meant to apply to a case such
as above in which T(r) 1s taken as following from R. An
analogous point can, perhaps, be made when T(r) 1s 1ntro-
duced otherwise; but I am not sure.
In such 8 case, let us represent the postulate or the
reduc1ng theory R by 'R1(r)&TI(r) 'where TI(r) represents
that part of the postulate from which T{r) 1s derivable
and RI(r) represents the remainder. 18 For ease of expos1-
19
tion, let us simply write: Rl(r)&T(r). We then have,
given Lewis' definitions: 'r' is synonymous with '~x(Rlx&Tx) '.
Now, it might occur, in 8 given possible world, that
there are many things which s8t~fy T, none that do, or
precisely one that does; and similarly with R. Let us
1
assume in what follows that there 1s exactly one thing
which satisfies RI ; this is strictly a matter of conven1ence:
it reduces the number of cases to be cons1dered without
affecting any of the Main points.
If nothing satisfies T then, on Lewis' view, neither
t (=~xTx) nor r (=~x(Tx&Rx» exist. If exactly one thing
18'RI (r)' could be the null string; I shall assume thatit is not.
19Technically, we should probably not write it this way;
for Lewis does say that fr',when introduced, 1s specified
as other than the entity which realizes T. Whatever Lewis
precisely means by that, he certainly does allow, 8S we have
seen above, postulate of the form: R1(r)&T1(r) j that is,postulates of the reducing theory from which T(r) follows.
Since my argument would remain precisely the same if I left
things as above, I have no qualms about changing from TI(r)
to T(r).
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satisfies T, then it is either the same thing which
satisfies R J or it 1s not. If it is, then t exists and r
1
exists. If it 1s not, then t exists but r does not (since
there is no one thing uniquely both T and Rl ). If there
is more than one thing which satisfies T, then if one of
those things is that which uniquely satisfies Rlt then t
does not exist, but r does. If none of the things which
satisfies T satisfy Rlt then both t and r do not exist (all
this is, of course, according to Lewis).
So there are circumstances in which t can exist
without r, and r exist with t; what is not possible.
however. 1s that r exist and t exist and t~r. That is,
assume we have genes and DNA molecules. hormoes and
chemicals (Lewis' example), pains and CFSs. There can
not then, in any possible world, be anything othe~ than DNA
molecules which are genes. these chemicals which are hormones,
or CFSs which are pains. 2O For in any possible world t to be
1dent leal wi th t (pa in. such and SLlCh a hormone, gene) 1s
to uniquely satisfy t; and if r (CFS, such and such 8
chemical. DNA) exists, it must also satisfy T, and so be
identical to t.
20What 1s allowed is that, e.g., hormones of such and
such 8 kind exist when chemicals of such and such 8 kind do
not exist altogether; and vice versa.
Lewis does suggest that sometimes 'r=~xTx' (and not
only IT(r) I) follows from the reducing theory. In such a
case. we would have the stronger objection that this entailed
that if r exists, it must be identical with t.
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This argument runs counter to the general thrust of
Lewis' argument. It is similar to, though not precisely
the same as, the flaw claimed for the mat~r181ist position
by PutnaM and others--chauvln1sm: e.,g., not counting 89
palll things which clearly are or wO'lld be. And it 1s precise-
ly, among other reasons, to meet this sort of objection, that
Lewis has formulated his more sophisticated views; that 1s
(e.g.), to allow that pain might not be CFS.
There remains, however, the equally undes1rsblB con-
se<luence here presented: In a situation in which rand t
exjLst, nothing could be r which was not t and nothing
COllld be t which was not r ( This poses 8 serious challenge
fOIl Lewis: it shows that the charge of chauvinism still
st:l.cks. His appeal to nonr1g1dlty will not extricate him.
Let me conclude by recalling Lewis' reasons for re-
jecting Carnap's definition of theoretical terms: that it
1s implicit in the scientist's use of such terms that they
are intended to reter to a unique ent1ties. Lewis' program
sut.fers, I believe, trom a somewhat similar failing; for it
1s likewise implicit in the use of such terms that they
are about some particular ent1tles--even if it is not
determinate on the basis ot the O-vocabulary which. Just
89 118v1ng no or multiple realization should falsify a
thectry, so also should having these (for the relevant
"these") entities not behave appropriately do so.
Thus suppose, amazingly enough, that we discover that
in a distant part or the (actual) universe, but not locally,
there are little Illen filling the IIruIl,ct1onal role ll associated
with quarks. Lewis would say one of t·.,o things in such a
s 1 tuat ion. E1theI" J (1) there ere no quarks and the correspond.-
lng cheory 1s false j or (2) quarks are one thi.ng in this
region of space 8Ild a~ther (11 ttle men) 1n that. But both
of these 81t~rn8t1ves seem clearl,· incorrect. There are
quarks, but the little men in the distant part of the un1verSEt
are not. True, if it 1s part of cur theory--and it needn't
be--thst quarks are the basic elements of the entire universe,
then the theory 1s false until modified. The point, neverthe-
less, remains: 'quark' refers to one particular kind of thing
only; not whatever happens to full the appropriate causal role.
The moral we may glean from Ollr discussion of Lewis 1s
that you can not get your theoret1.::al reduct ions easy; they
must be earned. Even if one be11e"es that, in a sense
everything is physical (superveniellt upon the phys leal) J and
that theoretical terms are functionally definable in such 8
way that they refer to physical entities only, it do~s not
follow that all special sciences are reducible; nor that
all significant theoretical terms refer to physical
entities. (Let me point out one last time that this whole
discussion 1s presupposing the existence of universals.)
One might accept this as dogma, but there 1s no argument
which has it 8S its conclusion.
The preceding pages have presented numerous arguments;
only a few (and perhaps none) can be claimed to be knock-
down. In most cases, there is 8 way for Lewis to preserve
the integrity of both his views and his formalism. What
we have seen is that in doing so, he diverges more and more
from traditional physicalist doctrine (when those views
countenance, 8S Lewis does, universals). Whether he
diverges far enough so that his views, when fully expanded
and its ramifications made cle8~.wl11 not be welcomed
by his brethren, 1s a question to which there is no
determinate answer. On the other hand, if his views are
adduced as supporting evidence by traditional physicalists
(e.g., Armstrong, Smart), then the objections raised
strike true.
we
KRIPKE
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I now turn, in the second half of this thesis, to a
consideration of Kr1pke l s antimaterialist arguments. This
takes the form of a critical discussion of what I con-
sider to be the most cogent arguments presented against
Kr1pke's views. Only one of the three sections, that
dealing with Feldman, deals with argwnents aimed d1rectl.y
at Kripke's antimaterialist's arguments. The other two,
that of Dwmnett and Chomsky, deal with Kripke's more general
views. Their relevance lies in the fact that if their
arguments were sound, they would undermine the premises
on which Krlpke's antimaterialist arguments are based~
Feldman's arglunent, as we shall see later, is directly
.
relevant to the question of whether Kripkels arguments
have fopee against Lewis.
As already mentioned, since they are so well known,
I do not bother to repeat in detail Kripkels views. Let
me just, in a tew lines, give here the broad general out-
lines of his antimaterialist arguments. Krlpke starts with
the Cartesian premise that Descartes could exist without
his body, or that Descartes' body could ex1~t without
Descartes. Given this, and the necessity of statements of
identity containing rigid designators, it follows that
Descartes is not identical with his body--for otherwise they
would have to be necessarily identical. Kripke also makes
similar arguments concerning pains (tokens and types) and
brain states. The possible non1dent1ty of pain states and
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brain states, say, can not be explained awav. Kripke
further argues, by appeal to the notion of ep1stem1c
possibility which helps explain away the illusory intuition
that heat might not have been molecular motion; for to be in
the same eplstemic state as pain, is to be in pain; and,
consequently, we CAn not say that what we are imagining 1s
a case in which we are in the same epistemic state as that
which we are in when we are in pain, but where we are
actually in some other state.
The above outline 1s intended as a reminder to those
who are already rami-liar with the views. Those who are
not, should not expect to gain much from the above. I
start in with Dummett's critique of Kripke.
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D~T'S CRITIQUE
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Dummett's Critique of Kripk~~
I wish to discuss Dummett's critique of Kripke's view1
that proper names could not be synonymous with definite
2descriptions, or clusters of such descriptions.
Kr1pke's antisynonymy argument is grounded in two
distinctions: That of epistemic vs. metaphysical necessity
and that of rigid VB. nonrigid designation. The crux of
Dummettls critique is that these distinctions are in reality
distinctions of scope; and do not differentiate names from
descriptions.
This chapter has the least direct relevance to Kr1pke's
mind/body argument. I have included it because it is widely
considered" and correctly so I believe, to til the most forceful
argument to date against Krlpke
'
s general views.
~} After completion of this section, 8 new version of Naming
and Necessity was published with a new preface by the author.
While he does not go into much detail, it is gratifying to
note that what he does say corroborates what I have written.
While I have not incorporated this new material into the
text, I have made some comments in the footnotes.
1In, Frega: Philosophy of Language. All references will
be to this.
Dummett's critique of 'The casual theory of reference'
and Krlpke's Godel example are not discussed. I have limited
myself to what I consider to be Dummett's major criticisms of
Kr1pke l s modal arguments.
2This view can handle some of the problems the simpler
view can not. I shall not go into details since for my
purposes, it is not important (See Searle: uProP3I" Names,"
Mind 67 (1958): 160-173). For convenlenc~sake, I shall
consider the view that every proper name is synonymous with
some one definite description. This simplification does not
affect any of the arg~~cnts.
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The relevance to the mind/body problem it does have 1s that
if Dummett's arguments are sound, then it follows, he contends,
that ra=b' does not entail that rnecessarily a=b', where a
and "b are proper names. As we know, that this entailment
does hold is a premise of Kripke's antimaterialist argu-
ment. Whether he could reformulate these antimaterialist
arguments if Dwmnett I s points' were conceded, 1s unclear' to
me.
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Kripke's second attack goes further and says that even
if the reference of a name were fixed by some definite
description--and he grants there can be such, e.g., 'Jack
5the R1pper'--the name and description are not synonymous.
For (1) the statement 'Necessarily Jack the Ripper 1s
Jack the Ripper' is true on every reading, while (2)
'Necessarily the famous London murderer is the famous Lon-
don murderer' has a reading on which it is false, and
(3) 'Necessarily Jack the Ripper is the famous London mur-
derer' is false on every reading.
A response to this might be: if we are granting that
'The famous London murderer' fixes the reference on 'Jack
the Ripper', then there is a reading on which (3) 1s true:
There is a sense in which Jack the Ripper must be the famous
London murderer, whoever that may be; similarly with 'St.
Anne 1s the mother of Mary', to use Dummett's more
intuitive example (see Fn. 5).6
5 The example Dummett uses is 'St. Anne', and 'The
mother of Mary'. Since Kripke holds that being the daughter
of St. Anne is a necessary property of Mary, using this exam-
ple might cause some confusion. I shall, therefore, stick
to the less intuitive 'Jack the Ripper'. For convenience's
sake, I shall use the description, 'The famous London
murderer', though it is obviously incomplete as a reference
fixer of 'Jack the Ripper'.
6It should be emphasized again that we are dealing here
strictly with names like 'St. Anne' which have reference-
fixing descriptions. It 1s not the least virtue of Dummett's
argument that he actually uses such a name as his example
(instead of 'Moses' or 'Aristotle'). For this permits
us to see that Kr1pke's arguments do not have all the
intuitive punch they appear to.
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At this point, Krlpke invokes his epistemic!metaphysical
distinction. 'Jack the Ripper is the famous London mt~derer'
may be conceded to be ep1stemlcally necessary of (equlva-
lently) a priori; i.e., in any world in which we fix the
reference of 'Jack the Ripper' as we do in the actual world,'
we can truthfully and a priori assert: Jack the Ripper 1s the
famous London murderer.
But there being an eplstemlc reading on which (3) 1s
true does not conflict with Kripke's above clalms,for
(1), (2), and (3) are concerned strictly with what Kr1pke
calls metaphysical necessity; and (3) is not metaphysically
necessary. Jack the Ripper might have channeled his
drives into more conventional outlets; and a statement is
metaphysically necessary only if there are no circumstances
under which it would be false.
(1), (2), and (3) are intended to show the distinct
behavior of names and descriptions in modal contexts. But,
replies Dummett, to d1scern such distinctions, one must have
antecedently committed one's self to Krlpke's metaphysical/
(Fn. S continued)
Thus, Kripke argues that even if we grant, counter-
factually, that, 'The leader of the Israelites' fixes the
reference of 'Moses', 'Moses was the leader of the Israelites'
is still contlngent--Mcses might have remained his whole
life in Pharaoh's court. But much of the intuitive force of
this argument 1s deceptive; it comes from our inability to
put ourselves in the appropriate cQunterfectual frame of
mind (l.e., with 'The leader of the Israelites' fixing the
reference of 'Moses l ). This is confirmed by the fact that
the analogous argument in the case of 'St. Anne might not
have been the mother of Mary' is (though I still think valid)
considerably less convincing.
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epistemic distinction; otherwise, there are no differences
to be discerned between the behavior of names and descriptions.
Thus, (2) has a reading on which it is false and one on which
it is true, and (3) likewise has a reading on which it ts
false and one on which it is true (Krlpke's epistemlc read-
ing). The reading on which (2) and (3) are both false,
contends Dummett, are those on which we take the descrip.tion
and name, respectively, outside the scope of the modal
operator--i.e., the de re reading. We might paraphrase these
readings as: The famous London murderer is (has the property
of being) necessarily the famous London murderer; and: Jack
the Ripper is (has the property of being) the famous London
murderer. While the readin~on which they are true
are tho~e with the description and name, respectivel~within
the scope of the modal operator--i.e., the de dicta reading.
These may be paraphrased as: necessarily, the famous
London murderer is the famous London murderer; and
7
necessarily, Jack the Ripper is the famous London murderer.
So that Krlpke's distinction is really one of scopes.
Let us turn now to the rigid/nonrigid distinction.
The difference in truth value between (1) and (2) (on one
reading) 1s due, according to Kr1pke, to the fact that
I
'Jack the Ripper' is, and 'The famous London murderer' 1s not,
7r count as de dicta any reading of a statement with a
mods] operator to the left, and nothing to the left of it
(and with no free variable); this is so whether what is con-
strued as having necessity attributed to it is a linguistic
entity or otherwise. I shall assume throughout that there is
only one modal operator in any statement under consideration.
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a rigid designator. Indeed, Krlpke's criterion for e
term being a rigid designator 1s that there be no sense (on
any reading of scopes) on which it is true to say ~might
f
not have been~~ His other criterion for rigidity is that
a term is rigid if it refers to the same individual in
8
every possible world in which that individual exists.
This rigid/nonrigid distinction is what Kripke takes to
be the crucial semantic difference between names and
9
descriptions.
Dummett's analysis of this distinction is that it
too is just the distinction of scopes in sheep's clothing.
To say th8~ a term is rigid 1s just to say that we take it
as occurring (in a, particular sentence) out of the scope
of the modal operator, and to say that it is.nonrigid is to
say that we take it as occurr1ng with1n the scope of the
8 .
Thus, 'Jack the Ripper' refers to the same things in
every possible world, while 'The famous London murderer'
does not; there will then be conditions under which the
two terms are not coreferential and hence, conditions
under which 'Jack the Ripper 1s the famous London murderer'
is false. Thus, Dummett puts it (more formally):
If we say that 'The teacher of Alexander might not have
taught Alexander\ we may represent this aB:~lT0xjTv)
and this might be expanded using Russell's theory of
descriptions as either (1) or (2)
( 1) 03y [b''IC(T~ t4 ,,-'/) ~ ,1,,]
(2) 3y[Vy(T~H".y) A ~'7Y]
9perhaps it would be better to talk, even on Kripkels
view. of rigid uses of designators. At a minimum,
, Kripke believes that the classes of terms he calls rigid
(e.g•• proper names, demonstratives) are standardly used
rigidly.
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modal operator. Since both descriptions and names. can occur
within or without the scope of a modal operator, the rigid/
nonrigid distinction does not differentiate names from
descriptions •
Before turning to the actual details, there is a pos-
sible confusion which should be cleared up. At first sight,
it seems that Dummettls analysis of the eplstemlc/metaphys1cal
distinction 1s inconsistent with his analysis of the rigid!
nonrigid distinction. For on his view, for a term to be rigid
1s for it to occur outside the scope of a modal operator,
while for an assertion to be epistemic, is for it to have its
referring terms within the scope. There could not then bel
it would appear, any statements of ep1stem1c necessity with a
referring term which is a rigid designator; for that term
would then have to be both within and outside the scope of
the modal o~rator. Yet, we may, with perfect reasonableness,
contend that there can be such assertions: e.g., 'Jimmy
Carter might be a robot in disguise'. Nor, for the same reason,
would it seem there could be an assertion of metaphysical
necessity with a referring term which 1s a nonrigid designator:
e.g., 'The first man on the moon might have had red hair'".
And in fact, Dummett 1s perfectly happy (indeed insists)
that one can have such assertions. The apparent contradiction
is eliminated by a more precise statement of Dummett's view
(though he does not put it in these terms): To use a term
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rigidly is to have it out of the scope of a modal operator,
and to use it nonr1g1dly is to use it within the scope
of a modal operator; and there is ·110 special class of refer-
ring terms which is intrinsically used rigidly or nonrig1dly:
Names and descriptions can both be used within or without
the scope of a modal operator--i.e., rigidly and nonr1g1dly.
Thus, an assertion of epistemic necessity containing a proper
name will just be a case of an assertion with a term--wh1ch
is perhaps most often used r1gidly--be1ng used nonr1gidly.
That this is possible is, in a sense, the point of Dummett's
argument.
The above g1v~the crux of Dummett's argument: Kripkels
rigid/nonrigid distinction is really one of scopes. There-
fore, the most that distinction can show is that the con-
ventions of our language have it that proper names, in modal
contexts, are standardly interpreted as being outside the
scope of modal operators, and definite descriptions within.
But even this 1s not so, since both proper names and
definite descriptions can occur within or outside modal opera-
tors. (Dummett does make one concession to Kripke which
we shall discuss later.)
My evaluation of these arguments will procede 1n three
sub~equent sections. Section II will discuss whether or
not Dummett's arguments have enough force to decisively
defeat Kr1pke; Section III will discuss whether there are
any effective counterarguments Kripke has available; and
Section IV will reconsider some of Dummett's arguments from a
slightly different perspective.
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II
This section will proceed in the following manner.
First, I will present a certain assumption of Kripke's argu-
ments. Then I will ask of Dummett's objections whether
(1) they show this assumption to be wrong, or (2) they show
that Kr1pke's conclusions do not follow from this aSSUIllption.
My oonclus1on shall be that Durnrnett shows neither. That
he has, essentially, made a different assumption than Kr1p~'sj
and that, consequently, unless further argument is brought
for or against either view, it must presently be construed
as 8 stalemate.
The assumption of Kripke's I am referring to is as
rollow9:(~The way we evaluate the truth conditions of a de
dicta assertion of metaphysical necessity is something like
this: We take the sentence in question, and each possible
world, and determine whether the sentence, with the sense
it presently has, is true to the facts (in the Tarski
10
sense) in each possible world. The important point here
being that it Is. evaluated as a de dicta and not de re
assertion.
D .
Thus, in his new introduction, Krlpke says the fol-
lowing ('(1)' refers, in this and the next footnote, to
the sentence, 'Aristotle was fond of dogs'):
PresUMably, everyone agrees that there is a certain
Man--the ph11o~oper we call IAristotle'--such that,
as a matter of fact, (1) is true if and only if he
was fond of dogs •. The thesis ot rigid designation
122
(2) Rigid designators are to be distinguished from nonrigid
designators by their behavior tn de dicta metaphysical
contexts. Thus, Kr1pke says:
Most of the things commonly attributed to Aristotle
are things that Aristotle might not have done at
all.. In a s1 tuation in which he didn't d,e them, we would
describe that as a situation in which Ar1stitle
didn't do them. This is not 8 distinction of seQ as
(emphasis mine), as appens semet mes n e case 0
descriptions, where someone might say that the man who
taught Alexander didn't teach Alexander.
This is Russell's distinction of scopes. (I won't go
into it.) It seems to me that this is not the case
here. Not only is it true of the man Aristotle that
he might not have gone into pedagogy; it is also
true that we use the term 'Aristotle' 1n such a way
that, in thinking of a counterfactual situation in
which Aristotle didn't go into any of the fields and
do any of the ach1even~nts we commonly attribute to
him, still we would say that was al~ituation in which
Aristotle did not do these things.
(Fn. 10 continued)
is slmply--subtle points aslde--that the same paradigm
applies to the truth conditions of (1) as it describes
counterfactual situations. That is, (1) truly
descrIbes a cQuntertactual situation if and Qnly if
the same aforementioned man would have been fond of
dogs, had the s1tuatloh obtained.
11Though my ~e8dlng of this quote 1s not the only
possible one, it 1s the most reasonable, I teel--espec1811y
when taken in context. Also, not1ce the following quote from
Kripke's preface; in it, the contrast he is referring to is
that between rigid and nonrigid designators, and sentence
(1) is 'Aristotle was rond of dogs'.
My point, however, was that the contrast would hold if
all the sentences involved were explicitly construed
with small scopes (perhaps by inserting aco'lo~ after
'that'). Further, I gave examples (referred to above)
to indicate that the situation with names was not in
fact parallel to that with large scope descriptions.
Proponents of the contrary view often seem to have
overlooked these examples, but this is not my point
llel'e. The contrary •••••• wha t about:
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Let us turn now to the details of Dummettls arguments.
First, with regard to the metaphysical/epistemic distinction,
Dummett advances two arguments. The first is an argument
from economy: It is conceptually simpler to advert to
scope distinctions only, to explain the modal ambiguities
evidenced, than to have to advert to Kr1pke's epistem1c!
metaphysical distinction in addition.
Given that we are assuming that metaphysical necessity
(as well as eplstemlc~ as construed by Kripke, 1s to be
evaluated as de dicta nec3ss1ty, if Kripke's metaphysical/
eplstemic distinction is pr1ma facie plausible, then Dum-
mattls argument from economy carries no weight in and of
itself. One can hardly el1m1nate a clearly perceived dis-
tinction by saying that it would be simpler 1f it were not so
perceived.
The question then ls, "Is the distinction prima facie
plausible?" Consider again, 'Jack the Ripper 1s the famous
London murderer'. Is there, as Kripke wou~d have it, a clear
nonep1stem1c de dicta sense on which this statement is
possibly false? Yes: there are circumstances in which
this statement would not be true, to wit, Jack the Ripper
goes into academia. STOP. There 1s no call to go further
and talk of essent1alproperties or ~ re modality. Kripke's
(Fn. 11 continued)
(4) What (I) expresses might have been the case.
Doesn't this express the desired assertion, with no
scope ambiguities? If not, what would do so?
See also Fn. 10.
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notion of metaphysical de dicta modality hinges on whether
there could be circumstances under which the given statement
1s true (or false). And that is all he commits himself to.
Dummett's second and primary argument purports to
ShCM that Krlpke ,'s notion of metaphysical modal! ty reduces
to that of de re modality; consequently, there is once again
no distinction to be discerned between names and descrl,p'tions
in modal contexts. Thus (I quote in full);
What then is the fact whose contingency we express by
saying that the standard metre rod might have been
shorter or longe~ than 1 metre, but which is not
expressed when we say a priori that it is 1 metre long,
or that it has the length it has? So long as we pose the
question this way there does not seem to be any
satisfactory answer. Rather, it is not so much that
some contingent fact obtains, at least, if we understand
a tact as something that can be expressed by means of
a sentence understood in some specific sense, but that
a certain Object, namely the standard metre rod possesses
a contingent property, that of being 1 metre long; or
perhaps that a certain length, namely a metre, possesses
the contingent property of being the length of standard
metre rod. If we refer to the rod as 'the standard'
metre rod' then we guarantee that (provided we are,
referring to anything at ell) we are ,referring to a
length which is that of the standard metre rod. But that
very rod which we refer to might have been of a
different length; that very length which we refer to
might not have been that of the standard metre. This
sort of contingency cannot be grasped in terms of the
notion of a contingent fact, but only in terms of
that of an accidental propertl. And, indeed, Kripke
himself strongly emphasIzes tEe importance for his
doctrine of the distinction between essential and
accidental properties of an object. But what this means
is that we cannot attain to the required notion of
contingency by concentrating on the linguistic form:
lIt 1s contingent (possible, necessary) that ••••• ',
where the gap is to be filled by an entire sentence; we
have, instead to understand the form: I It is contin-
gently (possibly, necessarily) true oflthat ••••••
I '. We have to explain, not what it is for the
~entence, 'The standard metre Ilod is 1 metre long', to
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be contingently true, but what it is for the pred1e~teI, is 1 metre long' to be contingently true of an
aeject; equivalently, we have to understand not the
sentence 't (the standard metre rod is not one metre
long)', but the predicate '0 ( , is not 1 metre long) '.
Just the same will be the case with the contingency
which we express by saying that St. Anne might not
have been a parent. We can not understand this as
relating directly to the status of the sentence 'St.
Anne might not have been a parent', as this might
be used to express something known a priori, but as
saying of St. Anne, that she possessed the accidental
property of being a parent. 'St. Anne might not have
been a parenti should not be rendered as 'It is possible
that St. Anne was not a parenti but as 'It 1s true
of St. Anne that she was posslbly-not-a-parent~ But what
this means 1s that, in order to understand the sort of
contingency Krlpke alleges to exist in these cases, we
are compelled after all to invoke just the notion of
scope to which Kr1pke appealed in the case of definite
descriptions. In 'St. Anne might not have been a
parent', the nAme 'St. Anne' must be construed as be1ng
within the scope ot the modal operator: this is what is
implicit in Krlpkels account in terms of accidental and
essential properties, as against contingent and
neoessary facts or statements. It 1s thus not merely
that the uniform explanation, in terms of scope, of
the ambiguity that occurs when either definite des-
criptions or proper names occur in modal contexts is pre-
~er8ble, because more economical, than having, in the
latter case, to introduce the a priori/necessary
distinction, it 1s that, in order to understand the
notions of necessity and contingency that Krlpke
uses, we find ourselvBs rorced to appeal to the notion
of scope, for proper names as well as definite
descriptions (pp. 124-125).
Let us consider first Dummett's puzzlement over Kr1pkean
"facts": 'What then 1s this fact whose contingency we
express by saying that the standard raeter rod might have
been shorter or longer than one meter? There does not seem
to be any sat1sfsctory answer, if we understand a fact as
something that can be expressed by means of a sentence
tmderstood in some specific sense. I This seems hardly a fair
query. We might just as legitimately ask of Dummett: 'What
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then is this fact which can be expressed by means of a
sentence understood in some specific sense?' Indeed for
Kr1pke, it is the same fact (actually Kripke would say:
same statement; see below) which is said to be contingent as
that wh1ch is known a priori. If there 1s, as Dummett
thinks, a clear sense to the latter, then th~re is for
Kr1pke a clear sense to the former and the mystery of facts
disappears.
Actually I am here being somewhat unfair to Dummett.
Immediately preceding this quote, he has argued that it can
not be the same fact which is contingent and a priori. I
12do not think h1s argument is convincing.
12Dummettls argument 1s basically by way ot example.
Here Is one•. Suppose someone 1n 1001 A.D.--at which time
1t was true by stipulation that Christ was born in 1 A.D.--
asserts that Christ was born in 1 A.D. That, says Dummett
(and let ~s agree) 1s a paradigm of the type of statement
which 1s clelmed by Krlpke to be contingent a priori. But
there 1s here, cla1ms Dummett, no one fact expressed which is
both a priori and contingent.
Thus, suppose the person making the assertion has no
idea of what year it 1s. His claim that Christ was born in
1 A.D. 1s indeed 8 priori. In a sense, his knowledge 1s of
the conventions of the dating system. But there 1s nothing
known here Which is contingent. Perhaps if he knew further
that it was 1001, he would know the contingent fact that
Christ was born 1000 years ago. But this further fact 1s
not known 8 priori since it 1s inferred from other contingent
knowledge.
Analogously, if he knew just that Christ was born 1000
years ago {and does ,not know the basis or the dating system},
all he knows is some contingent fact and nothing a priori. So
that Kr1pke l s cla~ that we have one thing, being a priori
and contingent, is based on an ambiguity der1v1ng from the
different possible ways of fixing the reference of '1 AaD.'
Though this argument is appealing, it is not (obvlousl~'
anyway) correct. The supposition that the person making
the assertion knows only the dating system (and no other
related fact including the present date) or only that Christ
127
Even if it were correct, all it would show is that one
and the same fact could not simultaneously be contingent and
8 priori. It would not show that Kripkecs distinction
between epistem1c and metaphysical necessity applied to
different sorts or racts; that one case but not the other
must be analyzed in terms ot necessary properties. Thus,
Dummett himself' allows the feas1bl11ty of "antic" necessity
(about which more later) versus epistem1c. On his inter-
pretation, there can be no a priori (ep1stem1cally necessary),
(ont1cally) contingent statements. Yet, various statements
Fn. 12 cont1nued)
was born 1000 years ago, 1s not, I believe, coherent. In any
case, the s1tuation, even 1f feasible, seems to me to be
completely symmetr1ca1; and I do not see how we can decide
that in one case, we have a priori knowledge, while in the
other, knowledge of a contingent fact.
Thus, if all that a person knows is Christ was born 1000
years aRC. there 1s a sense in which he does not know what
year it 1s now: he knows it 1s this year (1001). but not
that this year is 1+ however'many years have passed since
the birth ot Christ. Similarly, if all one knows 1s the
calendar convention. there 1s sense in which one doesn't know
what year Christ was born in: one knows Christ was born in
whatever year Christ was born in (1 A.D.), but not that he
was born 1000 years ago. These two cases seem completely
equivalent 8S tar as the having or lacking of a pr10riclty
(or contingency) goes.
It seems thus that Dummett's idea of breaking up the
individual's knowled8e into an a prlo~1 and a contingent
component 1s not satisfactory; and our knowledge does not, 1n
fact, consist in such independent facts. There is thus
room for our statements to be a priori contingent without th~re
being any ambiguity. This question is intricate and more
could be said; it seems clear enough though that Dummett
has not yet shown that 8 statement could not be a priori
contingent •
•
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can, univocally, be said to be either ontically or
ep1stem1cally necessary or contingent. Similarly here,
that a statement can not be a priori contingent does not,
in itself, enta1l that the two sorts of necessity apply to
different sorts of statements or facts.
Actually, the whole question of "racts" 1s something of
a red herring. Kr1pke standardly discusses the necessity
of statements and he exp11citly Makes the point of ':d1s-
tingu1sh1ng the metaphysical necessity of statements (and
not facts) from de re necessity. How then 1s Dummett able
to oonclude, "We can not attain the required notion of
contingency by concentrating on the linguistic form lIt
1s contingent (necessary, possible) that •••••••• ' where the
gap 1s to be f1lled by a whole sentence?" That, according
to Krlpke, 1s precisely the required notion; it 1s the
assumption we are working with. Have any reasons been
adduced to deny that assumption?
One thing which we should clear up right away 1s
Dummett's apparent suggestion that Kr1pke appeals to the notion
or necessary properties in his elucidation of the epistem1c/
metaphysical distinction. (I.e., "And, indeed, Krlpke
himself strongly emphasizes the importance for his doctrine
of the distinction between essential and accidental pro-
perties of an object.,") It 1s certainly true that Kripke
defends the cohsence of essential attribution. It is
equally true that that notion is not appealed to in his
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analysis of metaphysical necessity: Indeed, this is our
assumption, and it is an assumption pretty well born out by
the text (from which I've given some quotes above). Dummett
will have to produce an independent argument if he is to
convince us or this point.
Dummett's reasoning, ag far as I can tell, appears to
be something like this. Facts, for Kr1pke, consist in
objects having certain properties. To assert of any such
tact that it 1s necessary is, therefore, to appeal to the
notion of necessary property; and tha·~ is to take the assert10n
of necessity on its de re reading.
Now, even it we do ,talk of facts, how does it follow
that if one is committed to necessary facts, then one 1s
committed to necessary properties? There appears nothing
inconsistent or unreasonable in believing that an object's
having a certain property (i.e., a ract) 1s necessary--
independently of ,how the object in question is referred to--
without committing one's self to the existence of necessary
properties, or just plain properties for that matter.
And even if one were so committed to necessary proper-
ties, there i.s still room for the existence of (distinct)
necessary rae!! (or better statements): and Kr1pke need
merely have his argument be concerned with these.
We have seen that nothing Dummett has said counts
against Kr1pke's assumption about the analysis of meta-
physical necessity, or the validity of the conclusions
drawn from that assumption (except, perhaps, the weak claim
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that it 1s simpler to just advert to scope distinctions).
But, of course, neither have I given any positive
reasons for denying that appeal to scope distinctiollS is
the appropriate method of analyzing the data. As far as
anything has been said, there really seems to be two
separate analyses with no strong reason to support one over
'the other. And Dwnmett himself says things in this vein:,
His wish to dispense with the notion of sense for
proper names leeds h1m to regard 8 fact as consisting,
e. g., in Vte ..pefsession by an object of a certa1n
property: or in two objects' standing to one another
in a certain relation. A fact, so conceived, may be
taken as ro~lng the content of a particular statement,
but it certainly cannot be 1dent1f1ed with the thought
expressed by the statement, as Frega conceives of it,
and hence cannot properly speaking be said to be an
object or knowled~e at all. The knowledge which
someone expresses by means of an assertion (when it
1s knowledge) 1s the knOWledge that the thought
expressed by the sentence used to make the assertion
1s true; it cannot, properly speaking, be taken to be
the knowledge ,that the tact obtains lin Krlpke's
sense ot tract l ) which 1s the content of the assertion.
Thus, for instance, Krlpke l s notion of facts leads
straight to the conclusion, willingly drawn by
Kr1pke J that the fact which 1s the content of a true
statement ot identity 1s always a necessary one: for
it 1s just the fact that a certa1n object bears to itself
that relation which every object bears to itself and
to no other (p. 126).
We have witnessed no reason to think one analysis is
better than the other.
As long as I have quoted the above, let me jump ahead
B little. My last section will be concerned with a possible
line of argument on Dummett's behalf: That even though a
de dicta metaphys1cal/ep1stem1c distinction may exist, it
is solely the latter which is relevant to a term's meaning.
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There are suggestions to this effect throughout Dummett's
discuss ion; and the above might also be so constI'ued a
Let us turn now to the rigid/nonrigid distinction.
Dummett's claim, let us recall, is that this is in reality 8
distinction of scopes. And that both proper names and defin-
ite descriptions can be given either large or small scope.
Since Dummett's style usually leaves him open to multiple
interpretations, I shall, once more, quote in full.
The thesis that proper names are rigid designators 1s
expressed in te~s or the metaphor of possible worlds,
and hence, to g1ve it substance we must remove the
metaphor. And, as soon as we try to do this, we see
that it concerns nothing other than our old not1on of
the scope of 8 term in a modal context. For definite
descriptions, there 1s no distinction between their
meaning and the way their reference 1s determined;
in other words, the way in which the reference 1s
determined in the real world~ carried over into each
particular possible world. In any possible world, the
referent ot 'The man who led the Jewish people out of
Egypt' 1s the one and only object (if any) Which,
in that world, satisfies the predicate '1s a man who
led the Jewish people out of Egypt'. But the whole
point of saying that, tor a proper name, its meaning
diverges from the way in which its reference 1s de-
termined 1s to make clear that the latter 1s not taken
8S carrying over into whatever possible world we are
concerned with. So that there 1s 8 possible world in
which St. Anne had no children, involves that, in
that world, the reference of the name "St. Anne' 1s not
determined in the way in which it is determined in the
real world; rather, it is determined in the world via
its reference to the real world, 1.e., as being to
the same woman as the one who 1s its referent in the
real world. This can only be interpreted as the thesis
that, in a modal context, 8 definite description
must always be construed as lying within the scope of
the modal operator, while a proper name must always
be construed as lying outside its scope. To assign a
term a reference varying from one possible world to
another 1s just to take it as having, in each
possible world, the refernece which it would have in
that worldj coversely, to assign it a constant
reference is to· take it 85 having, in each world,
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just that reference which it has in the real world.
But to take a term in the former of these two ways
is precisely to treat it as being within the scope of
the modal operator, while to take it the second way
is to treat it as £alllng outside that scope. Thus,
when Kr1pke says that it would not be true that:
the teacher of Alexander didn't teach A~exander, he is
intending to convey that within any possible world, it
would never be true to say that 'The teacher of
Alexander didn't teach Alexander'. Here the definite
description is taken to have a~ referent, within each
possible world, the unique object (if any) which in
that world satisfies the predicate 'taught Alexander';
and we. display our adoption of this interpretation
by rendering the sentence with the description taken as
falling within the scoEe or the modal operator, namely
as: , t 31 'dy. [CTx..... v;-y)o. 'T1).
When, however, we assert that the teacher of Alexander
might not have taught Alexander, we are treating the
definite description 8S having as its constant
referent, that referent which it has in the real world,
and this amounts to taking the description to lie
outside the scope of the modal operator.
Krlpke l s doctrine that proper names are rigid
designators and definite descriptions nonrigid ones
thus reduces to the claim that, within a modal
context, the scope of definite descriptions would
,always be taken to exclude the modal operator, whereas
the scope of a proper name should always be taken to
include it. Even if this wer9 30, it would not demon-
strate the non-equivalence of a proper name with B
definite descript10n in any very strong sense; it would
simply show that they behave differently with respect
to ad hoc conventions employed by us for determining
scope (pp. 127-128).
The issues here are not really very different from those
encountered immediately above. This should come as no
surp~ise. If Dummett is correct in his claim that the only
coherent (or perhaps as we shall discuss in Section IV,
relevant) de dicta notion of necessity is the eplstemic, there
are no grounds to distinguish names from descriptions.
(Even Kripke would admit this.) For Dummett, both claiming
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that an assertion is epistem1cally necessary and that a term
is nonrigid, is the same as saying that the relevant terms
fall within the scope of the modal operator; and that 1s
equivalent to the claim tht the reference of the term
in other possible worlds is dete~ined by what the term would
reter to in each such world. Equivalent remarks apply to
his analysls of rigid terms.
If, on the other hand, Kripke is correct, and we can
make out the metaphysical de dicta reading, then the
(nonscope) distinction between names and descriptions 1s
stra~ghtrorward. one has only to consider the statements,
"Aristotle might not have been the teacher of Alexander,"
and "The teachel' ot Alexander ml~ht not have been the
teaoher of Alexander" construed (metaphysically) de d1cto
(See also footnotes 10 and 11 on this).
So, once again, the issues seem to depend on a dif-
ferent assumption on how to construe the truth conditions
of modal statements. I've already given what I take to be
Kr1pke's. PeUBps we can say that Dummett's view is that a
(medal) statement's truth conditions 1s determined by its
"logical torm"; that modal assertions allow for two such
(de dicta and de re) , .. each of which 1s applicable equally
to sentences containing proper names or descriptions.
Both Krlpke and Dummett's views follow naturally from
their assumptions. But, so far, no strong reason has been
adduced to support one over the other.
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I turn now to a problem first encountered in Section I.
Names can be distinguished from descriptions (reference
fixing or otherwise) by virtue of the fact that we can truth-
fully say, e.g., 'The teacher of Alexander might not have
been the teacher of Alexander' while we cannot say, 'Aris-
totle might not have been Aristotle'. On Kr1pke's
criterion, 'Aristotle' 1s rigid while 'The teacher of
Alexander' is not.
In response to this, Dummett makes a limited
concession to Kr1pke. "The grain of truth in Kripke's
view in the behavior of proper names after verbs like 'be'."
That this 1s so has to do not, claims Dummett, with the
general behavior of terms in modal contexts, but rather
with the fact that. "we do not regard such a predicate
as I '" 1s St. Anne I as standing for 8 pr,operty that can be
acquired. .. (While I (\ is the mother of Mary' would,
presumably, stand for such a property.)
One might think such 8 concession an the concess1onKrlpke
needsj not so, avers Dummett. What is involved in this
analysis 1s really (8 cluster of) two descriptions synony-
mous with the proper name: "It 1s not exactly accurate
to say the name 'St. Anne' has the ~lBe of 'The mother of
Mary': Rather it has a sense such that it 1s replaceable
either by 'The mother of Mary' or by 'The woman who was to
be the mother of Mary', according to context."
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~s another example, let us take 'Jack the Ripper', and
see if this move works. For it to do so, Dummett must have
it that an appropriate replacement of both occurrences of
~Jack the Ripper' 1n IJac~ the Ripper might not have been
Jack the Ripper' will yield a statement which has, as does the
orlg1~al, no true reading. Replacing both occurrences of the
name by the same description will clearly not do. What
Dummett intends is that we replace the first occurrence by
'The faMous London murderer' and the second by 'The man
who was to became the famous London murderer'. The outcome
1s a sentence, 'The famous London murderer might not have
been the man who was to become the famous London murderer,'
wh1c~, on Dummett's analysis of the modalities, has no 'true
~ead1ng.13
But the above does not yield the desired conclusion:
1.e.» that there 1s a sentence (containing only the appro-
priate descriptions) which has no (tout court) true
reading; Dummett has only shown there 1s no true reading
on~ conceptions or modality. There may be true readings
on other conceptions of modality. Indeed one such 1s
Krlpke's: The famous London murderer might not have been
13Dummett defines an essential property as one which is,
during every time of an object's existence, a 'presently
essential' property. A presently essential property 1s one
which, once an object has it, it can not lose and remain the
same object. Being a Man who was to be the famous London
murderer would. Dummett would have it, be an essential
proprty, and 'The famous London murderer might (in the
Dummett sense) not have been the one who was to be the fa-
mous London murderer' 1s false on all readings.
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the famous London murderer; in which case he likewise
would not have been the one who was to become the famous
London murderer. Hence, there is a sense 1n which 'The
famous London murderer might not have been the one who was
to became the famous London murder' 1s true. Unless Dummett
shows that there 1s some 1ncoherency in !{r1pke:s conception
of modality, and he has not, his argument here too will not
stand. And once again, the issue seems to depend on
differing conceptions or how to analyze the modalities.
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III
The conclusion or the last section was that we had
reached a stalemate. In the present section. I wish to
see If any positive argwments can be marshalled on Krlpke's
beh81t.
The tl~8t point 1s one that has already been touched
upon. Both Krlpke and Dummett agree on the existence of a
de dicta ep18temlc reading or modal assertions. The bone
ot contention 18, a8 we have seen, whether or not there is
• turther de dlcta metaphys1cal reading ot modal statements 0
There does seem to be a fairly nonproblematlc sense to this.
A sentence 18 true it it corresponds to the tacta (agaln, we
caD unpack this. 1. Tarskl). It 1s necessarily true,
it it corresponda in a 8~11ar manner to the tacts 88 they
obtain in each world (we can think ot 9 world 8S all the
tects there are). This seems to me relatively straight-
torward, and unproblematic, D~ett's attempted denogrB~on
or the concept not withstanding-
Nor, as already mentioned, is there really any reason
to think that such appeals to tacts on other 'possible
worlds invokes the notion or necessary properties. Thus,
consider someone who believes that 8 statement 1s true it
it corresponds to the facts: and hence believes 1n fsetse
It would be wrong to c18~ that merely by adherence to this
theory ~t truth be Is committed to hypostatiz1ng pro-
perties; 1.e., that since facts are nothing but objects
hav1ng proper~le8 to say that 'A is pi corresponds to the
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tacts 1s to say that there exists 8 p~opertz P had by A.
This reasoning is clearly invalid; one can be committed to
facts without recognizing prop.ert1es. My point above 1s
s1mllar; the tacts are just on other poss1ble worlds. Or
consider one who chooses to interpret 'necessarily' as
'compatible with the laws or nature'. Can he not make
assertions ot de dicta metaphysical necessity (wh1ch can
still be distinguished trom eplstemlc) without committing
himself to 'compatible with the laws ot nature properties'?
Indeed, Just this sort of Tarakl-type analysis extended
to other possible worlds has been Qsed by H. Field (in- his
previously cited article) tor quite 1ndependent reasons.
ThLl8 he writes:
Por lnstance, tor a .entence or ro~ rp(b)' where
P is 8 predicate and b a name, the definition will
read
rp( b)' is true at w 11" and only if ttere is an
objeet x that b denotes (1n the actual world)
and 8 propert, Z that P stands tor (in the
actual world), and w 1s a world in which x
exists and has Z.
For example, 'Bertrand Russell 1s hairless' 1s true
at any possible world w in which Bertrand Russell
(l.e., the person d~noted in the actual world by
the name 'Bertrand Russell') exists and is hairless
(l.e., has the property that the word 'hairless'
stands to~ in the actual world).
Given such an analys1s, it 1s straightforward how we
would analyze the (de dicta) notion or metaphysical
necesslty, and rigid designation. (Notice there 1s no
reference to necessary properties.) I think there are
problems with this treatment (e.g., its ability to deal with
139
definite descriptions instead of names). What is pertinent
~hough 1s that Field exhibits no need whatsoever' to defend
the coherency or his to~u18tlon. Further, it materialism
1s true, and 8 conception 89 above is necessary tor an
adequate materialist account of the notion of truth, we would
have proof positive of the notion's coherency.
Besides its prima facie plausibility, there are examples
we can bring on Kr1pke's analys1s' behalf: 'Cats might
be robots' I say, to use the venerable example. This 1s
metaphysically false, read both the de re and de dicta; there
are no possible circumstances under wh1ch cats (the mammalians
we know and love) could be robots. But it can be given an
eplstemlc Interpretation on which it 1s true: I could be
1n the same eplstemlc state 8S I am now and it turn out that
the things I've been calling cats are really robots in dis-
guise. On the other hand, if orf in the distance I v8g~ely
discern an object which, though I don't know it, 1s 8 tsble,
I may say 'The object in the corner might be an elephant',
which seems true read de dicta: epistemlc~y or metaphysically;
there are circumstances under which the statement would be
true. But false r9ad de re. 14
14It might be objected to the validity of this example
because or the lndexlcallty of 'The object in the corner'.
But Why should that make 8 difference? Below I discuss 'I'
8S 8 rigid designator and its appropriateness might there too
be que~led since it can apply to many people in any given
possible world. But if this 1s 8 problem, 1t 1s 8 problem
faced by almost all rigid designators including the paradigms:
proper names and terms like 'this' and 'that'. The crucial
l~
These examples should not dece1ve us into being over-
confident; they do not, by themselves, prove that Krlpke's
d1stinction exists; Dummett will say that in the former
case he can distinguish only one reading on which the
sentence 1s false, while in the latter only one on which
it is true; he can never be forced to concede Kripke's
distinction by such examples. for any perceived differences
in modal assertions can always be construed as either a
difference in scope (if there Is 8 difference in truth
value) or not to exist at all (if there is no difference
1n truth value). Nevertheless, these examples do add
plausibility to Kr1pke's case.
(Fn. 14 contln~ed)
property of rigid designators which make them such is their
demonstrativeness; 8S 1s clear trom Krlpke
'
s exposition
-(consider ,again 'this' and 'that'). On that count. 'I'
certainly qua11fies. Further. note the following from
Kr1pke l s new Introduction:
In~8cticeJ it is usual to suppose that what 1s
meant in a particular use of 8 sentence 1s understood
fromthe context. III the present instance, that context
made it clear that it was the conventionsl use or
'Arlsto~le' for the great philosopher that was in
question. Then Bivjn this fixed understanding of (1),
the question or r g alty 1s: Is the correctness of (1),
thus understood, determined with respect to each counter-
factual situatIon by Whether a certain single person
would have liked dogs (had the situation obtained)? ....
To speak ot 'the truth oonditions' or a sentence s·uch
as (1), it must be taken to express a s1ngle proposition--
otherwise its truth conditions even with respect to the
actual world are lndete~lnate. Thus, ambiguous words
or homonyms (perhaps 'dog' 1s (1) must be read 1n a
dete~lnate way (canine!), lndex1cals must be assigned
determinate references, syntactic ambiguities must be
resolved, and it must be fixed whether 'Aristotle'
nam~s the philosopher or the shipping Magnate. Only
S1V~ such a reading can Russell propose an analysis such
as" )--rlgbtly, no one ever faulted him on this score.
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Finally, there 1s Krlpke's example (quoted already in
Fn. 11) which 1s not so obviously answerable by Dwmmett. I
have changed the example so 8S to make it as favorable 99
possible to Dummett--and to show that Krlpke still makes
his point. Consider the follow1ng:
(1) St. Anne was the mother of Mary.
(2) What (1) expresses might not have been the case.
(2) appears truej on one reading, anyway. Yet, 1t can not
plausibly be construed as making a de re assertion of
modality (atter all, the object ot the Modell t.y 1s what
(1) expresses). Nor can it be taken to be attributing ep1s-
tem1c modality; tor on that reading. both Kr1pke and Dummett
agree (2) 1s false. So its true reading must be the meta-
physical de dicta one.
Finally, there 1s the following: We have been assuming
that accord1ng to Dummett, the only reading of de dicto
necess1ty 1s what Kr1pke calls the eplstemlc. We suggested
that Dummett might hold (more or less) that truth conditions
for modal statements are dependent on their "logical formn;
dependent, that is, solely on how we read scope. If, however
Dummett were to admit 8S valid some other noneplstemlc de
dicta interpretation, then his position would be much weaker.
Fo~ then, no longer would it just be a question of
two different ways ot evaluating truth conditions: For
Dummett would admit noneplstem1c de dicto readings: It would
be incumbent upon h~ to say what 1s wrong with Krlpke's.
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But this 1s what Dummett concedes. He admits the feasl-
, -
bl11ty of 8 "real1st1c" notion or (de dicta) necessity.
Such an interpretation would hold that "the sense ofl our
sentences 1s given in such 8 way as to relate to their deter-
mination as true or 8S false, by B reality existing inde-
pendently of us, and that. in 8 well constructed language,
every sentence will thus be determined true or false,
1ndependently ot our capacity, even in principle, for
recognizing what truth value 1t has l • {sounds close to
Kr1pke's metaphysical necessity, does it not).
Dummett proceed~ to give an explicit elucidation of
what such a notion might be like. wh1ch he calls 'antic'
necessity:
It tor the understanding or 8 given sentence 'it
1s necessary to 1nvoke the concept1on of 8 being whose
powers ot observation or mental capacities transcend
O~8 in a given respect. then the statement, if
true, is ontlcally necessary, 1f it would be epls~
temlcally necessary tor such a belng--l.e.: 1f it
could be known a prlorl by him.
Now a tew comments:
(l) This criterlon itself involves reference to
· 15
noneplstemlc necesslty--l.e., the 'would' and 'could'.
151t the notion ot ont1c nec8s31ty 8S so exp11cated
is legltLmate, then 80 must Kr1pke's notion of metaphysicsl
necessity be--for the former adverts to the latter. It
CQuld not be that the 'could' 1s to be taken relative to
our ~derstand1ng--l.e., eplstemlcally--tor then we would
have to understand the nature ot his a priori knowledge of the
sentence and we wo~ld therefore be able to understand it a
priori ourselves, contra hypo'~he81s·. Nor would the 'could'
be taken relative to the being's understanding, because then
we would have to posit yet a higher being with whom the same
problem would arise.
143
(2) Let us make a slight variation on Dummett's
criterion and take 8S the higher being, God. Let us
consider Him pondering whioh of all the possible worlds is
best so that He may bring it into existence. In particular,
He ponders 8 world in which "Moses led the Israelites out of
Egypt," and "Jack the Ripper 1s the famous London murderer"
is false. These assertions, assuming 8S we are that the
descriptions tit the reference or the names, are epls-
temlcally necessary. Yet, by 8 slight variation of Dummett's
criterion, they come out ontlcally (read: metaphysically?)
contingent, 80 th~s would confirm Krlpke
'
s 1nterpretation.
(3) .. There 1s no connection made between 8 "realistio"
interpretation, 8S ..first described, and the "antic" one just
presented. No reason 1s given Why a realistic interpretation
has to be this one and no other.
(4) Which brings us back,to our orlg1nal~lnt. There 1s
no reason why, it we are granting the coherency ot "realistic"
interpretations, that we can not take Krlpke's to be one
such. We have seen previously Dummett's attempt to discredit
that notlon--l.e., by claiming it was nothing more than
essential attribution; and we saw that he could not make the
charge stick. G1ven the assumptions we were working
under, we declared a draw~ but trom the present perspective,
it appears that Dummett remains with 8 debt to discharge:
showing something wrong with Krlpke's notion of meta-
physical necessl ty.·
D~ett does have two things to s8y about th1s, when
discussing ant1c necessity. First:
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None of t·hls has, however, verr much to do with the topic
of the bahavlour of proper names and def1nite descriptions
in modal contexts. This can be seen from the fact that
both the notions of antic and of eplstemlc necessity
that mtve been discussed concern the status of whole
senten~es. ~~ey, therefore, can be used, w1thout
supplem6nts.tion, only to expla1n the occurrence of iriitial
modal oper~tor8, whereas Krlpke's account of definite
descriptions involved treating such operators 89
capable of standing within the scope of other operators,
in particular of quantifiers. In order to provide
a sense for modal operators in such contexts, we
have to take 8 step of quite 8 different kind from that
of dist1nguishing antic from eplstem1c necessity:
we have, namely, to expla1n when a predicate con-
taining 8 modal operator, for instance the predicate
, l m1ght not have been a leader' or ,t might not
have been 1 metre long', 1s true of an object.
But this 1s really begg1ng the question. When we
construed Dummett's claim to be that the only issue involved
was "logical torm," snd the only coherent sort of necessity
was eplstemlc, the above could be plausibly argued, g1ven
those assumptions.
But now given that we are accepting the existence of a
'realistic' interpretation, and that, Kr1pke claims, essentlal-
. 1y, that his interpretation is to be construed 8S such,
much more 1s needed by way~ argument than the assertion
that something 1s wrong with Krlp'ke' s notion of facts.
Dummett Makes one further point:
Krlpke does not dr51 bis d1stinction between the
8 priori and the necessary in the way that the
distinction between ep1stemlc and antic necessity
has here been drawn. On the account sketched above,
eplstemlc necessity 1s 8 stronger notion than
antic necessity: a statement may be ont1cally but
not eplstemlcally necessary, but the converse could
not occur. Krlpke, however, claims the properties
of being 8 priori and being necessary to be quite
independent: not only maya statement be necessary
tho~gh not a priori; it can also be 8 priori without
be1ng necessary.
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But all this shows 1s that Krlpke's notion of meta-
physical necessity 1s not the same as Dummett's antic.
It gives no reason to suppose that Kr1pke's interpretation
1s not an equally valid "real1stic" one. Indeed, we even
saw that 8 slight variation of Dummett's antic notion yielded
a priori contingent statements.
The arguments considered so far in this sect 10n are' not,
cUMulatively even, decisive against Dummett. They do
cUMulatively show, however, that if we must come down on
one side 1n the dispute. it 1s Krlpke's.
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IV
Imp11c1t 1n Dummett's discussion 1s an argument with,
apparently, cons1derable force. Grant1ng, for argument's
sake, that Krlpke IS metaphys 1cal!eplstemlc distinction can b'e
drawn, Dummett might yet argue that 1t 1s only the ep1stem1c
context which 1s relevant to a·term's meaning. Thus Dummett
says:
Even it this distinction were the right one to draw, it
1s plain that it 1s the notion or ep1stem1c possibility
that Is required 1t we want to represent sense 8S a
function trom possible states of affairs to reference.
Sense 1s (to repeat again) a cognitive notlon ...•.•• (134).
Once this 1s granted, it 1s 8 short step to the claim that
proper names can be synonymous with the definite descriptions
which fix their reference. With1n eplstemlc modal contexts,
Krlpke l s QrgW1l~nts 'are diuarmed for the behavior of names and
descriptions are .not· dlstlnguishsble,. Thus (a few l1nes
later and concluding his argument):
... then the way 1s open to consider even s proper
name as a flexible designator: that ls, to consider
what object, 1f any, wou~d, in a given possible world
constitute its referent, if that referent we~e
determined ln the same way as is done in" the real
world (IPossible' here must mean 'eplstem1cally
possible': that 1s the only rele~8nt notion when we are
concerned with the eplstemlc question what we grasp in
grasping the use ot a word (pp. 134-135).18
16The first Dummett quote immediately above represents
the Idea that even if there 1s a distinction between meta-
physical and eplstemic ne cessity (which is not s dlstlm tion
ot scopes), it 1s only ep1stemic (de dicta) necessity which
counts tor a term's meaning.
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And lndeed peppered throughout Dwmnett' s argument are
suggestions stml1ar to the above.
Before proceeding, let me make explicit B point
contained in the above; and already mentioned by me some-
what obliquely. For both Dummett and Krlpke, the truth
conditions for an ep1stemlc assertion of necessity are
determined by what the terms in the sentence would refer
to it used in an eplstem1cally similar situation; or equi-
valently, by determining what terms would refer to if
used with the same reference-fixing device. From such a
perspective, 'Moses' might refer to someone other than what
it does in the actual world (Which Kr1pke would grant, given
that w~re talking about eplstemlc necessity).
Now Dummett takes the epistemlc/metaphyslcal distinction to
be really 8 de dicta! de re dist1nction; eplstemlc 1s
equIvalent to de dicta. But taking a term nonrigid 1s also
taking it within the scope of 8 modal operator. So saying
8 tennis nonrigid (assume it 1s the only referring term in
the sentence) 1s equivalent, for Dummett, to saying the
assertion of modality, of which it 1s a part, 1s read
(Pn. 16 continued)
By the t1me Dwmmett gets to this second quote, he has
once more reiterated that Kr1pke's d1stlnct1on 1s really
one ot scopes. His point seems to be that in either case it
is only the eplste~lc de dicta context which 1s relevant to 8
term's meaning.
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eplstemlcally. And this entails that taking 8 term as
nonrigid means that its reference in any possible world 1s
what the term would refer to 1f it were used In that world
with the same reference-tixing device.
And this is precisely what Dummett indicates. Thus,
in the prior long quote regarding rigid and nonrigid des1gna-
tors, he said:
For definite descriptions, there 1s no distinction
"between their meaning and the way their reference
1s dete~lned; in other words, the way In which the
reference ot 8 definite description 1s determined
in the real world 1s carr1ed over into each partCular
possible world.
And slightly later, "To assign 8 term a reference,
varying trom one possible world to another, 1s just to
take it 8S having, in each possible world, the reference
which it would bear 1n that world" (emphas1s mine); and
later on in the quote, "Thus. when Krlpke says that it could
not be true that: the teacher of Alexander didn't teach
Alexander, he is intending to· convey that , within any pos s lble
world, it would never be true to say, 'The teacher of
Alexander dldn' t teaCh Alexander. t" Anc f1nally, our
previous quote, " • • • then the way 1s open to consider even
a proper Dame as a flexible designator; that Is, to consider
what object, 1t any, would, in a glvAn possible world,
constitute ita referent, 1t that referent were dete~lned
1n the same way 8S 1s done in the real world."
Having made this point, let us return to the original
question ot whether the eplstemlc context 1s the only rele-
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vent one for 8 term's meaning.
To appreciate the strength or this content1on o 1t 1s
instructive to eX8~lne c~rtaln views of Putnam's; views
which PutnaM takes to be essentially equivalent to Krlpke's:
Let WI and W2 be two possible worlds in wh1ch I
exist and 1n which this glass exists and in which
I am giving a meaning explanation by pointing to
this glass and saying 'this 1s water'. (We do not assume
that the liquid in the glass 1s the same in both .
worlds.) Let us suppose that in Wi the glass is full
of H20 and in W2 the glass is full of XYZ. We shall
also suppose that Wi 1s the actual world and that XYZ
is the stufr typically called 'water' in the world W2 0(So that the relation between Engllsh speaker in WI
and English speaker 1n W2 is exactly the same as tlie
relation between English speakers on earth and
English speakers on Twin Earth.) Then there are two
theories one might have concerning the meaning of
'water I •
(1) One might hold that 'water' was world relative but
constant 1n meaning (l.e., the word has a constant
relative meaning.) In this theory 'water' means the
same In W1 and W2; it's just that water 1s H20 1n WI
and water is XYZ in W2.
(2) One m1ght hold that water 1s H~O in all worlds
(the stufr called 'water' b W2 lsn t water) but
'water' doesn't have the same meaning in WI and W2-,
If what was said before about the Twin Earth case was
correct, then (2) 1s clearly the correct theory. When
I say 'this (liquid) 1s water', the 'this' Is, so
to speak, s· de re 'thls
'
--i.e., the force of my
explanation Ii that 'water' 1s whatever bears 8
certain equivalence relation (the relation we called
'samer.' above) to the piece ot l1quid referred to as
'thlsT in the actual world_
We", might symbolize the difference between the two
theories as a 'scope' difference 1n the following way.
In theory (i), the following is true:
(1') (For every world W)(For every x in W), (x 1s
water - x bears sameL to the entity referred to as
I this' in W.)
(2 1 ) (For every world W)(For every x in W)(x is water -
x bears sameL to the entity referred to 8S 'this· in
the actual world Wi):
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(I call th1~ 8 'scope' difference because in (2')
the entity referred to 8S ' "th1s" , means 'the
ent1ty referred to as "this" in the actual world'.
and has thus 8 reference independent of the bound
variable 'W'.)
Kr1pke calls 8 designator 'rigid' (1n a g1ven sentence)
1f (in that sentence) it refers to the same individual
in every possible world in which the designator
designates. If we extend the notion of r1g1dlty to
substance names, then we may 8zpress Krlpke's theory
and mine by saying that the term 'water' 1s rigid
( pp. 230-231).
It 1s interesting how clQse Putnam's analysis comes
to Dummett'sj even to the extent or adverting to scope
distinctions. What divides them 1s that Putnam opts for
(2) as the correct analysis (at least tor terms like
'water') and contends thereby that difference in extension
1s 'ipso tacto a difference 1n meaning' and gives up 'the
cont8ntl~n that meanings are concepts or indeed mental
entitles of any kind'; while Dummett, naturally, will hold
precisely the reverse; he will opt for (1) claiming that
meaning 1s a cognitive not1on (and that 8 difference
17in extension 1s not ipso facto a dlrreren~e in meaning.
Dummett would, we can 1mag1ne, argue as follows:
Putnam's analysis cont1rms my claims; the rigid/nonrigid
and eplstemlc/metaphyslcal distinctions are distinctions of
scope. And even according to PutnaM. it meaning 1s taken ss
a cognitive notion, (1) above 1s the correct analysts; and
the only sense ot meanlng I ~derstand (and certainly
l7When I talk of (1) and (2), I should be construed as
talking or the schemata of which (1) and (2) and (1') and
(2') are instances.
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Frega's meaning!) 1s the cognitive one. Further, it should
be clear that, my opting for (I) 1s equivalent to my claim that
the only modal context relevant to a term's meaning 1s the
epistemic. 18 Hence, there is, 6nc~ again J ~ basis for
distinguishing names from descriptions.
There are here two questions which need resolv1ng.
The first is whether or not (1) as opposed to (2) 1s
the correct meaning analysis tor referring and natural kind
terms (including rigid designators). This quest1o\~, by its
very nature 19 not amenable to definite resolution, but
evidence can, I believe, be brought for coming down on one
side.
The second question is whether our decision to analyze
· according to (1) or (2) (I' or 2') 1s equivalent to the
-..
decision of whether to take a term (e.g., 'water') as rigid or
nonrigid (and equivalent also to the decision of whether to
take de dicta modal assertions 1n which the terms occur 89
ep1stemlc or metaphysical). The validity of this
equ1valence 1s crucial tor the argument we are expound1ng on
Dummett's behalf. For that argwment 1s that it we take s
te~ within an eplstemlc context (1.e. , it we analyze ac-
cording to (1) or (1') (see Fn. 18). we are thereby treating
18 -To see the equivalence of (1) and (1') with Dwmmett's
analysis ot the eplstemlc contex~ replace in (II> 'water' with
'Jack the Ripper' and ' ••• bears the sameL 88 the entity
referred to by ".this" ., wi th '1s the famous London murderer' .
We might also point out that Putnam's 'constant relative
meaning' comes to the same 8S Dummett's 'the way the
reference 1s dete~lned 1n the actual world 1s carried over
into each world' (from the long quote in Section II).
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it nonr1g1dlYi consequently, if we restrict outselves to
ep1stemlc contexts, there 1s no dlst1nct1on between names and
descr1ptlons--they both are used nonrlg1dly. Now if we show
that giving (1) 8S the correct anslya1s ot, 8 refer.ring term
does not entail that 1t 1s being used nonrlg1dly, then this
argument, persuas lv~ ~~'" Jugh it appears I will fall.
As to the f1rst question. let us consider the three
terms: 'I', 'Water', and 'Jack the Ripper', (or any other
proper name). These three are arranged 1n ascending order
of plausibility of having (2) as the correct meaning
analysis.
Not for a te~ such as 'I', it is clear, 89 Putnam
admits, that the correct analysis 1s (1). Merely because
in some other world 'I' can be used to refer to a person other
than that which it does in the actual world 1s not in itself
reason to contend that 'I' 1s being used with different
meaning 1n the two possible worlds; just 8S s~118r ,
remarks hold ot two uses of 'I' in the actual world.
In the case ot a natur,al kind term such as 'W8 ter' ,
there 1s more room tor dispute. My own intuition coincides
w1th Putnam's and independent reasons can, I believe, be
adduced. But the issue 1s not clear and (1) might without
much straining be plausibly defended by some.
In the case or proper names, however~ it seems clear
that contra Dummett. (2) must be the correct analysis. That
1s, if in some other possible, O~ actual, world, we use a
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name orthographically and phonetically the same as that
which we use in the actual world, with the same reference-
fixing device, it would still standardly mean something
other than what it actually does 1f it were used 1n that
world to pick out some other person (that is, if the idea
or 8 name having meaning makes sense at all--whlch
Dummett thinks it does).
This point 1s made more persuasive if one considers
the actual use of a name, 'Sam' J in two different contexts
(on distant planets, say). My utterance and an Alpha
Centurion's or 'Sam 1s wise' have different meanlng--after
s11, when queried I must respond that I really don't know
what he means; who 1s this Sam he 1s referring to? Thus,
the two uses of 'Sam
'
(even using the same reference-fixing
device) have different meaning (recall we are assu~mlng
that it Makes sense to talk of names hsv1ng meaning).
The above argument (if it can be called an argument at
all) 1s hardly conclusive. What it shows 1s that on the
face of 1t, (1) is not the correct meaning analysis of
proper names. But one 81~e8dy committed to Dummett's view
19
will hardly be moved by its force.
My response to the second question will, I believe, be
les8 8asy to dismiss. On its baats, we can see that even if
190r , it might be responded, since (2) is equ1,valent to
(2 1 ), the best Ghe arg~ent can show is that according to
"ad hOC" conventions ot scope, proper names go out ot the
scope ot the modal operator. I do not find this line of
argument persuasive. In any case, we shall see below that
the equivalence ot (1) and (2) with (11) and (2 1 ) with
rigidity and nonrlg1d1ty can not be supported.
154
it were conceded that for natural kind terms and proper
names (1) 1s the correct analysis, Dummett's argument will
not stand.
We hav~ seen that tor Dummett to say that 8 term is
used nonrlg1dly 1s to say that the same "cogn1t1ve mean1ng" j
1.e., the same reference-fixing device, 1s carried over
to the term's use in other possible worlds--that 1s (1) and
(1 1 ) (Dummett's eplstemlc context) are the correct
analyses. This 1s 8 crucial premise tor his argument for the
next step 1s that even proper names should or can be
analyzed according to (1) and ~l') and hence, can be construed
as nonrigid. Now all that now needs to be produced to show
the premise under consideration 1s 8 term which 1s cle~q
rigid and clearly has (1) or (1') 8S the correct analysis.
Such 8 term 1s 'I'.
, As Putnam rightly conceded, pronouns such as 'I' are
best analyzed by (1) and (1'). But 8S Putnam also rightly
argues, 'I' 1s rigid (or an '1ndex1cal' as he calls it);
when used modally it reters to the same object in every
possible world--as 8 moment's thought will show. 20
20 )Consider 'It 1s possible that I (you was (were)
the 37th president'.
Also in Fn. 12 ot his preface, ~rlpke 88YS:
For example, some philosophers'would ass1milate
proper names to demanstratlves. Their reference
varies trom utterance to utterance the way that of
8 demonstrative does. This does not atfect the issues
discussed, since the reference of a demonstrative
must be given for 8 def1nite proposition to be
expressed. Although I did not discuss the question
1n the present monograph, of course it was psrt
ot my view (p. 49, n. 16) that 'this', 'I', 'you',
etc., are all rigid (even though their references
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In Putnam's tErm~, this means that either (1) and (2)
are not always equivalent to (1 1 ) and (2'), or tllSt (1')
and (2 1 ) are not definitive or rigidity and nonrlg1dlty.
The crucial point for Dummett 1s that even if it 1s granted,
that (1), and what Dummett and Putnam take to be equi-
valent (1 1 ) J 1s the correct meaning an81~sls of referring
terms--whlch 1s tar from obvious in the case of natural
kind terms and proper names--the distinction between te~s
used r1g1dly and nonr1g1dly 1s n~t reduc1ble tv the
distinction between (1) and (2).
This point 1s brought out most forcefully by our
example of 'I' (or 'you' etc.). We can consider what the
term would ~efer to in some other possible situation if used
with the same meaning 8S it has in the actual world; and it
certainly can be so used to pick out someone other than it
actuallr picks out. But this clearly does not show 'I'
1s nonrigid the way, say 'the first president- is nonrigid.
Thus, we see that even if Dwmmett is right in contending
that (1) 1s the correct meaning analysis for all rere~rlng
terms, that Is not to say that the term 1s necessarily
being used nonrigldly. So the argument we are ascribing
to Dwmmett in its present state will not stAnd.
(Fn. 20 cont1nued)
obviously vary with the context of utterance). The
rigidIty or demonstratives has been stressed by
David Kaplan.
156
·The overall conclusion of my discussion of Dummett's
cr1tlque, 1s that it does not stand. Where the issues
have been joined, Kr1pke has come out on the winning side.
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CHOMSKY'S CRITIQUE
158
Chomsky's Critique
I wish next to discuss some recent criticisms, due
1
to Chomsky, of Kr1pke l s account of essential properties.
Chomsky's cla1m~ briefly ·put, 1s that what an object's
essential properties are 1s relative to our categorizations
of that object, and that Krlpke l s purported examples of
de re attribution of essential properties are actually cases
2
of de dicta necessity.
This claim has significance for Kr1pke's mind/body
argument (though Chomsky himself does not take up the poInt).
If, 8S Chomsky claims, things have essential properties onl~
relative to our categorization of them, then it would be
open to us to assert that it is essential to particular
pains that they are pains only insofar 8S they are catego-
rlzed.8s such. But we can, and do. equally well categorize
them in neurophysiological terms; and 8S such, they are not
essentially mental entities at. all. This, it appears, would
be enough to vitiate Krlpke l s argument ..
I. Chomsky's argument proceeds by first claiming that
giv1ng an object a name (and that object having that name)
presupposes a set or categorizations and conditions.
lIn, Reflections on Language, Pp. 44-52. All references
to Chomsky writ be to thIs.
2There have been many arguments in the literature along
similar 11nes. I discuss Chomsky's because, aMong other
reasons, of its intrinsic interest and the caut10n of 1ts
cla1ms. '
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First, to attach a name to an entity, that entity must be
"naturally nameable" j this involves satisfying cond'.t1ons
having to do with spat1otemporal contiguity, Gestalt
qualities, functions within the space ot human actions, and
so on (e.g., any mundane object such 88 a tree 1s
"naturally nameable"). Furthermore, "in determining that
an entity 1s a nameable thing, we assign it to a 'natural
kind' that might be designated by a common noun, a 'sortal
predicate' •••• This assignment involves assumptions
about the nature ot things named--some conceptual and some
tactual."
Besides these conceptual and factual assumptions drawn
from "the structure of common sense under~tand1ng,"
there are further conditions imposed by the "cognitive
structure o't language." Names are either personal names,
place name's J color names I etc. J each wl11h 1ts own intended
domain or discourse. There are no "pure" names.
Though I sympathize with much 'of this, it seems, as
it stands, clearly talse. ~ndeed, any constraints on what
can be named, or the specific bellefs and categories that
naming presupposes, ls, I believe. bound to be wrong.
We can, 1n theory, name anything and everything (though
perhaps not all at once); there are no restrictions on what
caD qualify 8S a "nameable' thing. I now name the anti ty
which consists ot the French Revolution, the first
twenty years of Chomsky's 11te, and the far side of the moon:
"T1'! 24. If Is there anything to prevent me from doing so?
And what natural kind does this entity belong to?
There 1s no point, to be sure, to naming such an
entity (as there generally would not be for such odd entities);
such things tend to be intrinsically uninteresting and names'
for them would- tend not to gain currency. But there 1s no
reason why they could~ gain currency, and certainly,
there 1s nothing which proh1bits the1r use as names.
This point ls, perhaps, circUMventable. We might, for
instance, contend that such recherche objects are IIderiva-
tive," in some· sense, on more "basic" objects (dealing
somehow with Goodmanlan problems), and these more basic
objects are "naturally nameable. 1I Further, in the case of
most names, there are indeed tactual and conceptual
assumptions attendant upon those terms' use.
But even ~O, it seems clear that there need not. in
every case ot naming, be some particular conceptual and
factual assumptions that we make about the object named--
some particular category (or natural kind) which we must
place it in. The strongest assertion we can plausibly make,
and the element ot truth in Chomsky's idea, is, I think,
that in standard cases ot giving something a name. and in
llsing names generally, it 1s presupp.osed that the object
named belongs to some kind or other. That, however, 1s a
much weaker claim than Chomsky's.
Thus, to give an example, imagine 8 quiz show in
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which I 8m the master ot ceremonies and announce that there
is some object or event--unknown even to myself--whlch has
either occurred in, or been placed in, the adjoining room.
This entity I call 'Arthur'. The task or the contestants,
I declare, 1s to determine the identity of Arthur. Questions
May be of the nature of':
(1) Is Arthur an event or object?
(2) Is Arthur animal, vegetable. or mineral?
'Arthur' strikes me 88 a perfectly understandable and
natural name. though neither I, nor the contestants, have
any idea what kind of thing Arthur 1s.
This is an example of an initial naming s:ftuatlon.
In the majority of instances, however, we use names which
are already in the linguistic community's lexicon. And
in such a situation, my point will be even stronger; for
in such a case, it appears even clearer that our use of 8
name 1s not dependent on our having 8 particular set of
beliefs about the nature of the object named.
Kr1pke otfers the example of 8 mathematician's spouse
who does not know whether the mathematician's use ot 'Nancy'
was to reter to a woman or to a Lie group. More mundane
examples are not hard to come by. At a cocktail party, I
discern in my friend's chatter constant reference to
(Michaelangelo and) Sag1tareusj in complete ignorance
of the topic of conversation, but wishing to seem erudite,
I say--to the consternation of my fr1enda-- n Sag1tareus 1s
huge." Or, in a similar situation, I say, "The Holy See.
stinks U ; not knowing whether I am referring to 8 person, a
lake, or whatever.
In these cases. I intend (successfully) to refer by the
use of the name to whatever the others in my small group
referred to by the use ot the name. Kr1pke's analysis of
reference seems correct in its broad outlines. In most cases
of using a name to reter, one must intend that, by one's use
or the name J one refers to whomever, or whatever, was
reterred to by either the person(s) whom one picked up the
name from, or society at large, or an appropriate set of
specialists, etc. (unpacking the 'etc.' 1s the hard part).
The~e need not be any particular categorization on the
user's part--though there usually 1s--1n either initial
nam1ngs, or 1n ordinary situations.
II. Chomsky uses his conception of names just described to
claim that Krlpke'~ notion of de re necess1ty--that is, the
attribution of essential propertles--ls just a case of de
dicta necessity in disguise. Tllus, Chomsky considers 'the
two sentences:
(1) Nixon won the 1968 election.
(2) Nixon 1s an animate object.
(2) wo~d, in Kr1pke's view, be an attribution of a necessary
property to Nixonj assuming Nixon ls, in fact, an~ate, being
animate is one ot his necessary properties.
This Kr1pkean intuition of necessity is due, cla~s
Chomsky, to the fact that statement (2) 1s (approximately)
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synon~ous with:
(3) The person Nixon 1s animate
since 'Nixon' 18 a personal name. Thus, (2), as ~1th all
other putative cases or attributions of necessary pro-
3parties, is, as 1s (3), a case or de dicto necessity.
This necessary truth (l.e., (2) and (3» may be
grounded in a necessary connection betwaen
categor1es or common sense understanding, or an
'analytic connect1on between the linguistic terms
'person' and lan1mate'. Under any of these
assumptions, we need not suppose that an
essential property 1s assigned to an individual,
Nixon, apart from the way he 1s named or the
category of iommon sense understanding which he
1s assigned.
Two points: First, Chomsky's argument depends on
the claim that (2) and (3) are synonymous. That depends on
the claim that 'Nixon' 1s synonymous with 'The person
Nixon'; and that cla~. I take it, entails that if we did
not use 'Nixon' (and similarly with other proper names)
with the sense ot Ithe person Nixon', 1t, say, we had
suspended judgment on what kind of thing 'Nixon' referred to,
then we would be us1ng the name with other than its
ordinary sense (or ordinary usage, or whatever; those
who do not be11eve names have sense should rephrase the
above point appropriately).
3Thus , Chomsky's argument 1s the reverse of Dummett·s.
Dummett argues that apparent claims ot de dicta metaphysical
necessity are really de re attributions of necessary
properties, while Chomsky argues that apparent de re
attributions or metaphysically necessary properties are
really de dicta attributions of necessity.
4Chomsky, Pg. 46.
lS4
The brunt of my discussion in section I was just that
Chomsky 1s wrong 1n this clalme Names can be used in a
perfectly ordinary manner (without changing their meanings
or usage), without there being any assumptions about the
kind of thing named. So, if my argument in section I was
correct, Chomsky's argument w~ll not work here.
To this first point, Chomsky might respond that he can
grant that there may be uses of proper names which do not
presuppose 8 particular set of beliefs j nor that the o,bject
named belongs to a certain category. Nevertheless, in this
particular case, we find an aura or~ess1ty surrounding
(2): Nixon 1s animate because, 1n point-of-fact. we
standardly do assume that 'Nixon' 1s a personal name;
consequently, (2) is more or less synon~ous with (3).
It we did, Chomsky may continue, attempt the psycholo-
gically difficult teat of using "Nixon' as a "pure" name, then
(2) would no longer seem to us to be the attribut10n of a
necessary property. So, the necessity we discern in (2) 1s
due to its (de facto) equivalence to (3), and hence, its
necessity 1s de dicta.
And Chomsky does propose an argument that more or less
comes to this. 5 Thus, he considers the possibility that our
5The difference is that Chomsky does not grant that
there can be "pure"names in a natural language--he merely
considers the possibility for the sake of argument.
As tor the possibility of "pure" names in natural lan-
guages, Ned Block has suggested to me that one can imagine some-
one writing a story that begins, liAs K awoke one morning from
uneasy dreams, he found himself transformed in his bed into 8
gigantic insect." Notice, too, the possibility of conceiving
of such a situation might be used in an argument about what
propert1es are essential to individuals; that one can there-
fore, make essential attributions using lIpure" names (See below).
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name for Nixon did not, in fact, mean 'the person Nixon'--
that it is Q pure name, 'N' say. In that case, the analog
of (2). (2'~ N is an1mBte~ would not have the aura of necessity
(2) has; for (2) has it only because 'Nixon' 1s a personal
name, 'which 'N' 1s not. So, as above, the neceaslty of (2)
is de dicta. If we do not read (2) equivalent to (3),
but read it equivalent to (2'), its necessity will not be
perceived.
So far, there is nothing Chomsky has said that would
have any fo,.ce fOil one who 1s already commltted to essential
attribution. To such an individual, there 1s still nothing
pr~blemat1c with the contention that 'N is animate'
attributes an essential property--no more so (or less so) than
in the case of 'Nixon 1s animate'.
What Chomsky says in the way of support for his contention
ls,
Within this new invented system (i.e •• or pure names).
divorced from language and common sense understanding.
we have no relevant intuitions to guide us, I believe.
Thus, we might want to say that there is no way for the
thing, N, to have been anything other tha~ what it 1s.
For thee it would have been a different thtngj thus,
in an uninteresting sense, all its properties are
)essential' • Or, we might want to 98'y that any of
its properties might have been other than what they are.
The expository recourse to distinctions between (1) and
(2) (for example), between what might have been and
what could not have been otherwise, 1s no longer
available to us within the new system we are now
imagining.
This argument is not persuasive. Certainly, the two
essentialist posltlo~s described are attributable whether
we use "pure" names, as above, or whether we use personal
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names 7 such as 'Nixon'. In either case, we can contend that
all or none of an object's properties are essential. Indeed,
such views have, in fact, been forwarded by various
philosophers (e.g., Le1bnltz the former; Russell the latter).
I see no distinction or significance that can be drawn between
"pure" names and ordinary names on th1~ score.
There 1s, to be sure, some difference between 'N' and
'Nixon'. If we d1d not know that 'N' standardly referred
to a perso~we would not know (2') to be even true--a
fortiori that it truly attributed a necAssary property.
But even if we did not know th1s to be so, it would, never-
theless. an essentialist would claim. still be so. And given
that we do know that 'N' refers to a person--no matter how
that information was aequ1red--we would thereby know that
an essentlal property had been truly attributed.
So the difference between 'N' and 'Nixon' 1s or no
significance as ~ar as essential attribution goes; and we
can not conclude that (2) 1s necessary de dicta. To conclude
there 1s a relevant distinction between 'N' and 'Nixon',
one must assume that the necessity of (2) 1s de d1cto--an
assumption the essentialist 1s obv1ously not prepared to
make. (I should point out that I am not here purporting
to offer posit1ve arguments for essentialism; merely contend-
ing that Chomsky's arguments do not affect one already
committed to it.)
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One last consideration is this: need I here defend what
I have been assuming without argument, that be1ng animate 1s
8 necessary property of Nixon? There are those who would
deny this (though I supposed that anyone who grants that
there are nontrivial essential properties will grant that
this 1s one of them). This undefended assumption ls, in
the present context, legitimate because Chomsky is not here
taking 1ssue with the particular properties Kr1pke claims
are essential; he 1s contending that the notion of essent1al
property--lndependent of how the object is categorized
or referred to--ls incoherent; that the modal status of (2)
depends on its containing 'Nixon' and not 'N'.
My point has been that Chomskyls example does not
show tIns at all (unless, of course, one already assumes that
essential attr1butl~ns are incoherent); that one can ascribe
necessity just as easily with "pure" names as with ordinary
names. He has not shown that there is any relevant difference
between these sorts of names; nor that there is anything
incoherent about essential properties 8S interpreted by
Krtpke.
I now turn to the second or my two polrlts. Kr lpke
might certainly admit without d1ff1culty that in many cases,
what partially fixes the reference of proper names are
descriptions such as: 11s an1mate', '1s a person', and 90
on. This, in Kr1pke's view, would entail that, e.g.,
'Nixon 1s animate', can be known a priori; for we would
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then take 'Nixon' to refer to what (and only what) 1s an
animate thinge That this might be the case does not, as
Krlpke points out, affect his contentions about necessary
6properties.
But Chomsky is not here purporting to point out the
possibility ot such a priori knowledge. He quite rightly
clalmB that 'Nixon 1s animate' can not be known a priori.
(Kr1pke would agree and say that this shows that '1s
animate' is not sllfflclent to nr 1x the reference" of I Nixon' .)
But it, as Chomsky grants, it 1s not a priori, how can
it be synonymous with, 'The person Nixon is animate', which
apparently ls--especlally if the necessity that Chomsky
discerns in the latter statement is grounded 1n the relation
between 'person' and 'an1mate'.
It Dtr1kes me that I am missing something here, but I
am not sure what. Chomsky says later, II ••• suppose
that we were to discover that the entity named 'Nixon' was,
in tact, an automaton so that (2) was false. We might then
conclude that the personal name 'Nixon' had been misused
(so we now discover) •••• " It 1s true that 11' 'Nixon'
mea.lt I the person Nixon'. then 'Nixon' would have been
misused. For 'Nixon' (synonymous with 'the person Nixon')
would purport to pick out something which is a person
where there isn't any such.
'Nixon', however, does not seem to be such that it
would ~m1sused if there turned out to be no person who
6See NN, Pp. 351-352, Fn. 58 tor instance.
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was Nixon; ~e would just say (at least, so it seems to me),
that Nixon 1s not animate (we have no found out).
Further, the lack of a person Nixon does not affect the
ep1stem1c status of the assertion 'The person Nixon 1s a per-
son' (just as the a priori status of 'The man living upst81r~
lives upstairs-' 1s not affected by the possibility that there
1s no man upstairs); but the eplstem1c status of 'Nixon is a
person' is affected by the possibility of the lack of a
person N1xon--lt 1s this possibility which makes the state-
. ment a posteor1.
In the same vein, we might further ask of the statement,
'Nixon 1s not a person'. what its ep1stemlc status is. This t
in Chomsky's view, should be synonymous with 'The person
Nixon 1s not a person', which is unequivocally, logically
.
false. Yet, there 1s a clear sense in which 'Nixon is not 8
person' is not logically false. So how are the two synonymous??
These two points show, I believe, that Chomsky has
shown not"hing incoherent with Krlpke's views; and that h.ls
inferences are open to serious Question. 8
7Indeed, what does Chomsky do with 'The red table might
not have been red'? This clearly has a true reading--but no
true de dicta reading. So it must have a true de re reading.
Certain philosophers w1th views similar to Chomsky's
(e.g., Plant1g1na and Kaplan), attempt to deal with this sort
or problem. ~lr.vlew8 are refinements ot the contention
th'at sentences as the above are to be analyzed 89 "There 1s a
termc.\ su.ch that~ reters to the red table and I .~" 1s red I 1s
possibly false."
Chomsky's analysis 1s different, however. The assertion
that Nixon is necesBsr11y an~ate is analyzed in terms of the
synonymy 'Nixon 1s animate' and 'The person Nixon 1s animate'.
aKr1pke need not deny any or Chomsky's insights about com-
mon sense and conceptual categorizations. One can eas11y
imagine him granting that. though it 18 not the last word, one's
common sense and conceptual categorizations have a lot to do
w1th what kinds or things we think there are, and consequently,
with what essential properties we think there are.
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III. Chomsky makes his above points again while discussing
some or Kripkels examples of essential properties, i.e ••
having a particular set of parents and being a ta~le.
In the latter case, he presents two further arguments.
What looks like a perfectly normal table might have
been, contends Chomsky, designed to be a hard bed and
actually used as such.
Surely, we would then say that thing is not a
table but a hard bed that looks like a table. But
the thing 1s what it ls. Neither a gleam in the
eye of the inventor nor general custom can determ1ne
1ts essential properties, though intention and
function are relevant to determining what we take an
artifact to be.
Again, the point is that what essential properties
an object has depends on how ~e categorize it and is not
intrinsic to the object itself. But, as Chomsky himself
says,. what we have here 1s merely a case of 8 bed whi.ch
looks like a table. It intention and function are
relevant to determining what we take an object to be, why
balk at the contention (which I think true) that what an
artifact is, 1s partially determined by the producer's
-
intention and by the object's function. These may, 1n some
sense, not be any ot the object's physical properties, but
so what? As Chomsky notices, such things 8S constitution,
structure, and agent responsible for generation, are among
Aristotle's and Kr1pke's list of kinds of essential properties.
Function and intention, when it comes to artifacts, should
likewise be included. After all, what an artifact 1s, as the
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table example amply shows, depends on its function and
intention. Nothing is a carburetor unless it can function
like a carburetor (when not broken), to take a venerable
example; it 1s not just that it wouldn't be described as a
carburetor--it really wouldn't be a carburetor.
Of course, to the extent that what an artifact 1s
depends on what it wss intended to be, that artifact's
essential properties depend on human cognition, broadly' con-
strued. This fact hardly makes Chomsky's point; all it
shows is that sometimes what an object is--what its essential
properties are--depends on human intentions. It does not
show that all of any object's essential properties are
relative to our categorization of that object and that it 1s in-
coherent to think otherwise.
Chomsky's other move 1s to consider possible alien
creatures who say that a table "would have been a different
thing had it been nailed to the floor, though it could have
been other than Ii table." To them, as opposed to us,
immovability would be an essential property of objects while
being a table would not. And there appears to be no way of
a~ud1catlng between the two ways of looking at the world.
Once again, it seems that what essential properties an
object has depends on how one categorizes it.
How one would indeed adjudicate between such conflicting
ontologies is a difficult snd tantalizing question. One
answer is Chomsky's: that there is no genuine question as
to who is right; there are just different ways of categorizing.
But this is not the only possible answer. The best
solution, to my eyes, is the 11~ral one of admitting both
ontologies, and both sets of essential propertles--when t
that is, there is no further objective way of deciding
between the two. In the present case, this entails admitting
earth tables (and other artifacts) which mayor may not be
movable objects, and alien movable (and immovable) objects,
which mayor may not be tablellke. Each Strt ot objects will
,have its own set of essential properties.
We can even allow that one hunk of matter m1ght be the
matter of an instance of both these kinds of thingsj we
would have two things in the same place, at the same time;
however. Locke's prov1so: of the same kind, would not be
satisfied.
9
Or perhaps, this liberal move 1s to be eschewed.
A different view. distinct from Chomsky's, might be just that
in tact. we and the aliens wou»dlsagree about what kinds of
things there are and what essential properties these have.
This, in itself, does not entail that there are not
(description and categorization independent) k1nds of things
or essential properties. For what is this disagreement about.
other than what kinds or things there are (and what essential
properties there are)? If there are no categor1zat1onally
independent kinds of things and essential properties, wh9re
then 1s the disagreement? All hands can certainly agree
9perhaps we eould imagine some situation in which the
ontologies were truly incompatible.
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that each race believes, on the basis of its categorizations,
different kinds or things to exist than the otheI'--but that
is not the issue. The question in this analysis is, who, if
anyone, 1s right? That Is, what kinds of things and
essential propert1es are there?
Again, my point here has not been to offer pos1t1ve
arguments for essentialism; rather, I wished to show that
Chomsky's examples need not perturb the essentialist, for
the essentialist can analyze these examples 1n quite
reasonable ways, compatible with his views.
IV. Chomsky claims that his views do not commit him to any'
particular metaphysical outlook. He 1s thus able to hold aloof
from most of the metaphysical claLms and counterclaims sur-
rounding the notion of essential attribution. Perhaps it 1s
for this reason that his arguments do not. as we have seen,
have any torce tor those already committed to essentialism.
v. If all this 1s correct, then the possible argument against
Kripke1s mind/body argument with ~hich we started, will not
work. There 1s still, however, an analogous argument. in
the Material mode, as it were, that might be made. I shall
take this up in the next section.
IOEssential properties need not, or course, enter into
this disagreement at all. The conflict can be described as
one ot varying ontologies, without any mention of essential
properties. But it was Chomska's point that in the situation
described. we apparently have!fferent essential properties
and that, therefore, the notion of essential property inde-
pendent ot categorization, is incoherent; my point has been
that it does not follow.
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FELDMAN'S CRITIQUE
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Feldman's Critique of Krlpke
This section will discuss Feldman's response to
Kr1pke's antimaterialist argument; a response which has
received wide currency and 1s often taken to be conclusive.
Feldman is concerned with Kripke1a denial that,
ueach person is identical with his or her body," and that,
"each particular mental event or state 1s identical to some
1
corresponding physical event or state." His a1m is to show
that (1) Krlpke
'
s arguments are open to serious objections;
and (2) Kr1pke's principle that true identity statements
containing rigid designators are necessarily true, is not,
pac~Krlpke, relevant to arguments concerning ml~d/body
ident1ty. My concerns shall be mainly with the first ot
these aims.
There are three basic strategies in Feldman's attack.
In the csse ot persons and bodles.they are the claims that:
(1) Persons are not essentially persons.
(2) Bodies are not essentially bodies.
(3) The contingency felt to obtain
between persons and their bodies can
be analyzed in a manner (given below)
innocuous to materialism.
1See Feldman, "Krlpke on the Identity Theory," Journal
ot Phl10SO~ VI, LXXI, No. 18 (Oct. 24, 1974): pp. 665-676;
and, "Ki'ip e 8 Argument Against Materialism," Philosophical
StUdies XXIV. 6 (November 1973): pp. 416-419.
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When applied to the mental and physical states (events) csse,
these become:
(1 1 ) Mental states are not essentially
mental states.
(2 1 ) Brain states are not essent1ally
brain states.
(3 1 ) The contingency felt to obtain
between mental states and brain states
can be analyzed in a m8nne~ innocuous
to materialism.
In the persoq/body case, Feldman concentrates on (3).
2though he does have some discussion of (1) and (2). In the
mental/brain event case, Feldman concentrates exclusively on
~(l'). He mentlon~ in passing only (2'); and does not even
2(1) is used prtmari1y against Kripke's nonmodal (Feldman's
term) arguments. Krlpke mentions, though does not uncondi-
tionallyendorse, the argument that since (dead) bodies exist
without the person to which they are putatively identical
existing. the bodies are not identical with those persons.
Feldman contends that the materialist would respond that
persoDs--that ls, certain bodles--are not essentially alive,
or not essentially persons. A person can exist without being
alive or a person, just as 8 particular red rose might exist
without being reel. (Though the argument mentioned by Kr1pke
1s ltaslt nonmodal, the objection introduces modal notions.)
A materialist could extricate himself as Feldman
suggests, but if being a person 1s not an essential property
or persons, then what 1s? This point does not depend on
the coherency of essential attribution. It can be s1mply
~ut by saying that people, and not their bodies, go out of
existence when they die. Elvis Presley 18 no more, though
many still make pilgrimages to his body.
There 1s an adequate reply to this sort of nonmodal
argument, oni mentioned by Krlpke himself. Perhaps
Feldman makes·,the response he does simply because it
parallels his analyses ot Krlpke's other arguments.
The reply Krlpke suggests 1s that analogously to
the case of the statue and the matter of which it 1s made, or
the ship and the planks of wood ot which it is composed, 8
~erson 1s a body with a certain physical organization--
one that it does not have when it 1s dead.
There 1s a sense in Which the ship 1s not identical with
the planks or WOOd; the planks can exist when the ship does
not; bu~ there 1s equally 8 senRe in which the ship 1s the
I planks ("nothing over ana above the planks, as KrlpD says).
. The added element ot organization 1s not some further ob-
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do so much for (3'). Why Feldman chose to concentrate in
particular on (3) and (1'), I do not know.
Let me note that my discuss10n of (1 1 ) will be
relevant to Lewis' materialist claims. Our previous examln8~
tiOD ot Lewis rocused on his type/type views; Kr1pke's
arguments, however, will, it valid, apply also to Lewis, even
construed as espousing a tokeq/token view.
The issue between Krlpke and Lewis appears to reduce. to
the question or whether we can take 'pain' to be a nonrigid
designator (See the discussion in Fn. 7, section 2 1n the
Lewis half' of the thesis; see also Lewis' "Mad Pain and
Martian Pain," in particular, Fn. 2). Or equivalently.....
Feldman, and probably Lewis, would assert--whether pain
1s essentially painful. But this 1s the claim of (1 1 ), which
we shall be discussing.
Lewis has, of course, independent reasons tor adhering
to (1 1 ), that Feldman does not adduce; 1.e., his entire
framework and justification of theoretical and psychological
definition. ot course, to the extent that we have pre-
Viously questioned the correctness ot these definitions,
we also undercut Lewis' defenses here. Let me now turn to
(Pn. 2 continued)
ject that 1s added to the planks ot wood--or the body of
the person or the clay ot the statue; it 1s their ro~.
I think that a materialist would be perfectly happy
with the content1on that the relation or bodies to
personals the same as the relation ot planks or wood to the
shl'pa whose material it 1s (whatever that relation precisely
1s). This, I think, 1s an adequate response to the
Inonmodal' arguments.
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the particulars ot Feldman's arguments.
The Person/BodY Argument
Krlpke l s argument against perso~body identity is
(as we know) in outline: Let Id' be a rigid designator of
Descartes, and Ib' a rigid designator ot Descartes' body.
It b=d, then (since Ib l and 'd' are rigid) necessarily,
b=d. But it 1s possible that b~ dj therefore, b~d. Feldman
formalizes the argument as follows (the numbering 1s his):
(13) Id' 1s rigid and Ib' 1s rigid.
(14) '9(3 t) (Edt&,Ebt) I 1s true.
(1S) Ir~ 1s rigid and~ 1s rigid, and r(J (3t)(FPet& E/t)
1s true. then r~ ~ ~')" 1s true.
(16) It 01. is rigid, and" 1s rigid, and r.q (DC ~,)1 1s
true • ~hen 'c ~ " 1s true.
(17) ,ldP'b1 1s tru8a
where 'Ext' means that x exists at time t.
The bone of contention, claims Feldman, 1s (14); or
3
better, neglecting the time variable, the cla~ that
Descartes can possibly exist wi thou.t Decartes I body. .( From
now on, I should be construed, when referring to (14), as
reterring to this cla~}
Krlpke's clatm is that one can not, 88 the above
argument proves, accept (14) and then b11thly proceed to
3The time variable just complicates matters and for the
rest of the paper, I shall ignore it. (14) 1s then ,~( Ed&1Eb) I.
1'f9
assert the identity of Descartes with his body. But, responds
Feldman, Krlpke has merely asserted, not shown (14) to be
true. And until he has done so, he has not proven the non-
identity or d and b.
We may grant Feldman that Krtpke has not proven his
point. Mgch of his argument reads as it he 1s attempting
to show that materialists can logically deny Kripke's
conclusion; that it 1s open to them to deny, without
inconsistency, one or the premises (and hence the conclusion).
But that hardly constitutes a counterargument. Where,
after all (outside of say logic or the philosophy of logic),
do we have substantial philosophical theses which can be
proven (formally)?
What Feldman must show, it his objection is to carry
weight, 1s that it 1s reasonable for the materialist to
deny (14)." To merely assert that an intelligent materialist
would notice that he must deny (14) 1s not the same 8S
producing e reason for such a denial.
~ere is, atter all, prima facie intuitive support
for the contention that people might not be bodies. (Even
such materialists 8S ~strong concede the Ross1b111ty of
bodiless persons.) We all feel, it seems to me, the
intuitive torce of this contention; intuitions are, to be
sure, otten ~~el18ble; but the burden or proof is surely
on someone who denied what appears to be intuitively true~
in this case, Feldman.
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There is a further point to be considered. Even were
Feldmanls denial tq (14) reasonable, still, Krlpke l s
argume'nt is, to a large extenii aimed at the "Contingent
Identity Theor1st" (h~nceforward, eITs) wh0.2.2, it seems,
accept (14), while at the same time, asserting the identity
of d and b. Kripkels argument may then be looked at as 8
reductio ad absurdum of the C~Tsl position.
Feldman entertains this analysis of Kr1pke's argument.
but rejects it on the grounds that the elTs do not, or
should not accept (14).
As a matter of historical fact, th1s does not seem to
be quite accurate. E~egealsJ however, or the literature
representing the ClTa' view to determine what, if anything,
was precisely meant, would clearly be to no purpose.
If Feldman can come up with an adequate alternative to (14),
which the ClTa could have, or should have, espoused, and
whiCh does not s as does (14), entail that d#b, then he will
have an effective counterargument against Kr1pke. Kr1pke
will no longer have a reductio ad absurdum against the
CIT vlew-~when properly formulated.
What Feldman claims the CIT should have asserted 1s:
(18) (x) ( t) ( Pxb (3 y) (Byt&Oyxt&x=y) &
llJ(x)( t)( Pxt.J\3y)(Byt&Oyxt&x=y) ~
where 'Pxt' means x 1s a person at t. and 'Bxt l means
4
x 1s a body at t, and 'Oyxt' means x belongs to y at t.
'without the ttme variable, we have: (x)(Px~Bx)&
'D(x)(Px~Bx); (19) below would become: (x)(PxJ(Ey)(By&x=
Y&lQX-Y) )~
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From (18). claims Fbldman, one can not deduce (14)j what
would entail (14) 1s:
(19) (x)(t)(Pxt~(9y)(Byt&OYXt&~&7Q(X=Y».
But (18) does not entail, asserts Feldman, (19) (nor (14).
nor that d'b). (18) 1s true if everyone in the world
1s necessarily identical with his or her body, though in
other possible wo:rlds. there do exist pure spirits. Tha.t,
however, would make (19) false. So, it appears that the
erTs can, by accepting (18), assert, in 8 sense, the contin-
gency ot the identity of people and bodies; i.e., the1
may grant the p08sibl1'. ty of a world wi ttl bodiless people,
and still deny ot any actual person that he might not have
been a body_ Thus, they may deny (14), and block Kr1pke l s
reductio.
Again, as a matter ot historical tact, it strikes me
that (19) 1s closer tha~ (18) to WJlat CITs actually said.
To be sure, (19) is 8 s1l1y thing to accept; but that 1s
precisely the point ot Krlpke's attack.
We are, in any case, lett with two pertinent qU8stlonso
Pirst, do the CITa, whether or not they 80 intended, have
recourse to (18) and thereby escape Krlpke l s reductio?
Second, 18 holding (18), whether or not CITs would or should
do 80, 8 reasonable rSBponS8 to Krlpke's challenge? That is,
might we not 88J that (18) i8 behind the lntQltlona ot the
contingent relation between persons and bodies, which I
appealed to previously when throw1ng the burden of prioof on
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Fe~an. If so, then appeals to such intuitions will be of no
support to Kripkels claims; for even 1f valid, they will not
entail the nonldentlty of Descartes and Descartes' body.
Bes1des these two, I shall also discuss a third issue:
Feldman's contention that the materialist could defend
against Krlpke by claiming that bodies are not essentially
bodies; and a fourth: Feldman's contention that the notion
ot rigid designator 1s not relevant to questions of mind/
body.
(1) In response to our first question, the answer must be no.
It the CIT~ hold anything. it 1s that the identity of people
and their bodies, and mental states with physiological
states, 1s to be construed on analogy with the better' ~nown
cases or "contingent" identity: e.g., that of water with H 0,
2
light with electromagnetic radiation, heat with molecular
mot1on, or lightn1ng w1tn electrical discharge.
What I shall show 1s that in these cases, they would
not, or &nould not, accept analogs of (18). Consequently,
they would not, or should not, accept (lS)--tor again, the
crux of their posit1on 1s just that the analysis of person/
bod1 identity 1s to be construed analogously to that ot other
contingent identities.
Suppose some CIT were challenged by Kripke's
arguments (and suppose he accepted, as does Feldman, Krlpke's
contention that identity statements containing rigid
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designators are necessarily true if true at all); that is,
suppose it were argued that if heat 1s identical with mole-
cular motion, then it 1s necessarily 30 identicalj that in a
situation 1n which you do not have molecular motion, you ipso
facto do not have heat, though you may have something which
feels like heat. How would the CIT respond?
My conception or how he should respond 1s: You are '
correct, Krlpke, 1n calling us to task for the formulat1on
ot our position. Yet our view is, we claim, basically sound;
and you, yourself, have accurately to~u18ted what we have
wished to say: Given the way we pick out heat (that 1s, by
the way it feels). 'heat' might have referred to something
other than ~~), something other than molecular motion.
Our view ot contingent identity 1s probably best put in te~s
"of what you call lIeplstemlc ll modality: It 1s only con-
t1ngentlJ true that when we are in an ep1atem1c state similar
to that which we are in when we actually tl1 the reference
ot heat, that we refer to heat--l.ea, molecular motion.
This 1s what we mean when we say that heat 1s only contin-
gently molecular motion. Analogous comments w1ll apply to
persons and bodies. We might be in the same eplstem1c
state as we are aotually in relative to Descartes and
people in general. and Jet there be something other than
5Descartes or people.
580 it appears that the CITs have in any case a reply
to Krlpke. Krlpke indicates that the sort ot reply
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There 1s no way of knowing that such would actually
be the CITs' reply, but it 1s the most plausible line to
6
take.
But according to Feldman. this should not be the ClTs'
response. For, to respond thus, would not be to respond
in 8 manner "analogous to (18). An analog of (18) would be
something like (18 1 ): (x) (Hx f+Mmx( &,a ( x) (Hx+-JMmx); where
(Fn. 5 continued)
mentioned here would sutter from problems analogous to those
suttered by a similar response in the pain state/brain state
case, but he does not say precisely what that problem 1s
1n the present case.
Perhaps, he has in mind something like this: It seems
true to 8SY. "I might not have been a (or this) body." This
intuition can not be explained away in the manner described
above: We can not say we are imagining a case in which III
refers to some other entlty--for ex hypothese it 1s I who am
doing the referring, so it can only be me that I am
referring to; consequently, it must really be I who am possibly
not a body. Something like this 1s what I imagine Krlpke
had in mind, though I am not sure.
6Notice thetollowints quote trom Armstrong (The Monist:
(Apr1l 1912) Vol. 56 #2, Materialism, Properties, and
Predicates ll ). In this quote, he distinguishes properties
trom predicates, the latter being linguistic entities.
We can pick heat trom other sensory qualities but
that does not mean that perception (or introspection)
yields any awareness of what the quality ls. What it
ls, we first learn later as a ~e8ult or the labor
ot scientists, who make a theoretical identif1cation
ot heat with mean kinetic velocity ot molecules • • • •
We have seen that cases where two 10g1cally distinct
predicates apply in v~tue ot the 88ma property • • • •
'Anger 1s a certain sort of tiring ot nAural
circuits I lnvolvea two 10g1cally distinct p~edlcate8,
both ot which apply to the objects they apply to 1n
virtue of the same property. But the two pred±cates
do this in 8 semantically different way.
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IH' is shorthand for '1s (an instance of) heat', and 'Mm'
is shorthand tor 11s (an instance of) molecular motion'.
That 1s, every particular instance of heat 1s an instance of
molecular motion, but there could be a situation in which
there was some heat which was not molecular motion. (And
similarly, with any ot the other examples of contingent
identity.) Is this plausible?
Two preliminary points. First. notice that this
response does not contend (as my response does) that there
could be something which felt like heat and was not mole-
cular motion: but rather that there could be something
which was the same (kind of thing) as heat, ~nd yet not be
molecular motion. I find Krl'pke' S .argwnents in this context
convincing. One can hardly imagine this contention to be
true--unless we are implicitly interpreting it to mean just
that something could teel like 'heat and not be molecular
motion. For any situation in which there 1s no molecular
7
motion 1s one in which there 1s no heat.
Secondly. the very notion of a part1cular instance of
heat used by (18 1 ) is quite murky. Is the instance of
heat in the corner the same 8S that which tills the entire
room? or a part or the room?' or neither? Is it the same
1nstance 8S that ot a second ago? And when 1t comes to talk
.. , ..
ot different possible worlds, the problems are even worse.
7T.his point is more convincing when buttressed by the
full force of Krlpke l s argumentation.
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The crucial point ls, however, th1s~ What the ClTs
standardly asserted is that heat (the universal) is molecular
motion, or that light 1s electromagnetic radiation, or that
water is H20. If the CITs accepted (lSI) or something like
it, in the case of other contingent identities, then they
would again be vulnerable to Kr1pke I s attack. F'or they
would be admitting that heat 1s possibly not molecular motion;
the second conjunct of (18') says that there 1s a possible
world in which heat 1s not coextensive with molecular motion,
and that surely 1s sufficient tor the two universals to be
possibly nonldentical o But then, by Kr1pke l s argument, it
follows that they are, in fact, not.
So (18') and its analogs (including (18») 1s incompatible
wi th CITs' claim that, e. (~. J' heat 1s molecular energy. Con-
sequently, the reductio of the CIT position by Kr1pke,
can not be blocked by appeal to (18)--tor if they did accept
(18) and its analogs, they would be no better cfr~
2) So far, we have seen that (18) 1s not an acceptable
premise tor a CIT. There still remains the question of
whether, independent ot the views ot the CITs, we could
use (18) to refute Kripke; whether we could analyze our
lntultlon that people might not have been bodies 88 the
intuition that (18) holds, and thus, knock out the basis for
(14) and Kr1pke l s conclusion ot nonldentlty.
The discussion ot this question will assume that
bodies are essentially bodies. Those who would deny this
187
would, in any case, find appeal to (18) superfluous. (I
shall discuss such a ~.en1al in point 3) below.) For them,
not only might there be people without bodies, as (18)
asserts, but even actual people, actual bodies--e.g.,
Descartes--might not have been bodies, and still (14) would
not follow. So they find the intuition that possibly Des-
cartes 1s not a body, quite conpat1ble with their materialism,
and do not need (18) to explain away that 1ntu1t1011. Let us,
therefore, 1n discussing (18), restrict ourselves to the
assumpt~on that bodies are essentially bodies. Given this
assumption, can (18) be used to explain away our intUtlons
in such a way so as not to commit us to (14)?
Though there appears to be nothing formally wrong with
.
(18), I think it unacceptable. For 1) on the most plausible
asswnpt1ons, l't 1s talse; 2) 1t seems 1ncompstibia wi th our
present assumption that bodies are essentially bodies; and
3) even it we disregard the above two points, (18) does not
seem to capture the content or our intuitions.
First point: The CITs were, I believe, to a certain
extent, correct. One should take the "person" case as
analogous to the heat (lightning, water, etcs) case. Just
as to be heat 1s to be a particular kind or thing, viz.
molecular motion, and nothing which 1s not molecular mot~on
1s heat, so, too, being a person 1s being a kind of thing--
and for the materialist, that should be being a body ot a
certain kind, and nothing which 1s not a body of this kind
could be 8 person. We have it then that (18) 1s raIse, for
it claims that there could be persons which were not bodies;
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so muCh anyway on, what seems to me, the ~OBt plausible
assumptions. Perhaps this is just a way of reiterating
for 'person' the claim that Kr1pke and Putnam have made for
ter~ like 'water', 'tiger', heat, etc.: that they
behave like rigid designators.
Second point: If we grant that (18) is true, then it
seems that one can not reasonably discount the possibility
that actual people might not be ,bodies. HaVing a body is
not a prerequisite for being a person, as (18) admits,
Why then might I not have been such an entity, though this
1s perhaps physically not possible? If persom m1ght not
be bodies. what metaphysical necessity demands that I,
a person, must be one? The only poss1ble reason would be that
I am identical to my body and bodies are essentially bodies.
But to advert to this ls, to a certain extent, to beg the
question.
Further, (18) and the cla~ that bodies are essentially
bodies, seem jointly incompatible with a widely held v1ew
(one of the few) on the nature ot essential properties. The
view ls, loosely put, that aside from such lI·trivial"
properties as being self-identical (or being 1dantlcal with
Israel Krakowski), entities have the essential properties
which every object in the natural kind to which they belong
have and no others. On such a view, it some objects or
8 kind are essentially bodies. then every object of that
kind must be so. But (18) claims that there can be
189
persons who are not bodies, and hence, not essentially bodies;
though, on present assumptions, some persons--l.e., those
which are bodies--are essentially bodies. 8
To this last point, there is an obvious r~sponse "Feldman
might make. To be a person, he might respond, 1s not to be
any particular kind ot thing. 'Person' 1s not a "natural
kind,lI or "sortal" term; it 1s rather a terM such as, say,
'baseball player', or Ired object'. Thus, it 1s reasonable
to suppose that all baseball players are persons (or for a
materialist, bodies). but that there could be baseball
8The tor.mulatlon at this point needs to be tightened up
considerably, but th~ 1s not the place to do it. For a
nice r.resentation at a view at this sort, see: Bernard
Ene, 'Necessary Pl'opertles and Llnnean Essentialism,"
Canadian JP, Vol. V, No.1.
One problem with mJ formulation 1s that it must be
modified tor the case in which we have 8 hierarchy or kinds.
Hydrogen atoms. besides being essentially atoms, are also
essentially Hydrogen atoms, while Carbon atoms are not only
essentially atomB, but also essentially Carbon atoms. Simi-
lar points could be made with other hierarchies.
Could Feldman nov respond to my point about essential
properties by claiming that the person case 1s analogous to
the above? Perhaps, embodied persons are essentially bodies
as well 8S essentially persons, while possible disembodied
people are essentially disembodied as well as being
essentially people--analogously to the other hierarchies of
kinds. First or all, Feldman would have trouble with this
move since he has already rejocted on behalf of the material-
1st the claim that {actual)people are essentially people
(See Fn. 2).
In any case, there seems to be a crucial difference
between the person case and the others, though I am hard put
to articulate it precisely. It 1s the difference between
the relation ot 11on~J tigers, and even possible unicorns to
the general class ot animals on the one hand, and the relation
between embodied people and disembodied people to people,
on the other. The to~er stands as species to genus, and there-
fore, ro~ a hierarchy or kinds, while the latter does not.
There would certainly be something very fishy about saying
that' in this latter case. too, we have a hierarchy of kinds.
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players who were not persons (bodies) in some possible
worlds. But this 1s surely not incompatible with the cla1m
that 811 actual baseball players are essentially persons
( bodies) •
Baing a person, Feldman would claLm, 1s in this
respect like being a baseball player; it 1s not to be any
particular kind or thing. Hence. there 1s no incompatibility
between (18) and the cla~ that bodies are essentially
bod1es. 9
The trouble with this response, it seems to me, 1s
just the c18~ that 'person' 1s not a sortal. I certainly
do not have any criterion for distinguishing sortals from
other terms, but whatever criterion one uses, it surely
seems that 'person' 1s just 8S much a sortal term as any
other.
Could there be a reason tor denying that this 1s so?
Is it somehow that persons are not basic to our conceptual
scheme (whatever that precisely means) the way, say, bodies
are? That hardlJ seems true: persons seem as fundamental as
anything to our view or the world (one thinks naturally ot
Strawson in this context).
Is it because there are no scientific laws which
range over persons? But what ot economics, psychology,
sociology? Whatever criterion one uses, 'person' seems to
9 Perhaps this 1s jUS"t another way of saying that Feldman
respond that 'person' does not act like a rigid designator.
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qualify. So it seems that my original point stands.
And in rurthe~ support of this point, it seems easy
enough to describe a situation in which 1 might not have
been this or any body. Thus. imag1m that I am transmuted,
over a long period of time, into ghost stuff, retaining
all along the memories, personality traits, etc., that I
presently have. ll I would still be a person; wouldn't I
be the same person?12 Perhaps, it one does not countenance
leThe obvious exception to this 1s the view that the
only aortal terms are the "basic" predicates of physics--
e.g., Icollection of basic part1cleu', or What not. This
might be the view or someone who tht)ught that the only
things which "really" existed were t~hose mentioned in our
most basic physical theories.
It we did use this criterion, then 'body' would not
be a sortal term either; nor would being a body be an
essential property ot bodies, contrary to our present
assumptions.
~us, trom the point-or-view of physics, we would have
to identify a body with a particular set of atoms say. (Or
even Detter, an n-tuple ot such sets. one tor each instance
ot time in the personls existence.) But there are certainly
possible worlds in which that precise set of atoms would
not constitute a body. So the body--the set of etoms--1s
not essentiall,- a body_ This sort ot argument needs some
ob~lou8 tightening up, but the general point ls, I think,
clear.
llperhaP8, Feldman would respond tha~ in such cases,
one still had the same bod.,. (ghost stuff 1s still stuff' after
all). Though we grant this, (18) still claLms that there
might be persons without bodies; 80 whatever that 1s supposed
to amount to (I leave the lurid details to science fiction
butts), we are to 1maglne the present case as one in which
I am transmuted into a bodiless person as construed by (18).
l2Since, by hypothesis, I am being transMuted into what-
ever it 1s that (18) has in mind when it talks ot bodiless
people. Perhaps, such a transformation 1s physically
1mposs1ble, but it should certainly be metaphysically possible
if' (18) 1s true.
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the possibility of such bodiless entities altogether, the
answer might reasonably be no. But if with (18), WA do
countenance such ~nt1t1es, the above scenario sounds quite
13plausible. So again, it we accept (18), we should not,
contra our present assumptions, accept both that persons are
bodies and that bodies are essentially bodies.
Third point. Even if we disregard the above two
points, we have still not captured, by (18). the intuition
expressed when we say people might have have been bodies.
For this intuition, whatever its merits, arises most
naturally trom one's own casei trom the feeling, in my
case, that I might have existed without a body. Th1s is not
just the intuition that there might have been bodiless
entities, ghosts as it were, but the stronger intuition
that actual people might not have had bodies.
We need not, of course, accept this intuition at
face value; there surely 'may be ways or explaining it away;
but it 1s that intuition which needs explaining sways This
(18) has not done.
13There are two questions here. The first is what
properties a person might lose or gain and continue to
exist. This 1s what the transMutation story seems most
relevant to; it 1s the question of "personal identity."
When we speak of essential properties. however, we are
concerned with 'the (timeless) properties an object could not
have railed to have and the properties it could have
lacked while still timelessly existing' (To quote Krlpke).
What the above example should then be construed as
Showing ls, given the metaphysical possibility, persons
granted by (18), the metaphysical possibility that there be
a time at which I--a person who haa a body throughout his
entire ex1stence--do not have 8 body. This will suffice, I
believe, to make my point.
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The above three points are not demonstrative, though
I do find them cumulacively convincing. Let us, however,
recall the role we are presently attributing to (18). It is
to allow that (14) might be false, granting that bodies are
essentially bodies, while giving expression to the felt
contingency of the relation between persons and their bodies.
My point has been that (IS) can not reasonably be said to have
succeeded at this. That, therefore, the burden of proof
remains wit h Feldmane
3. ----The--at-s--ciifis--io-n- or---the--ab-ov-e--po!-ntassumed that bodies
are essentially bodies; w1thout this assumption, appeals to
14(18) are superfluous. I now turn to the question or the
nonessent1al1ty of bodies. The ·complementary question of
whether the materialist can claim that persons=bodles are'not
essentially persons (in notation: (x)(Px~(B~'OPx»). has
already been raised by Feldman on the materlal1st l s behalf
(See Fn. 2). The claim that they are not essentially bodies.
either, can also, cla1ms Feldman, be put to good effect by
the materialist. Let me note at the onset that this whole
discussion assumes the coherency of essent1al attribution.
Feldman contends that even were a materialist to
concede to Krlpke his lntu1t1on that Descartes might not
have been a body, (14) would still not follow and the
l4(18) is formally compatible with the claims that
persons=bod1es are not essentially persons, are not
essentially bodies, neither. or both of these.
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materialist still nl1ght contend that Descartes was identical
with his body. For the contrary would follow only if
being a body were en essential property of bodies; if it 1s
not then a situation in which Descartes 1s not a body may
merely be a sltuatjon in which Descartes' body is not
a bod~'. Compare: This man is identical with this baseball
player, and necessarily so., Yet, this man might not have
bean a baseball player.
I do not think such a v1ew can be demonstratively
shown false. Still. if a materialist were to use it to
defend bis materialisM, it would be, I feel, incumbent upon
him to justify it. Given that we are granting the coherency
of essential attribution, could it really be that a body might
not be a body? that, say, Quine's body might not be a body
and still be the same thing? Such a thesis is by my lights
prima facie false: there 1s no reason to believe it and
Feldman does not attempt to produce euch a reason.
To be sure, if one insists that Descartes is identical
with Descartes' body, and that. Descartes might not have
been embodied, it then follows that De~c8rtes might not
have been a body. But should we not rather make the inference
the other way around. it at all? That nothing could
possibly be Descartes' body which was not a body, and
hence, 1f Descartes can exist without being embodied, then
Descartes is not identical with his body?
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What would one think of the following (analogous)
argument tor the contention that not all planks of wood are
essentially planks of wood. This ship (assume I am
pointing to a wooden ship) is identical with these planks
or wood. This ship could have been, and still m~t be,
made of metal (or ghost stuff or whatever); in which
case it would not be planks of wood. Since the ship is these
planks of wood we can conclude that these planks of wood might
not have been planks of wood.
I take it this 1s not a reasonable argument. Aha!
Any ship materialist would realize that his view entails
that plarlks of wood are not essontially planks of wood (sayeth
Feldman). But 1s this plausible? If this example shows
anything, does it not rather show that these planks of wood
are not identical with this ship? (This discussion would
remain unaltered 1f instead or planks of wood, we had
planks of wood in a certain organization.)
I think it safe to say that Feldman has not presented
the materialist with a plausible position. All he has,
again. done. 1s shown that Krlpke has not proven his case;
that 1t we deny certain assumptions the conclusion no
longer follow. or course. But he has not given good
reasons tor denying the assumptions.
Feldman's exposition May read more convincingly than
it should because or the disputes that have revolved around
the notion of essential attribution. But these have dealt
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mainly with the coherenceof' the notion (which Feldman
apparently concedes). Thus, it may seem that any attribution
of an essential property 1s moot. But if the coherence
ot the notion is conceded, cer~aln attr1outlons are a lot
more reasonable than others; and one such reasonable one is
that bodies are essentially bodies.
4. This fourth, and last po1n~ will be a brief digression
to take up Feldman's other Major point. As we have just
seen, Feldman claims that Kripke must assume that bodies
are essentially bodies; if not, then the possibility of
Descartes not having a body does not entail the possibility
of Descartes not being identical with his body. But if
we grant this, claims Feldman, then we might just as well
use Lelbnltz's Law to get Krlpke's conclusion, obviating
the need for his argument. The Lelbnitz's Law argument
would be that Descartes~Descartes' body, since Descartes has
a property his body does not: possibly existing where no
body does.
Granting the validity of this latter -argwnent does not,
however, Make Kr1pke l s argument superfluous. One may
think what one will of essential properties, and yet·have to
deal with Kr1pke's argument; for in the formulation or that
argument, he does not advert to essential properties (in
defense of(14) or otherwise}.
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To be sure, Kripke does countenance essential properties
and appeal to them in response to those who deny .that bodies
are essentially bodies or persons essentially persons. But
doing so 1s not part of his original argument; it is only in
response to an objection, and it 1s the objection which
raises the issue of essential properties. Thus, we might
eschew all talk of essential properties and still be faced with
Kripke's argument.
Further, whether or not the Le1bn1tz's Law argument
makes Kr1pke's argument superfluous or not, that the issue
can even be put clearly in terms of Leibn1tz's Law
1s, in part, due to Kripke's analysis. Prior to Kripke's
argument, one might have heard a discussion such as this:
A: Descartes 1s not identical with Descartes' body,
for Descartes has the property of possibly existing where
no body does, while Descartes' body does not.
B (8 CIT): Your argument can not be valid. If it were,
we could also show that heat~ molecular motion; for heat
has the property -of possibly existing where no molecular
motion exists and molecular motion does not. But heat 1s
molecular motion. So the argument 1s invalid.
The virtue or Krlpke's argument is that it helps
disentangle these issues and see Why B1s response will not
do.
The Pain State/Braln State Argument
Kr1pke l s argument against brain state/pain state
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identity is formally analogous to his argument against
person/body identity: Let 'pl be a rigid designator of
some particular pain and let 'b
'
~e a rigid designator of
the putatively identical brain state. If b=p, thenUb=pj
but it 1s possible that b~pj therefore b~p.
Feldman again attacks the premise that pos\sib11 b~p.
For though we concede that there might be a world in which
this very brain state was not a pain state, it does not fol-
low, cIa1ms Fe Idman, that in such a world, this brai n state
is not identical with this pain state; for such a world might
merely be one in which this pain state 1s not a pain. Only
if pains are essentially painful would it follow that in such
a world, b~p. But Kripke has not shown this to be so, and
his conclusion does not, therefore, follow.
Krlpke 1s aware of this response and says (as quoted by
Feldman) : '
The difficulty can hardly be evaded by arguing
that being a pain 1s merely a contingent property
ot a, and that, therefore, the presence of b without
pain does not 1mply the presence ot b without 8.
Can any case of essence be more obvious than the
fact that being a pain 1s a necessary property of
each pain? Consider a particular pain
or-other senaat10n that youonca
had. Do you find it at all plausible that that
very sensation could have existed without being a
sensation. the way a certain inventor (Franki!n)
could have gxisted without being an inventor?
15Krlpke, Pg. 335.
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Feldman's response 1s that:
Any serious materialist should recognize that his
view entails that painfulness 1s never part of
the essence of a pain-event. Pain events are
experienced as they are only as a result of the
contingent laws of nature • • • these very pain
events J had the laws of nature been different, would of
course still have been self-identical, but would not
have been identical to anything that would, under
those circumstances, have been a pain event. Thus,
such events are not essentially painful. The very
same point can be put more straightforwardly by
saying that certain brain events are sU1ft that lt~
contingent that they are felt as pains.
If. then. it 13 open to one to reject tl1e assumption.
as Feldman does, that there are essentially phenomenological
events--e.g., that pains are essentially pa1nful--1t seems
the best Kr1pke can hope for 1s a stalemate.
Aft other argument mentioned by Kr1pke, though he
docs not go into detail. is that this very pain could have
existed without being a brain state. Feldman suggests that
the materialist respond to this by denying that brain states
17
are essentially brain states.
16Feldman, Ope Cit., Pg. 675.
17Another way the materialist might deal with this
1s by appeal to an analog of (18). All arguments made
about (18) would then go over to this case. E.g., such a
view would not do tor a CIT since it would entail that pain
(the state) is not identical to CFS, since it would
admit the possible noncoextenslv1ty of the two.
Since Feldman does not mention this possibility, I mention
it only here. Similarly, for the contention in the text
that brain states are only contingently brain states.
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Feldman's contention that the materialist can deny
that pains are essentially pains has, in particular,
received wide attention; I shall, therefore, examine it in
some detail below. Before doing so, however, let me
briefly note that a Feldman-type response does not work
against Kripke's type/type argument. (Feldman does not say
that 1t does.)
Particular pains, we are assuming, have the contingent
property of being felt as painful. But what of that
property? Given any physical property (of brain events,
their structure for instance) it seems possible for that
physical property to obtain and there be nothing felt
as pain; that is, without the contingent property of being
felt as painful obtaining. Since the properties are then
possibly not identical, they are, by Kripke's argument,
actually not. So this (mental) property is not identical
18
with any physical property.
To return to token/token identity. It appears that
Krlpke accepts Feldman's inference for, as we saw, he takes
it that the cla~ that pains are essentially painful, 1s
crucial to his argument (and also obviously true). If
so, he does h~self a disservice: he can, in fact, concede
(for argument's sake) that pains are not essentially painful
without doing his cause damage.
18Since Feldman does not consider type/type identity,
I shall not pursue this line of thought in detail.
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Intuitively put, my po1nt~1s this. Krlpke focuses on
the phenomenological quality of mental events. Conceding
Feldman's point will not, appearances to the contrary,
prevent his doing so; viz., instead of considering a
particular pain, Kr1pke could now consider the particular
event of that pain I s having the cont1.ngent property of
being painful. This event, if' ·physicalism is true, must.
also be physicalj but Kr1pke's argument will now apply
to" it.
Feldman's claim--just quoted--ls that it is only be-
cause of the contingent laws of nature that pains are
experienced as they are. Consider now some one particular pain
(you once had), IAbe' let us call it. This event, Feldman
asserts, has the contingent property of being experienced
19
as paln(r~l) (we may call this contingent property 'Q'),
just as a baseball player has some contingent property which
makes him a baseball player--the contingency of which
entails that this baseball player might not have been a
baseball player.
But Feldms"n l s move does not really avoid Krlpke' s con-
clusion: it merely postpones it. Instead of discussing pains,
and Abe, in particular, we can now discuss the particular
event of Abe's being experienced as pain, or put another
19
Feldman, 8S quoted above, talks as if 8 paints
being a pain 1s identical to a pain's being experienced as
paln(ful). From which I suppose we can conclude that he
believes that the property of being 8 pain is identical
with the property ot being experienced as pa1n(ful)e In
any case, I shall let the contingent property Q be the pro-
perty or being experienced 88 painful in this note.
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way, Abe's having the contingent property Q. Let us call
this event Issac.
Kripke could now argue that Issac is not identical with
any physical event; for given any physical event to which
Issac 1s purportedly identical (an IIFS' we might call it,
on analogy with ,'CFS') we could imagine that physical event
occurring without anything being felt as pain, that is, without
20Issac occurring. By Kr1pke's argument, Issac is then not
identical with the IFS, while 8 physicalist 1s surely
committed to Issac's being physical (since he 1s committed
to all events being physical).
Here I am assuming, of course, that there is such an
event as Issac, an assumption based on the (popular view)
view that tor any individual 1, and for any property of 1, P,
21there 1s an event or state of liS having P. And all my ar-
gument requires 1s the noncon-a.;roverslal part or the above
analysls--1.e., that the above gives a sufficient condition
for eventhood. It would be a very strange physicalism
indeed which required as one of its premises the denial
or this sufficient condition. And such a denial would be
of little use to Feldman. For he argues that Ucertain
brain events are such that it 1s contingent that they are
2°T.his intuition is certainly something the Contingent
Identity Theorists would agree to. It Is, on their view,
only due to the contingent laws of nature that Neurophysio-
logical events are experienced 8S they are.
21The most frrolific proponent of this view 1s Jaegwon
Kim; see, e.g., 'Events as Property Exemplifications," in
Action Theorz, Myles Brand and Douglas Walton, ads.
1bordrecht, Holland, Reidel, 1976), pp. 159-1?7~
203
felt as pain." Given this and Feldman's countenancing of
the existence of events, he 1s hardly in a position to deny
the existence of Issac.
Kripk~'s argument depends or1 the claim that, If • • • if,
the identity thesmware correct, the element of contingency
can n~t lief as in the ce5e of heat and molecular motion,
in the relation between the phenomena (heat = molecular'
motion) and the way it 1s felt or appears (sensation S), since
in the case of mental phenomena, there is no appearance
beyond the mental event, itself." This is what Feldman
denies: The mental phenomenon does have an appearance
beyond it; besides the phenomenon 1tself, there is thEI way
it contingently happens to teel. But this, I ~8ve argued f
merely pushes off the problem from the mental phenomenon to
the mental phenomenon's feeling a certain way, from Aba to
Issac.
My point so tar has been that Feldman's response sticks
him with an event--Issac--whlch a Krlpke-style argument shows
not to beph1s1~al. But perha.p~ Feldman could now defend
the pn~slca11ty of Issac analogously to his defense of Abe's
being identical to some particular CFS o
The defense might be that the 1magined possibility of
the particularly IFS occurring without anything being felt
as pain 1s due to the fact that it 1s only a contingent
property of the IFS (=Issac) that it 1s an experiencing of
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something as pain. What we are imagining is not the IFS
occurring without Issac, but simply Issac (= the IFS) not
being an experiencing of something as pain.
But again, this sort of move will not work. First, re-
call that Issac 1s the event of Abe's being experienced as
pain; now, could the event of Abe's be1ng experienced as
.pain not be an experiencing of something as pain? The chair
I am sitting on 1s black and contingently so; perhaps, it
is even contingently a chair. But could the state or .event
of this chair's being black (or being a chair) possibly
exist without being 8 state or event of something's being
black (or being a chair)? Such a view 1s doubtful to say
22
the least, and so, too, the analogous claim about Isaac.
It is even more dubious than the idea that pains mlgh~ hot
be painful.
Un1ntu1tlve or not, Feldman could, I suppose, stick to
his guns: Issac, he might say, a particular physical event,
is only 8 case of something's being felt as pain because of
the contingent laws of nature. Thora 1s some contingent
property (C) which it has in virtue of which it is an
event of being experienced as pain. If this were r1ght,
a Kripke-type argument would still not work.
22The problem here is not the ascription of contingent
properties to events. One can say that the assassination
at Sarajevo contingently has the property of causing WWI.
What would be implausible would be to say that the assassina-
tion at Sarajevo's causing WWI might have not consisted in
something's causing WWI.
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But, if Feldman would thus use this same sort of
response in the Issac case, we~could make, pari parsu, the
equivalent counterresponse; there is now 8 certain further
event,··1.e., Issac's having the contingent property C--let us
call this event 'Jacob'--which we can, in an analogous
manner, now argue 1s not physical. Either we stop positing,
at some level, these strange contingent properties, at
which point we can apply Kripke's argument, or we are in an
23infinite regress: Abe, Issac, Jacob ••••
And this would, I believe, be a vicious infinite
regress. It would entail the existence, in one person, of
an infinite number or contingently related neurophysiological
events. But a person's functioning brain and nervous system
exists for but a finite amount of time and have only a
finite number of, say, basic particles. If we assume that
there is a non-infinitesimal lower bound on the duration" of
a neurophysiological event and that each such event must
involve at least one basic particle, then it seems clear
that there could not be the required infinity of con-
tingently related events.
230r more awkwardly: SOMe particular pain, that pain's
being experienced as pa1n,(that pain's being experienced
as pain) 's being an event of something's being experienced
as pain. Probably, the most perspicuous way or putting the
sequence (due to Ned Block) is:
1. The pain.
2. lis being expe~lenced as pain.
3. 2'8 being an event or something's being
experienced as pain.
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Could, however, Feldman circumvent the viciousness of
the regress by claiming that the above argument 1s valid only
if we assume the events in question (Abraham, Issac,
Jacob • • • ) are distinct contingently related eventso That
if we assume that these events are logically, semantically,
or set theoretically related, then the existence of the
infinite serles of events: Abraham, Issac, Jacob ••• , is
no more strange than the existence of the infinite series:
• • •
my finger, the set containing my finger, the set containing
24the set containing my finger •
For Feldman, such a reply can not work; it 1s
incompatible, I believe, with his requirement that the
particular events (Abe, Issac, Jacob) have their corresponding
properties only contingently.
Consider, as an example, the clalm that each of the
events 1s related to the others by the relation of identity.
That ls, Abe, Issac, Jacob • • • are all identical to one
another and to some one neutral event--1.e., some particular
CFS. This would be an attractive line for one who thinks,
as Feldman does, that pains ~ experiencing as pains.
But recall that it 1s supposed by Feldman that Abe
can occur without being felt as pain; so Abe can occur
24One recalls Bradley's generation of an infinite
n~ber of relations given just one of the form aRbj to which
I have heard it very sensibly replied, "So what?"
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without Abe's being felt as pain. Then Abe can exist wlth-
out Issac existing: so Abe 1s not identical with Issac,
contra hypothesis.
So this sort of reply could not be used to prevent
Feldman's ~palement on the horn of infinite regress. And.
similar problems will attend any such attempt to avoid the
viciousness of the regress by taking the ralat10n between the
events, Abraham, Issac, Jacob
· · .,
to be some.(other)
logical, semanticsl, or set theoretic relation.
In sum, Feldman's position leads to a dilemma: slnc~ it
must allow for the existence of Issac distinct from Abe,
we can ask whether Issac is essentially an experiencing of
something 8S pain (as 1s most plausible) or not. If it is, then'
we can proceed to apply Kripke's argument to Issac. If, on
the other hand, it is not. we are caught in a vicious
1nf'1n1te regress.
And this dl1emna is not an artifact of my interpretation
or Feldman. It 1s intrinsic to his argument: the offspring
of his cla~ that for mental phenomena--e.g., pain--there
are appearances beyond the phenomena ltself--1.e., they only
contingently feel the way they do. For we may now enquire
atter the status of these further appearances.
25T.he validity of the argument depends on the validity
of the claim that where Q 1s a term ~or a property, ra,s
having (or being) Q obtains if a has (or is) Q1. This ~laim
,would be very hard to deny.
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CONCLUSION
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Conclusion
This thesis has examined the views ot two philosophers.
The result of this examination 1s that (especially) typel
type materialism Must, given the present state of philo-
sophical discussion, 8S represented in this thesis, be
tentatively considered false. The basis for this judg-
ment 1s that (1) the most cogent defense of this view I
know of, Lewis', has major flaws; and (2) there remains
unanswered a forceful challenge to materialism in general,
Kripke's.
~e flaws discerned 1n Lewis' views are varied. First,
we noticed that his relativlzatlon to context ot everyday
mental terms engenders problems. There are two ways of
analyzing" this move. The first, while preserving the
type/type character of Le~ls' claims, applies only to a
limited domaln, and 18 emp1r~Blly falsifiable. The
seoond, while ot unrestricted domain and immune trom
falsification, can no longer properly be considered 8 typel
type view. Both analyses run into trouble when we ask
whether they should be'extended to the more general case
ot theoretical terms.
We have also seen that Lewis defines 'pain' so that it
refers to a phJsical entity, but does not so define 'the
property ot having pain'. Dolng this engenders the
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problem, along with some other technical ones, that the most
crucial (it seems to me) property for a type/type materialist
to reduce, has not been 90 reduced. Similar problems are
seen to obtain tor Lewis' more general theoretical con-
siderations. Lewis does not define the kinds over which
the laws of special sciences make true, interesting
generalizations, so that they come out physical.
Further, when discussing Krlpke, we have seen that
his antimaterialist claims remain unanswered. Dwmmett's
line of attack isthat both Kripke's metaphys1cal!ep1stemic
and rigid/nonrigid distinctions, are properly construed
as distinctions or scope; and that. there ls, consequently,
no distinction to be discerned between proper names and
descriptions. Krlpke's arguments do not fall prey to this
line or attack.
Chomsky attacks 8 different aspect of Krlpke's
views. His maln argument 1s that Krlpke's notion of
essential attribution reduces to that of de d1cta necessity.
We concluded that Chomsky's argument has no force against
one who 1s already committed to essentialism.
F1nally, Feldman's critique aims d1rectly at Krlpke's
arguments against the claims that, each person 1s identical
with his or her body, and that each particular mental event
or state 1s identical with some corresponding physical
state or event. In the person/body case, his main thrust
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1s that we can account for-the contingency felt to obtain
between persons and their bodies in a manner innocuous to
materialism. I showed that Feldman's analysis ot this felt
contingency is not compatible with the other v1ews of
contingent 1dentity theorists, and that generally it will '
not do in its support of Materialism.
In the mental/brain state case, Feldman argues that
Krlpke assumes and depends on the claim that mental states
are essentially mental, e.g., that pains are essentially
painful. An~sumpt1on that the materialist need not and
should not make. It wac seen that this view of Feldman's
leads to 8 dilemma, either horn of which impales.
So, all in all, Krlpke's arguments have remained
unscathed.
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